Problematic Signs of God

February 9, 2010

I take it as part of human nature that we interpret the world through signs and symbols, and those of us with religious faith see events and images in the world as signifying the divine. We are also dangerously prone to see signs of God where none exist and, therefore, to draw dangerously false conclusions about God. I received an email yesterday containing a picture of ruins in Haiti in which a crucifix stood unmoved and undamaged after the earthquake. A caption accompanying the picture stated that God had left this crucifix standing as a sign that he remains in control. I can fully appreciate needing to take comfort in God’s presence amidst an overburdening tragedy and needing to find great hope in small comforts, but this well-meaning caption has it all wrong.

Read the rest of this entry »


Thiessen’s Faulty Application of Double Effect on EWTN

February 2, 2010

There are a number of things wrong in Raymond Arroyo’s interview with Marc Thiessen: the host’s happily unchallenging questioning style about a dreadfully serious moral issue, the way he uses viewer emails to set up a straw-man for his guest to brush aside, Thiessen’s strange claim that arguments against “enhanced interrogation” come from a position of radical pacifism, his failure to acknowledge the possibility of psychological torture, and his dismissal of critics’ moral comparisons of U.S. water-boarding with the water-torture done by the Khmer Rouge because “we did not submerge people in a box full of water.” I’d like to focus on Thiessen’s faulty application of the principle of double effect. Thiessen remarks:

When you kill an enemy soldier, your intent is not to kill the enemy soldier, it is to defend society. There is a double effect: the soldier is killed and society is defended. One is intended the other is not. The same is true with interrogation. When the interrogator uses a technique on KSM, he doesn’t intend to cause him harm; he intends to get information to defend society, and he doesn’t cross a moral line into torture, and so the principle is the same.

The principle of double effect does not apply in either of Thiessen’s examples. You might kill an enemy soldier intending to kill him or not intending to kill him. You might seek to immobilize him while foreseeing the consequence that he might die, or you might simply seek to kill him making every effort to cause his death. In both cases you may also intend to defend society, but having the intention to defend society doesn’t mean you don’t intend what you do in society’s defense. In the case of interrogation, the interrogator may intend to get information to defend society, but that doesn’t mean he doesn’t also intend to cause the one he interrogates harm. Indeed, he intends the one so that the other might follow. He intends to inflict physical or mental pain so that his prisoner will cooperate and give him information to defend society. Getting the prisoner to talk is an intended effect of the very much intended effect of pain. Double effect doesn’t work in these cases because we’re not dealing with two effects, one intended and good and the other unintended and bad. We’re dealing with two effects, both of which are intended. Arroyo fails to correct this error and so leaves his viewers with an erroneous presentation of an important principle in Catholic moral thought.


A Note on Narrative Identity

January 26, 2010

Richard Kearney notes in his book On Stories that when someone asks you who you are, you tell your story, and in doing so, you narrate your identity, “you give a sense of yourself as a narrative identity that perdures and coheres over a lifetime.” We take the fragmentary moments of our life and put them into a plot, desiring to make sense of life’s events as a unity. “Every life is in search of a narrative,” Kearney says.

The narratives we create and recreate may tell of individuals or families, nations or peoples, cultures or humanity as a whole. They may be small tales of the oppressed or grand legends of the great. They may be mythical or historical, religious or scientific. Each and every narrative offers a particular and different answer to the question of who we are.

Read the rest of this entry »


On Reading

January 25, 2010

The philosopher Paul Ricoeur compared reading a text to the execution of a musical score, an analogy that highlights the plurality of possible readings while keeping those readings situated in the text. Just as each musical performance of Tchaikovsky’s Violin Concerto differs from all others, even those others performed by the same musician, while still remaining true (or false) to the score, so too will each reading of Moby-Dick differ and realize new semantic possibilities of Melville’s novel. Each reading of a text and each execution of a score involves interpretation; each interpretation brings forth more than the intended and inherent meanings of the text and sheet. What the author and composer write functions more as a guide for interpretation than a dictator of meaning. Nevertheless, the reader has no more liberty to make the text mean anything he wants it to mean than the musician has the liberty to play impromptu melodies when performing Chopin. Reading is an exercise of pluralism, not relativism. It gives birth to a surplus of meaning, not its absence.


