Golly, Catholics! Think for Yourselves for a Change
I can only assume that outsiders scratch their scalps in bewilderment whenever, out of morbid curiosity, they pay a little attention to debates among Catholics about how authoritative some controversial idea is. The tiny insignificant squabbles concerning the merits of the idea often seem to clear the road and make way for the really important procession: a long royal train of arguments over whether or not an idea proposed by some self-defined religious authority binds the assent of all faithful Catholics.
To the outsider, it probably looks like Catholics approach the truth of an idea by 1) debating whether or not they need to get in line and 2) getting in line. This perspective glosses over a lot of nuance and skips over why Catholics recognize the authority of their religious leaders in the first place, but I can’t help but think there’s something to it.
A lot of the inside baseball discussions I’ve had with my fellow Catholics about morality, politics, and so forth have focused on arguments over the authoritativeness of a teaching or on demonstrating that a Catholic cannot hold some position or another without opposing the Church. These are not fruitless discussions to have, but if they comprise the bulk of our debates, then perhaps we’re getting sidetracked from matters of more consequence, such as the merits, rational-grounding, and truth of an idea.
Comments are closed.
Discussions I’ve had with lay and clergy about the new translations run along the line of being bad translations and bad theology, but we’ll do it anyway. We had the argument about the line, now we’re getting in it.
Very much agreed. I’m not sure that they are always “matters of more consequence”; I think the depends on the particular topic under discussion. But it certainly seems true that there is a passivity that can be fairly commonly found among Catholics of all varieties,one that takes different forms, but if not countered inevitably creates a tendency not to think. One finds it in Catholics who cannot grasp the idea that conclusions can be wrong, even dangerously wrong, even if the Magisterium has not definitely said so; one finds it in different form in Catholics who insist on claiming that every single thing they believe is Magisterially backed; one finds it in different form in Catholics who insist that bishops speak on this or that subject just because they themselves think it important, as if nothing could be properly recognized as important if the bishops didn’t speak on it; one sees it in different form in people who complain and complain about what the bishops say and do without, as far as anyone can possibly tell, doing anything to give the bishops viable alternatives; etc. And the problem really doesn’t seem to be a matter of intelligence, or of where one locates oneself among the conservative-liberal spectrum, or what particular topic is being discussed. It implies a deficient philosophical understanding of the authority of a teacher and the responsibilities of learners, but I’m not sure if such a deficiency is a cause, or if there’s an underlying cause leading people to act as if they held such a deficient view even if they don’t.
I’m not sure that they are always “matters of more consequence”; I think the depends on the particular topic under discussion.
Fair enough, though even if the particular topic is a question of teaching authority, this authority itself serves as a means to an end. Ultimately, it’s the truth of an idea, and not the idea’s support by a teaching authority, that should concern us.
When we’re talking doctrines about God and the world, yes; but practical policies and fiat-doctrines, i.e., the whole realm of economy in the theological sense, are a different matter. Some ideas get their validity and legitimacy wholly and entirely from the authority they have; they occur in contexts that call for constructions; and then verum-factum applies and authority is pretty much the whole shebang. And, of course, many contexts are mixed, with a little of both thrown in.
Brandon
Very much agreed. One of the provisions we need to remember is the limits of human reason and our ability to come to the truth by natural means. The level of authority (which is a wide range, to be sure) we find a theological truth helps us determine the value we must give in when engaging our pursuit for truth. Faith has to have some levels of authority in which one gives something a given, others as high level of authority which should, in general, followed, others a practical authority, etc.
Of course, in other fields, with faith, we still have to rely upon authorities for those areas we have no expertise.
Okay, but authority here also serves as a means to an end: legitimacy, validity, verification, a basis for believing.
Kyle, I confess I go back and forth on the best way to handle this point. Rosmini talks about the authority of the natural magisterium of reason, which makes a good comparison point, since any adequate account of authority has to have a place for it. Even though reason has truth as its end, the authority of reason is not so much a means to an end as it is reason itself to the extent that in making decisions it is a good end. At least, for us; it can very well be a means to an end for a higher authority like God, but we encounter the authority of reason as an end, and only then come to recognize that this authority derives from higher, and therefore potentially more authoritative, ends. Every matter, even, as Henry notes, the pursuit of truth, seems to exhibit authority this way insofar as it is practical, and the more practical the matter is, the more it rests on this authority. So I’m inclined to think of ‘legitimacy, validity, verification, and a basis for believing’ as both effects and signs of the authority of reason; but they are not what the authority of reason is for. Reason is authoritative not as means but entirely as end, even though it has its authority because it is a subordinate end ordered to more important ends like truth. I think you’re right that authority is a matter of means and ends, but I’m not convinced that it ends up being a means itself, rather than a way to look at certain kinds of ends. It’s final causality, not instrumental causality; and although final causes can also be instrumental causes, this is distinct from their role as final causes.
The only other option I can see is to make a distinction between intrinsic authority, which would be found in things like reason, and instrumental authority. But I’m not sure how it can be made consistently.
When it comes to liturgical stuff, it has always seemed to me less a matter of whether we Catholics think for ourselves or not, and more a matter of wanting to do what we’re supposed to. If we’re supposed to hold hand during the Our Father, then great! Let’s do it. If we aren’t, then great! Let’s not do it. Just tell us so we can worship God together as the Body of Christ. A few people would rather argue regardless, but not most people.
Maybe the question of authority comes up when we find that we can’t agree on the merits.
That’s how church authority has often historically operated.
Kyle, I think you’re on to something. It seems to me that the real value of authority, any authority, is that it allows the question of the truth of an idea to come to the forefront. (Without authority, humans are not actually very good at this. We’re far too self-interested.) At its best this is what the Church stands for. That’s why a Catholic education, properly done, is about the best education one can get. You’re completely right, however, to point out that we often miss this ideal.
Authorities are often too self-interested too.
Almost always, in fact.
And so we must always be vigilant. But my kids are better off with me around, warts and all. And I’m better off with the Church than without her, despite her less than exemplary record.
I would change the word order of that sentence, Kyle, so that it reads: “Authorities are too often self-interested too.” The problem with authority, as with institutions, is that their first priority (always unspoken) becomes self-preservation. No joke: the devil makes them do it.