A Crisis of Legitimacy
As a young man, author and blogger Dmitri Orlov witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now living in the United States, Orlov detects many of the same signs of economic, social and political disintegration that he saw in his homeland during the late ’80s and early ’90s. I’ve recently re-read Orlov’s book, “Reinventing Collapse: The Soviet Example and American Prospects.” It’s an eye-opening book. Borrowing from the famed five stages of grief described by psychologist Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, Orlov has defined what he calls the “Five Stages of Collapse:”
Stage 1: Financial collapse. Faith in “business as usual” is lost. The future is no longer assumed resemble the past in any way that allows risk to be assessed and financial assets to be guaranteed. Financial institutions become insolvent; savings are wiped out, and access to capital is lost.
Stage 2: Commercial collapse. Faith that “the market shall provide” is lost. Money is devalued and/or becomes scarce, commodities are hoarded, import and retail chains break down, and widespread shortages of survival necessities become the norm.
Stage 3: Political collapse. Faith that “the government will take care of you” is lost. As official attempts to mitigate widespread loss of access to commercial sources of survival necessities fail to make a difference, the political establishment loses legitimacy and relevance.
Stage 4: Social collapse. Faith that “your people will take care of you” is lost, as local social institutions, be they charities or other groups that rush in to fill the power vacuum run out of resources or fail through internal conflict.
Stage 5: Cultural collapse. Faith in the goodness of humanity is lost. People lose their capacity for “kindness, generosity, consideration, affection, honesty, hospitality, compassion, charity” (Turnbull, “The Mountain People”). Families disband and compete as individuals for scarce resources. The new motto becomes “May you die today so that I die tomorrow” (Solzhenitsyn, “The Gulag Archipelago”).
Whatever your view of Orlov’s “Five Stages” or how it may apply to the United States, it is clear (to me, at least) that we’re at the vector intersection of multiple converging crises, from the immediate threats of debt, default and depression; to the ongoing problems of war, terrorism, and energy insecurity; to the gathering storms of climate change and global resource scarcity. The fact that few people today, on either side of the political divide, believe in the capacity of political elites to deal effectively with these problems points to a deeper, more profound crisis: the collapse of institutional legitimacy.
Legitimacy is to a political system what investor confidence is to a financial system: the glue that holds the entire edifice together. In the words of political philosopher Dolf Sternberger, “legitimacy is the foundation of such governmental power as is exercised both with a consciousness on the government’s part that it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of that right.” In his groundbreaking work on democratic government, Political Man, American political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset wrote:
The stability of any given democracy depends not only on economic development but also upon the effectiveness and the legitimacy of its political system. Effectiveness means actual performance, the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of government as most of the population and such powerful groups within it as big business or the armed forces see them. Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society. The extent to which contemporary democratic political systems are legitimate depends in large measure upon the ways in which the key issues which have historically divided the society have been resolved. While effectiveness is primarily instrumental, legitimacy is evaluative. Groups regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit with theirs.
Max Weber, the German sociologist and economist, identified three sources of political legitimacy: charismatic, as in the legitimacy conferred on populist dictators; traditional, as in the legitimacy conferred on monarchs by long-entrenched habits of mind; and rational/legal, as in the legitimacy conferred on secular democratic systems based on the rule of law, equal representation, and other democratic procedural values.
Political legitimacy in the United States rests on the deep attachment of the American people to their Constitution (rational/legal), as well as the mythological superstructure embedded in conventional interpretations of the nation’s founding and history (traditional). The general precondition for political legitimacy in the United States was uniquely defined by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence, when he wrote: “That Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government …”
The key phrase in Jefferson’s famous passage, above, is “whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends.” Today’s crisis of institutional legitimacy derives from the widespread conviction – again, present on both left and right – that our political elites and the system they embody are not merely ineffectual and incompetent, but positively destructive of the rights of citizens. This summer, Americans in large numbers may well be concluding that while our present “Form of Government” was sufficient for securing our rights in the past, it has now failed to do so catastrophically, and that the events and figures of our present represent a decisive break with our history. If that happens, both the traditional and rational/legal sources of legitimacy will have been undermined, perhaps irrevocably, creating the conditions for a root and branch rejection of the present system. Such a development would represent a kind of political “event horizon,” beyond which lies accelerating social conflict and either collapse, revolution, or dictatorship.
All of this was a long time coming, and probably inevitable given the lies we’ve told ourselves for much of our history. Most of the deformations in our national character spring from the conception of America as a “shining city on a hill,” a nation set apart, enjoying a divine dispensation from the vicissitudes of history. That notion, always false, may soon be decisively contradicted by history itself. Over the course of two hundred and thirty years we have become a great power, a global empire. But every empire that rises also falls. And the situation we face today fits neatly into the many of the historical conditions that marked the tumble of all great powers: foreign overextension, debt, inequality, cultural excess, political-structural failure, and the loss of institutional legitimacy. This year and next, Americans may discover to their surprise that there are no exemptions from history or human nature, and that reports about a shining city here below were, quite simply, fanciful.