Today’s Hero, Tomorrow’s Villain

January 22, 2010

Henry’s position on the advocacy of some pro-life groups for Scott Brown makes sense, and I tend to agree with it. For better or for worse, Brown is now a nationally known figure, and some pro-lifers and organizations participated in his ascension. Whether he decides some day to run for president is unknown, but it’s not out of the question. If he decides to run, he’ll need to appeal to the pro-lifers within the GOP, and he can now point to concrete endorsements from pro-life groups to establish his credentials. He may not even need to pull a Romney and switch his views. After all, during the previous Republican primary, Rudy Giuliani’s pro-choice views were much more accepted on the stage than Ron Paul’s anti-war views. Brown’s win enhances that acceptability. I’m not saying pro-lifers had no good reasons to support Brown over Coakley, but their victory today could undermine their cause down the road. Certain issues of the day may be black and white, but the act of voting surely isn’t.  I wouldn’t celebrate yet.


The Human Factor

January 18, 2010

So I’m getting the sense that healthcare reform hinges on what happens on Tuesday when the voters of Massachusetts decide who will replace Ted Kennedy’s Senate seat. All the efforts of healthcare reformists, tea partiers, bishops, legislators, lobbyists, and everyone else with a stake in the healthcare debate have come to a point where the decisive action may well result because the Democrats decided to run the downright awful candidate Martha Coakley.

A lesson I draw from this is that an issues-centered approach to politics will, on not a few occasions, come to a crashing halt upon arriving in the messy, human, chaos of political reality. You might find a candidate with the right positions on all the right issues who looks likely to team up with other like-minded politicians, vote and see the lot of them elected to office, watch as your dream legislation is crafted, only to then stare dumbstruck as your hopes for those issues come crashing down because events or situations having little or nothing to do with those issues undermine the whole operation.

Read the rest of this entry »


Coercion and Torture

January 13, 2010

Despite my disagreement with his position on interrogations, I have to give credit to Marc Thiessen for at times using the term “coercive interrogations” for those controversial methods he believes do not reach the level of torture. Unlike the adjectives “enhanced,” “aggressive,” or “harsh,” which tell us next to nothing definitive about the interrogation methods, the adjective “coercive” has a clear-cut meaning.

Coercing someone differs from motivating someone, even when painful possibilities or realities are used as instruments of motivation. Motivation works with a person’s will. Coercion works to undermine it. Coercion forces one to act involuntarily, without volition or will. It forces a one to act contrary to their nature as a person, as a free moral agent.

We can distinguish coercive interrogation techniques from torture not because torture doesn’t involve coercion – it does – but because not all coercive techniques involve the infliction of severe physical or mental pain. Torture is one type of coercion.

Read the rest of this entry »


Distinguishing Two Gospels of Salvation

January 11, 2010

I have argued before that a materialistic and militaristic gospel of salvation pervades in our political discourse and that we find this gospel proclaimed even by those who also proclaim the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Of course, advocating the use of military force in defense of life and limb does not, in itself, mean the proclamation of this gospel. Rather, we find this “good news” witnessed to by those who uphold the instruments of war as the solution to the problem of evil, who treat the threat of evil in the world as essentially a material problem with a human solution, who seek salvation from evil by killing the evildoers.

Read the rest of this entry »


Hear Ye, Hear Ye, Hear Ye

January 1, 2010

What Gandalf, Aragorn, Galadriel and Faramir all knew when facing their temptation to take the Ring and wield it against the enemy was that using evil, even against evil, makes one evil. Slowly, perhaps, but surely. Evil corrupts and possesses; it destroys the conscience, the will, the soul. An act of evil begins the habit of evil until we become enslaved to it. We all know that the more we sin the easier we fall to sin. Tolkien’s heroes knew using the Ring, even for good, would destroy them: that they would not long have the power over themselves to keep the Ring only as a last resort or a hidden-away, rarely used necessity. I have often heard Tolkien’s tale used this past decade to direct people’s attention to the reality of evil and the necessity of facing it, but such is not the only lesson we might draw from The Lord of the Rings.

