Does Relativism Allow for Normative Terms?
Credible sources have forever told me that The New York Times is a bastion of liberalism, but now all of a sudden I’m confused because here’s Paul Boghossian on the Times website arguing against moral relativism and for the quest for moral absolutes.
I follow much of his argument, but he loses me with this:
What’s essential to “right” and “wrong” is that they are normative terms, terms that are used to say how things ought to be, in contrast with how things actually are. But what relativistic cousin of “right” and “wrong” could play anything like such a normative role?
Most moral relativists say that moral right and wrong are to be relativized to a community’s “moral code.” According to some such codes, eating beef is permissible; according to others, it is an abomination and must never be allowed. The relativist proposal is that we must never talk simply about what’s right or wrong, but only about what’s “right or wrong relative to a particular moral code.”
The trouble is that while “Eating beef is wrong” is clearly a normative statement, “Eating beef is wrong relative to the moral code of the Hindus” is just a descriptive remark that carries no normative import whatsoever. It’s just a way of characterizing what is claimed by a particular moral code, that of the Hindus. We can see this from the fact that anyone, regardless of their views about eating beef, can agree that eating beef is wrong relative to the moral code of the Hindus.
True, when the moral relativist says that Action X is wrong relative to Moral Code Y, the relativist is describing rather than stating a norm. However, when those who subscribe to Moral Code Y say that those who also follow this moral code ought not do X, they are making normative statement, even if the norm only applies to those who follow the code. The code described by the relativist may not be universally normative, but it can still establish a norm, a standard of right and wrong and a sense of how things ought to be for those who follow the code. The relativist position, as I understand it, is that there are no universal moral norms, not that there are no kinds of norms whatsoever.
None of this is to say that moral relativism is a tenable position. And maybe I’m missing why a relativist cannot posit a moral norm that is only conditionally binding.
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St. Paul was demonstrably a moral relativist. Therefore, it follows that moral relativism is a permissable, maybe even a divinely ordained, thing. Error comes in, I think, when Group A, which is bound by normative-to-A moral code Y, attempts to coerce conformity to code Y on members of Group B, who find code Y to be abhorrent, irrelevant, or just plain stupid.
All men will never agree upon “Thou shalt not kill.” But it seems to me possible that all men might be able to agree upon “Thou shalt not murder,” providing that they take care to first agree upon a universally accepted definition of the word “murder.”
Please demonstrate.
Which aspect would you like to have demonstrated? Please pose a question regarding the above, and I will make my best effort to provide an answer to that question.
St. Paul was demonstrably a moral relativist.
Would you please demonstrate?
One set of moral rules for Jews, re: dietary laws and circumcision; an equally valid set of different rules for converts to Christianity–those issues which he got into Peter’s face over. And also, just generally, that he wrote of being all things to all men:
1 Corinthians: 19 Though I am free and belong to no one, I have made myself a slave to everyone, to win as many as possible. 20 To the Jews I became like a Jew, to win the Jews. To those under the law I became like one under the law (though I myself am not under the law), so as to win those under the law. 21 To those not having the law I became like one not having the law (though I am not free from God’s law but am under Christ’s law), so as to win those not having the law. 22 To the weak I became weak, to win the weak. I have become all things to all people so that by all possible means I might save some. 23 I do all this for the sake of the gospel, that I may share in its blessings.