I’m not sure exactly where we are in Orlov’s Five Stages of Collapse, but it seems to me that the trending is very serious, and perhaps irreversible. Or, as the poet Bob Dylan once put it: “It’s not dark yet, but it’s getting there.”
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Political legitimacy in the United States rests on the deep attachment of the American people to their Constitution (rational/legal), as well as the mythological superstructure embedded in conventional interpretations of the nation’s founding and history (traditional).
This Enlightenment anthropology of the American political philosophy was always, and in every respect wrong about human nature. People are “attached” to other people, not to documents, and rulers who have “legitimacy” are those about whom their subjects feel that, in some true, incalculable sense, they LOVE them. The life and career of the Dalai Lama and his enduring relationship with the Tibetan people proves that to me. Both the Communist and the Capitalist systems (the latter dearer to American culture than the documents you refer to) are predicated upon a total avoidance of the compassion that is central to the Dalai Lama’s view of politics; despite all the tribulations of the Tibetan people–some actually CAUSED by his youthful political naivete–he still has “legitimacy” with them. Those heretical and wrong-headed documents you write about are now meaningless in the multiple crises faced by the Americans, who are heading toward a “Revolution of the Right.”
Mark – great post, and I agree that we’re probably facing imminent collapse.
One thing I would add, though. When you say:
I would put large amount of the blame for this on the corruption of the system by a bunch of people whose wealth exempts them (or at least, so they believe) from the effects of collapse. I think they are in for an unkind awakening from such hubris, but that’s a post unto itself.
I think most people who are paying attention detect a profound disconnect between the actions our current crisis calls for, and the actions being undertaken by both political parties in DC. My own take on it is that the Democrats have been corrupted by the Game-Riggers at the top, but the Republicans…well, there’s no real corruption, since This Is Who They Are.
This kind of corruption is only ever destroyed by popular uprisings, or else it destroys the societies infected by it. The evidence suggests that the latter possibility is the more likely one. In a country with thousands of nuclear weapons, the prospect is pretty grim. We’ll see what happens. I still have some relict hope – that Lincoln was right, that you can’t fool all of the people all of the time.
“Despite an elite education, effusive charm and brilliant wit, Barack Obama, like Bill Clinton before him, has ended up betraying his humble origins by abjectly serving the most rapacious variant of Wall Street greed. They both talk a good progressive game, but when push comes to shove—meaning when the banking lobby weighs in—big money talks and the best and the brightest fold.” Robert Scheer, from today’s column on truthdig.
I agree with your post Mark and your comment Matt. Looking at the spiritual aspect of our human history it appears that chaos will always appear as the symptom of a system whose foundational values rest on greed, gluttony and power no matter how many social programs are developed to give token help to the disadvantaged. The money trail reveals what is in the heart of man.
Aeh, we used to have money panics and depressions ALL THE TIME. Not to mention fairly substantive changes of political party. When was the last time you ran into a Whig?
Read American history of the 19th century. You’ll be amazed how much shenanigans and reshuffling can go on without actually breaking the American system.
I am relieved to learn that the American political system is infinitely elastic, even indestructible. I really should study 19th Century American history more closely.
I’m wondering if we’re on the verge of a fall from grace, or more appropriately from alpha-dog status, set up perhaps by the very myth of exceptionalism. If this is the case, I just hope and pray we don’t take the whole world down with us.
This may be a bit of an explanation as to why the partisan vitriol has reached such a fever pitch. Or might it be an unusually nonpartisan echo of the apocalyptic hyperbole coming from the political parties?
What hope might the church have to offer here?
I think theory is overrated in its predicative value. Way overrated. And it’s easy to get sucked into an illusion of control by emphasizing seeming patterns of history.
Why study history at all, Liam, if not to draw lessons from it? If there are no patterns in history, then it really has nothing to teach us, does it?
Actually, mostly history merely provides a data point in the present for the future so that our successors may get a better sense for how we viewed the world (with the past as grist). And I say that as someone who was trained in history. Past performance is not indicative of future results….
I grew up in the 70′s. We experienced all five types of collapse, and many people were doubting the future of America. Did everything fall apart? No. Did everything turn around? No, but some things did. (And some things got worse.)
I’m not persuaded that we’re facing an event horizon.
Then again, I’d feel a lot more optimistic if I didn’t see so many signs of cultural collapse.
Pinky, I’m sure you’ll disagree (as I did for a long time), but some would say that beginning in 1980 we only doubled down on the self-delusion of American exceptionalism. “Morning in America” was enabled by the return of cheap energy – mainly in the form of major discoveries of oil in the North Sea and Mexico, deposits now nearly depleted – and a fatal accommodation to the deregulation and financialization of the American economy. The result, as we now know, has been the evisceration of our manufacturing base, the rise of the low-wage “service economy,” a massive accumulation of public and private debt, and near-Third World levels of income inequality.
Mark, there was a perceptible shift in subject there.