Alas, we have Marc Thiessen in National Review, like some panic-inducing town crier in Minas Tirith, urging we use the Weapon of the Enemy – torture, in this case – on terrorist Abdulmutallab and on any active (or suspected to be active, really) enemy combatant. His proclamation isn’t the dangerous advice of Denethor that the Ring should be used only as a last resort: no, he, and apparently many of our fellow citizens, wants torture used as a matter of routine policy, whether it’s thought to be necessary or not. In his words, “You make him tell you what he knows so you can prevent new attacks.” You make him. You break his will; you offend against his dignity as a matter of course. How quickly and easily we are becoming like Mordor.

These defenders of freedom and material salvation will have us enslaved to sin, a country of confused Gollums, conniving Sarumans, wicked Ring-wraiths, and doomed men. Who will free us from this spiritual prison they’re building?

H/T: Andrew Sullivan


John Crosby on von Hildebrand’s The Nature of Love

December 26, 2009

Personalist philosopher John F. Crosby, one of my teachers during my often reminisced university days, has written an introductory study to his newly published translation of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s The Nature of Love. In the first part of his study, Crosby goes over the basic themes of von Hildebrand’s ethical philosophy, and in the second part, he brings von Hildebrand’s philosophy into dialogue with the contemporary phenomenological work of Jean-Luc Marion.

Though von Hildebrand was one of the initial figures I studied when my academic wanderings took me to the well-lit but shadow-heavy halls of philosophy, I never considered myself a von Hildebrandian or a follower of this thought. Even back then, when I could entertain the idea of flirting with Thomism, I found him too much of a realist for my liking. Nevertheless, I welcome his contributions to philosophical knowledge, and, if I may dare to opine, being out of my element, I believe his legacy is best served by bringing him into dialogue with the larger phenomenological field. I’m thankful that Crosby has done this here. Others have as well. David Utsler, for example, has related the phenomenology of von Hildebrand to the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur. Perhaps we’ll someday soon see von Hildebrand receiving a fair showing at SPEP.


Driving is a Life Issue

December 21, 2009

If I were a less attentive cyclist, I would probably be dead, or screaming in pain, my fatless frame spread-eagled across some poor, inattentive driver’s hood. Not that some cars wouldn’t benefit aesthetically from my attractive body displayed across the front. The simple hood ornament is so very yesterday. Life-sized figurative car art: that’s the future.

Yeah, I almost got run over today. I almost get run over a lot of days, as the suburban drivers in the Dallas area raise negligent driving to an art-form. They all seem to follow the same illegal and unsafe rules, such as placing the back tires on the thick white line before an intersection. Very few people seem to walk anywhere; cities in Texas don’t generally seem made for pedestrian travel, and so drivers making right-hand turns can, perhaps, be forgiven for looking only to the left before turning. Thing is, I am often on the right, ready to cross, having the right of way, staring at the back of the soon-to-be-turning driver’s head who has no thought to the possibility of my existence. I could deal with people not knowing I exist when I was in high school. On the road? Not so much. So I wait, sometimes pretending to move forward while keeping myself out of harm’s way, just in case the driver happens to turn his head to gain a newfound appreciation for looking toward the exact spot he plans to drive over. I’ll always be a teacher, even if I’m not in the classroom.

Read the rest of this entry »


Two Kinds of Caring

December 19, 2009

The Christian martyr reveals a way of caring that’s incompatible with the kind of care urged by those preachers of political salvation I’ve talked about lately. At the heart of Christian martyrdom is a response of love not only to the revealed Christ, but also to the one who murders. The martyr says to her murderer, “I die for Christ who died for you.” She witnesses to the love of God in the sacred hope that her sacrifice will speak to her murderer’s heart and mind. She therefore cares more for her murderer’s spiritual salvation than for her own physical life. She cares more for the eternal fate of the guilty than for the temporal fate of her own innocent self. The preachers of political salvation, on the other hand, place their faith in the instruments of violence and their hope in human saviors. They love life, but it is the life of those they deem innocent that speaks to their hearts. For the salvation of the guilty, they have no care.


A Telling Example

December 14, 2009

Never having taken President Obama for anything resembling a peacenik such as myself, I wasn’t much surprised by his carefully crafted defense of perpetual war in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech. You don’t become the commander and chief by subverting the country’s military basic structures and policies since the end of World War II. We’ve seen so many military operations since then that I cannot reasonably imagine most of them meet the terribly difficult conditions for just war. President Obama considers our past sixty years of sacrificed blood and shown strength of arms as having justly “helped underwrite global security.” “The instruments of war,” he says, “do have a role to play in preserving the peace.” As he uses as his example for this alleged truth six decades marked by hundreds of military operations, we mustn’t interpret him as defending war as a last resort or in accordance with traditional just war theory. Yes, he references the concept of just war and speaks of all wars as tragedies, but he nevertheless plays apologist for permanent war. Saying war is sometimes necessary doesn’t rule out a constant state of warfare, which he defends with his example. “Evil does exist in the world,” he says, and war is his response to evil. Obama attributes to the U.S. instruments of war a permanent salvific responsibility; in doing so, he preaches an idolatrous political and material gospel of salvation.


Philosophers and Preachers

December 7, 2009

The philosopher is not a preacher. He may listen to preaching, as I do; but insofar as he is a professional and responsible thinker, he remains a beginner, and his discourse always remains a preparatory discourse.

- Paul Ricoeur

Would I be accurate in observing that many of our political pundits, commentators, and officials act more as preachers delivering Good News than as philosophers exploring questions? I suspect so. Much of what I see presented as political thinking, including from myself, bears greater resemblance to religious kerygma than philosophical inquiry.

I expect this, of course. That matters politicians and other political thinkers face are often urgent, temporally and ethically. Economic recessions, healthcare injustices, system breakdowns, military aggressions and the like may demand immediate responses. We simply don’t have the time for philosophers to sit back in their comfy sofas, sip some whisky, ponder the roots of these complex problems in their contemporary instances, write and published peer-reviewed works, and influence the thinking of those tasked with taking action in the public sphere.

Read the rest of this entry »


A Greater Triumph

November 17, 2009

Those certain that there’s no hope for committed jihadists to renounce their murderous ideology and no hope for the West but to destroy the jihadists would do well to read this fascinating piece by Johann Hari in which he interviews three ex-jihadists and one jihadist who remains unrepentant but is clearly burned by the “fire of certainty.” There’s much to digest in Hari’s writing, from the circumstances that led these people to embrace jihad to the affects of our foreign policy on their propaganda, but I was most intrigued and given hope by the small, seemingly insignificant moments that moved them to ultimately renounce Islamism. Read the rest of this entry »


Terrorism and the Language of War

November 16, 2009

Matthew Yglesias’ argument against responding to international terrorism in the manners and metaphors of war makes sense to me. He writes that in approaching terrorism within the framework of war, “you partake of way too much of the terrorists’ narrative about themselves.” He continues:

It’s their conceit, after all, that blowing up a bomb in a train station and killing a few hundred random commuters is an act of war. And war is a socially sanctioned form of activity, generally held to be a legally and morally acceptable framework in which to kill people. What we want to say, however, is that this sporadic commuter-killing isn’t a kind of war, it’s an act of murder. To be sure, not an ordinary murder—a mass murder—but nonetheless murder. It’s true that if al-Qaeda were something like the “blowing up train stations” arm of a major country with which we were otherwise at war, it might make the most sense to think of al-Qaeda as fitting in with spies and saboteurs; criminal adjuncts to a warrior enterprise.

I suppose if we didn’t think of ourselves as at war with terrorists, then we might be less likely to go to war against countries under the banner of that war on terror. That would be a good thing. I suppose as well that this debate about language would be less of an issue if we didn’t generally hold war to be a legally and morally acceptable framework in which to kill people. That would be a good thing too.


Not Panicking

November 8, 2009

We are free so that we may love and do what is good. Because of this, I find assertions and arguments that healthcare reform measures will diminish our freedom and should therefore be opposed to be less than convincing. We uphold the value of a free society not because freedom is an end in itself – it isn’t – but because a free society affords us the best opportunity to achieve the common good. And even in a society with the greatest possible freedom, restrictions on freedom would still exist and be necessary for the common good.

The idea that our public servants would require us to participate in a health insurance plan seems especially outrageous to some people, but even this idea, while I’m uncertain as to its prudence, doesn’t cause me much concern. We, through the institution of our government and other social structures, require each other and ourselves to do certain things in order for society to function effectively and justly. Generally speaking, we have to pay taxes, find and maintain employment, converse on telephones, use some means of transportation, get an education, shop at grocery stores, and fill out paperwork. Society demands a lot from us, and these demands place limits on our freedom, but, if our power to do the good is not diminished, we are not really less free because of these limits.