The original points (the five stages) deal with faith in institutions, a subjective thing. The reply you just made to my comment deals with quantitative measures of the economy. If we stick to the original premise, you’re correct in pointing out that the 1980′s through 2001 saw a return of American confidence in institutions. While I don’t think you can overlook the underlying structures of the institutions (and we could discuss those at length), this article seemed mainly concerned with American faith in those institutions, and that, as I said, has varied historically and is not obviously beyond repair.
Most striking to me are that the currency has recovered from its post-gold standard inflationary period, and that faith in the presidency and judiciary has recovered from its post-Watergate lows. New problems have arisen in both areas, no doubt, and problems have waxed and waned in other areas. But institutional success always looks like imminent institutional failure. It’s like plate-spinning. It requires faith – not in the spiritual sense, but in that it’s always close to catastrophe. Maybe “hope” is the better word.
I guess my point – to return to the original premise – is that although confidence in American institutions did recover during the 30 year interregnum between 1980 and the present, the policies and personalities that drove that revival are now being revealed as elements in a monumental confidence game, one greased by cheap energy and debt. In the 1970′s the system was not only broken, but obviously so. It’s my contention that the system is still fundamentally broken, but that our options for embarking upon new decades of self-delusion have finally run out. The American people are being confronted with the truth that this is who we are and in fact who we’ve been all along.
I hate seeing a partisan tint added to what is clearly a post-partisan reflection. Whatever the CHANGE so many of us made the object of our HOPE just a short while back, it is clear that the system could not deliver it. Business as usual has not only been bad for business itself; it has been truly catastrophic for the poor and marginalized. Meanwhile, those whom many Americans expected would make the Wretched of the Earth their top priority have focused instead on pandering to well-heeled interest groups, even recasting members of those groups as suffering victims. I doubt this country will survive the lifetime of my own children. I only hope what replaces it will be better for their children.
I agree, Ron, and have strenuously argued that a post-partisan position is the only one that can credibly be taken by Catholics who seek to apply the whole, authentic teaching of the Church to every aspect of their lives, including politics.
Great post. I’m not completely certain that the west is on the brink of collapse, but I do certainly think it is in decline. How far it declines will depend on how messy the fallout is. It is distinctly possible that complete collapse will occur in our generation. For my children’s sake I hope that never happens.
This is really the inevitable consequence of capitalism. Capitalism’s natural end is totalitarianism; its natural effect is that the rich get richer, creating a gap of dependency by which the masses rely on a few select entities; competition has been destroyed, and those entities now control the supply chain. That’s why regulation is required – to ensure the scales always remain in balance and that monopolies are never created. Deregulation is the catalyst for collapse.
What scares me is that the intrinsic protections built into democracy, in which people have the power to alter or change the government, don’t work in a global economy or techno-cracy. Don’t like the government? Go ahead and overthrow it. But if you want real change, you’d better figure out how to buy oil to heat your home or drive your car to work, as the oil barons in the middle east don’t care for your principled government and will expect the same provisions and rights they currently get, or you’re cut off. Same thing with any other international trade partner. Either become a completely self-contained entity or play by their rules. There are no other options.
Therefore, any government you instill must always be corrupt in a corrupt world. The world requires it for survival.
I apologize for the time it took for your comments to appear. I’m the new guy, as you know, and I forgot that I have to actually approve comments below my posts. I’ve been refreshing the page for two days wondering why no one had commented, until I remembered just now …
I’ll get used to it, I promise.
On the larger question presented, it should be noted that Russia and the United have quite different socio-political histories. The main things they have in common are:
1. A continental scale of manifest destiny (in Russia’s case, however, tt was eastward, mostly in the 17th century, and while in the US it was led by interests of trade, the plantation and settlement phase lagged by comparison)
2. A continental scale of human and natural resources
But Russia’s history is one where elites were constantly shredding the organs of social trust, for centuries. Also, it’s trade and economic system has not been as globally focused as that of the US (in fact, it was very inhibited in that regard for centuries – and not only trade, but people – I think Americans would be astounded to realize how long Russians were *forbidden* to emigrate!). And, lest we forget, Russia is not even now a nation that has collapsed into insignificance.
China from the mid-19th century to mid-20th century is an interesting case: a continental scale of human and natural resources that went briefly (in the context of its history) into collapse. But China’s history is one of constant collapses and rebuildings. (Contrast, say, Mesopotamia since the Mongol invasions, when its history of rebuilding finally ended after a few millennia).
One might contrast Britain and Japan, for example, with Russia, China and the USA in terms of scale of natural and human capital available for rebuilding after collapse.
Anyway, going back to recurring references in popular culture to the collapse of the Roman empire, if our current state of affairs has a precursor, it’s not Rome AD410, nor Rome AD235, nor Rome AD180. It’s more like Rome in the second half of the second century BC: when Optimates and Populares consolidated conflicting centres of power by mobilizing different dimensions of society. Think of the Gracchi and Marius et al.