Read the rest of this entry »


Responsibility for One’s Philosophy

October 28, 2009

William Brafford over at The League of Ordinary Gentlemen remarks that “if you advocate for a political philosophy, taking responsibility means that you ask yourself: ‘what does it look like when this philosophy goes wrong?”’ I’d add that responsibility for one’s political philosophy also means recognizing that it was constructed by people in history and in response to particular political events and problems.

Political philosophers, like all philosophers, are distinguishable by not only the answers they give, but the questions they ask. As much as they responded to each other, Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine, for example, were exploring different questions and responding to different issues; they were not just giving their own answers to the same timeless questions or the unique questions of the age.

No political philosophy is the True Political Philosophy. None can be applied in all times, places, and circumstances. Even the best possible political philosophy will fail in its application. Even if pure, committed adherents to it get exactly what they want and the philosophy “goes right,” the philosophy will fall short, will exclude, will reach its limits, and will in some ways fail.

Responsibility here means taking responsibility — appropriately responding to — the limitations and consequences of one’s philosophy. Irresponsibility, then, means acting as though one’s political philosophy, if only applied rightly and by the right people, would be free of failure, limitations, or negative consequences.


Buffy: Slaying and Saving

October 26, 2009

This weekend, my wife and I finished watching Joss Whedon’s television opus, Buffy the Vampire Slayer, a show of seven seasons which had taken over our evenings. I now hope to get more reading and writing done after our son goes to bed. We just have to fight the temptation to watch Angel, Dollhouse, or, once again, Buffy.

We’d seen a few episodes of Buffy here and there and were entertained, but hardly hooked. It was not until we started from the very beginning and watched the series in order that we recognized Whedon and company’s masterful storytelling. We knew Whedon’s genius from seeing Firefly, but the world of Buffy hadn’t tempted us the same way. I still think the short-lived western in space is a better work of art than Buffy, but Buffy deserves the praise and popularity it’s received. The show is smart, mythological, metaphorical, genuinely emotional, funny as hell, and morally dramatic. Don’t let the cheesy title or make-up fool you; Buffy is serious literary art.

Read the rest of this entry »


Religious Hermeneutics at Comedy Central

October 14, 2009

Stephen Colbert treats a controversy over the placement of a cross on public property with his typical playful comedy, but he touches on some matters of heavy hermeneutics, namely, questions about whether and how subjective interpretations of the cross contribute to its symbolic significance. Does the cross have an essentially religious meaning or is its religious significance merely historical? Is it possible to remove the Christian meaning from the cross and attach only a non-religious meaning to it? Colbert dances around these fascinating questions. Perhaps his jokes point us to some answers.


Prayers for Kyle Cupp

October 1, 2009

Our own Kyle Cupp suffered the loss of his baby, Vivian Marie, last Thursday, September 24th. We at Vox Nova offer our deepest sympathies to Kyle  and family. He has posted a very moving eulogy on his own blog which is just…stunning in its beauty and sanctity. We invite you to join us in prayer for the Cupp family.

The Light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it.

Signed,

The Vox Nova Contributors: Matt Talbot, Henry Karlson, Sam Rocha, Radical Catholic Mom, Michael Iafrate, Kari J. Lundgren, Gerald Campbell, Mickey, Morning’s Minion, Brett Salkeld, Mark DeFrancisis and M.Z.


A Persuasive Sign, But How So?

September 14, 2009

According to Aristotle, the art of rhetoric aims at persuasion. The rhetorician seeks to motivate a change in belief or opinion. It is with this definition in mind that I shake my head at a sign apparently distributed by the American Life League that reads, “BURY OBAMACARE WITH KENNEDY.” Some thought might have gone into the sign’s use of alliteration; I’m not sure what the writer of the sign was thinking regarding its persuasive effect.

Read the rest of this entry »


Due Date

September 9, 2009

Today marks the expected delivery date of our daughter Vivian Marie, but her birth may be a few weeks away. This is a difficult day for us, both longed for and feared. We learned over Holy Week that our daughter has anencephaly, a rare and fatal condition. Statistics say that about half of the babies diagnosed with this condition make it to term, but those statistics may not be accurate as the typical response to anencephaly is abortion. We hoped during Holy Week and we continue to hope now that we’ll be blessed to share some time with Vivian. Anencephalic babies that survive the birth typically live a few hours to a few days. Vivian continues to be very active, kicking and twisting and bending and stretching. My wife and I want very much to hold her and comfort her and say hello to her before we’re forced to say goodbye. We want our three-year-old son to meet his sister.

The months since April have challenged us physically, emotionally, and spiritually as we’ve prepared for both her birth and burial. We’ve struggled with responding to people who in passing congratulate my wife on the pregnancy. What do you say? How do you say it? We’ve had to respond many times but still lack a definitive answer to those questions. Many people around us know about Vivian’s condition, and the support we’ve received from our family, friends, parishioners, neighbors, and even strangers has been an awesome blessing to us, but many others do not know and won’t find out until they see us post-birth with no baby in our arms. We’ve also faced uncertainty about what it means to be good parents to Vivian. We plan to baptize her, but we won’t be able to raise her in the faith. We won’t be able to educate her or play with her. We can’t fix her condition. We couldn’t have prevented it. Nevertheless, we have loved her and will continue to love her. We have suffered with her and will continue to suffer with her. She may not know us, but her not knowing us doesn’t prevent our presence to her. Whatever happens, we will be with her.

Read the rest of this entry »


Doubt, Discovery and Sadness

August 7, 2009

Missy Higgins – Where I Stood


Would You Ever Support an Atheist for President?

August 3, 2009

President Obama made headlines a few months ago after stating that the United States is not a Christian nation, but is also a Jewish nation, a Muslim nation, and, among other things, a nation of non-believers.  Much discussion and debate ensued about our national identity.  In light of the president’s statements and the response to them, I’d like to ask readers the question: would you ever support an atheist for president?  Why or why not?


The Wrestler

July 21, 2009

The other evening my wife and I took a break from our marathon through the Buffy the Vampire Slayer series to watch Darren Aronofsky’s film, The Wrestler. The movie stars Mickey Rourke as a professional wrestler 20 years removed from his glory days and Marisa Tomei as a stripper struggling to compete with the younger employees. Randy “The Ram” Robinson and Cassidy sell their bodies for people’s carnal appetites, but age and other things have taken their toll on business and their happiness. Randy has an action figure of himself on his dashboard, but he frequently has to sleep in his van because the trailer park manager has locked him out of his home.

The Wrestler is an existential film, one I’d likely show if I were teaching a class on Existentialism. It’s a harsh look at a man who may be running from or embracing who he is—we’re not sure. At least, I wasn’t sure. Despite the loss of prestige, Randy continues to wrestle in less than glorious settings, subjecting himself to punches, staple-guns, barbed wire, self-inflicted razor wounds, and whatever else pleases the audience—the people he considers his only family. He works part-time at a grocery store to help pay the bills, but while he shows up for work, he’s never really there. A heart attack midway through the film pushes him away from wrestling into retirement, at least for a while. Continuing his violent passion will probably kill him. So says a doctor. And when meager exercise takes a huge toll on Randy, a man used to being smacked around with ladders, he knows and we know the doctor is right.

Read the rest of this entry »


Time of Debate, Discernment, and Patience

July 9, 2009

Paul Ricoeur rejected as an illusion the idea that all the various levels of truth can be harmoniously situated into a singular philosophical system. In History and Truth, he wrote, “The ultimate meaning of man’s perilous adventures and the values which they unfold is condemned to remain ambiguous: time remains the time of debate, discernment, and patience.” John Paul II said something similar in Fides et Ratio: “No historical form of philosophy can legitimately claim to embrace the totality of truth, nor to be the complete explanation of the human being, of the world and of the human being’s relationship to God.”

Time is the time of the other, of fragments, and of hope for the unity of truth. Time will not see the construction of the final, totalizing philosophy nor the fragments of truth neatly fitted together. It will not see the end of inquiry and debate. Time will not see the pursuit of truth turn into a possession. Time, then, is a time for hospitality, a time to welcome the other, to listen to her stories and to share her perilous adventures.

Read the rest of this entry »


Father to Vivian

June 21, 2009

My wife and I learned during Holy Week that our daughter in the womb has a fatal condition called anencephaly; since then we have struggled to share with Vivian the little bit of life she has. My wife has done what she can to stay healthy, exercise, and eat well. She’s made our daughter birthday gifts to present to her at her hoped for day of birth. She’s felt her roll and kick in the womb, savoring those precious gifts from Vivian.

Prior to this experience, when pondering the meaning of fatherhood, I would have thought of showing my children affection, forming their character, teaching them their parts of speech, instructing them in the faith, or playing games of all sorts. I have been able to do these things and more with my son. My daughter will not likely have the opportunity to see me smile at her, hear my words of affection, or feel me holding her. Anencephaly doesn’t generally allow for such sensations.

I have come to the conclusion that what it means to be a father to Vivian is this: I am there with her, suffering with her, even if she cannot know me. Is this experience of fatherhood in any way akin to the fatherhood of God, who loves and weeps for his children? God doesn’t always get what he wants. He is our loving Father, not a cosmic engineer who prevents all disasters or fixes all breakdowns in the system. We certainly can’t fix our daughter’s condition. Nor could we have prevented it. It happened as many sad events happen. I love her and suffer with her, and therefore I am a father to her. I pray for the grace to be a good one.


Uninformed Comment

June 15, 2009

Much to my disappointment, I notice that I, on occasion, passionately hold opinions about matters of which I have little to no knowledge. On these occasions, when I come upon a view contrary to my own, I almost instinctively draw my sword, raise the banner, and launch a thousand ships, ready to battle in a fit of Homeric rage. Of course, my opponent has but to breathe the slightest breath in support of his position, and my sword is shattered, my banner is torn, and my fleet is lost to the stormy sea. I retreat and seek shelter in the labyrinths of Wikipedia or Google, hoping against hope that I might find some posthumous support for my uninformed opinion.

Read the rest of this entry »


A Fragment on Alterity

June 9, 2009

We Catholics talk a lot about truth, and we do so with good reason. Lately though, I written a lot more about something called alterity, a word a friend of mine thinks I made up. I’d love to take the credit, but I didn’t come up with the concept.

My fascination with alterity might raise a suspicious eyebrow here or there, for normally one hears the word alterity while treading those treacherous and poisonous swamps where dwell the dreaded deconstructionists, postmodernists, and other subversive philosophers. Yes, I admit, without reservation and without apology, that I frequent the company of these supposed enemies of truth. Indeed, they’re my kind of thinkers—they think about alterity. A lot.

Brian Treanor defines alterity as “that aspect of things, and others, that is (absolutely) unfamiliar, alien, or obscure.” Alterity refers to that to which we have no clear or direct access. Alterity itself cannot be spoken or heard, written or read. It is something that words and other human constructs cannot express. Read the rest of this entry »


Remember the Beanie Babies

June 1, 2009

I got my first job in 1996 while in high school, and I kept it through my college years. I have a lot of fond memories of working under the golden arches. Some days of the week I would open the restaurant and arrive at 4:00 in the morning; other days I would close and leave at 2:00 a.m. When the place was already exceedingly messy at day’s end, we’d occasionally engage in some late night food fights. My specialty was filling one palm with hot fudge, the other with hot caramel, and attacking the face and hair. Of all the memories, though, none return to me as frequently as those few occasions we sold Teenie Beanie Babies in the happy meals.

Whenever I hear the word consumerism I recall arriving at McDonald’s, two hours before we opened, to see cars already lining up in the drive-thru. I think of the drive-thru line a couple hours later, stretched out of the parking lot and down the street a couple blocks. I remember the police soon coming to direct traffic. Read the rest of this entry »


Metaphors Matter

May 15, 2009

A professor of mine once said, “If you want to understand a philosopher, study his metaphors.” Of all the lessons I learned in college, this advice may have been the most formative and influential. Someone could rightly accuse me of spending more time and energy writing about the metaphors we use in expressing our philosophies than I do writing about the content of our philosophies. I suspect that I’ve blogged more about the language pro-lifers use than I have about the life issues themselves. I’ve taken a road less traveled, and that has made all la differance.

Metaphors matter. They shape the way we see and understand the world. They are at play, sometimes unsupervised, throughout our encounters with reality. They set and reset the stage on which we act and respond to other actors. Read the rest of this entry »