Ficino on Those Who Die as Infants
Perhaps some Platonist will come up with the following conjecture. If God created minds for the sake of the first light, and if they are made ready to acquire that light both by knowledge of the divine goodness but most of all by love of it – given that knowledge forms them thence with splendor (lumen) and love re-forms them hence and thither with light (lux) – it is probable that justice divine wishes absolutely none of the minds to be lacking in any faculty and occasion for knowing and loving God forever. But because both knowing and loving have been withheld by the malign necessity of fate from many who die before the use of reason and again from those who are stupid from the onset, it is appropriate that divine providence compensate them for such a faculty, either in this life on some occasion and in some marvelous way, or at least in another life, lest someone be deprived of the principal end of [our] species without any fault of his own. Accordingly, with the souls of these [infants and idiots], though it never happens here [on earth], yet when they are released from bodies and dwell in that splendor we have described and recognize the Creator in His creatures, they are set ablaze step by step with such an ardent love of the Creator that they are made ready to receive the light itself at an appointed time. At an appointed time, I say, because only the angelic minds, all of them being in eternity, either advance or fail to do so in a moment, but souls which already in a natural way turn aside toward temporal things enact their own work in time – for a longer time in the body, but for a much shorter time outside the body. They do so in a moment only when they have been wellnigh transformed into the angelic nature. But if souls confined to the punishments of purgatory, though they are in a much worse condition and location, nonetheless arise again even to blessedness, then it should not appear surprising that souls placed in the middle region of painlessness, closer as it is to blessedness, can advance all the way to blessedness. Philosophers have formed these opinions in the main about infants.
Marsilio Ficino, The Platonic Theology: Volume 6. trans. Michael J.B. Allen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 211-13.
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I posted this for the Western celebration of all souls.
…the malign necessity of fate…
How does such necessity square with an omnipotent creator?
Why must we always assume that our castle in the sky is the true Camelot? Perhaps our perceptions and biases are what deceive us; is it necessarily less perfect that an infant who has not reached the age of reason cannot be perfectly happy in “perpetual infanthood”, or that a mentally disadvantaged person cannot be perfectly happy in a more perfected state of “blessed idiocy”?
I’ve always wondered why we all seem to take for granted that people somehow magically transform into some “better” version of themselves when they get to heaven. Wouldn’t such a “better” version be virtually unrecognizable from the original subject – to the point that you could no longer identify such an individual as the selfsame person? For example, if Sally has down syndrome, we all naturally assume she would be transformed into a fully functional human, but if that was the case, her new and improved version would be ultimately unrecognizable from her old self – neither her family or even herself would be able to reconcile the differences. Her essential personhood would be lost – she would be destroyed, and a surrogate created on her behalf. Her down syndrome makes her who she is. Without it, she is someone else.
As a corollary, if such transformations are indeed possible – such that our essential personhood on earth is lost and replaced by some new perfected personhood, then purgatory becomes a needless exercise in torture by a cruel God.
Dan
Am I, as a child, a different person than I am as an adult?
This passage seems to be particularly pertinent to “David’s Children,” as I have decided to call them. They are the majority of human beings, but the ones who die within a few days of conception. Pro-lifers get furious when I bring them up. So far I have managed to get one person to say they deserve to be prayed for. People assume if you bring up the topic, you are arguing, “Since so many die naturally before birth anyway, abortion is no big deal.”
How does such necessity square with an omnipotent creator?
Antonio,
This is a very good question. But as I have pointed out, the Church does not claim to have the answer. In fact, the Church cannot say what the fate of all of these human beings is. It just tells us we can hope they are saved.
I argued over on Mirror of Justice that if the majority of human beings are not like us (never have brains, for example), then realizing this causes a change in perspective not unlike the discovery the earth was not the center of the universe. Nobody bought it.
David,
Yes — it explores, in brief, the topic you bring up. Ficino comes to it with a Plaotnic vision, which is understandable since his work is as a Christian Platonist, and as one of the most thoughtful ones from Christian history. His exploration continues also with his explanation of the “stupid” which would, of course, be a group of people who do not have normal mental capabilities. Of course he believes that they do have them, though it is wounded in history; that the body, in a way, is hurt in such a way as not to allow them proper use of their spiritual faculties. This is an important insight which I think can be explored further on its own.
Dan,
I used to know a Christian Brother who speculated that continued existence after death was just “more of the same.” On the other hand, C. S. Lewis in A Grief Observed seemed to believe something quite different:
David,
Very interesting quote, I will need time to digest it.
Henry, you tricksy pixie, you responded to my question with another question. But your question still does not adequately address the case of mentally challenged individuals.
Dan
Yes, I did. Sometimes, in order to answer a question, the one being asked the question needs to know more about the one who is asking the question in order to know how to respond. In this way, I asked a relevant question. If an infant and a person at the age of 21 can be seen as the same person, where the infant’s mental capabilities are not the same as the person at age 21, then there should be no problem. But if you want to say they are not the same person, then we can begin to ask if anyone will be the same person in heaven, because every moment will a new person make.
Henry,
The distinct impression I have of Catholic teaching about the afterlife is that in terms of determining a person’s fate, nothing significant can happen after death. If you die in a state of grace, you are saved. If you don’t die in a state of grace, you are damned for all eternity. Something very fundamental seems to become permanently fixed and unalterable at the moment of death. So if that is true (and I am not sure why it should be, really, if one continues to be a person with intellect and will after death), what limits does that put on the afterlife of persons who die so early (or lived in such a drastically impaired state) that they never really participated as functioning persons in life on earth?
David
It is much more complex. On the one had, who one is in life, and what one has done in life, is intimately connected to one’s eternal life. However, as Jesus pointed out in his message, often who one is — often becomes a surprise to the very person themselves. Their response to grace in this life might be hidden (leading to Rahner’s anonymous Christians). More importantly, though eternal life is connected to who one is here, it is not one without change — it is theosis, which is an ever-increasing improvement of oneself. Lewis’ end of Narnia does a good example of this, as does Gregory of Nyssa’s Life of Moses. Moreover, accidents which might have serious affectations of one here (dying when too young to have intellectual ability; having a head blow which makes one brain dead; being mentally challenged due to physical problems) does not define one, though it might limit how one expresses who one is in a temporary setting. This is the point I am trying to make with the discussion of how we change in life.
Henry,
But here is then Cardinal Ratzinger making a point about human persons in an attempt to make some sense of the doctrine of original sin:
Now, if “[h]uman beings are relational, and they possess their lives -– themselves -– only by way of relationship,” one might ask in what sense a human organism incapable of having human relationships (as, for example, an fertilized egg or early embryo) is a person at all.
It seems to me that all of us who grow to maturity started out as partly a blank slate and partly a bundle of genetic propensities. When we reach a certain age, presuming we are not in some way grossly impaired, what is on the slate becomes our own responsibility. But the early embryo never gets anything written on the blank slate, and never gets the chance to try and shape what is on the slate, since it is forever blank. They would be all nature and no nurture.
In their opposition to same-sex marriage, the Catholic Bishops constantly insist that every child is entitled to a mother and a father, but the early embryo has no mother and no father except in the purely biological sense. Consequently, if it really is true that life (personhood) begins at conception, and if it really is a scientific fact that 60% to 80% of embryos die before viability, then the majority of human beings are deprived by early embryo loss to what the bishops say every child has a right to.
As Antonio asks, “How does such necessity square with an omnipotent creator?”
It seems to me it must be admitted that God’s plans for the majority of the human race are mysterious, unknown, and perhaps unknowable.
David
I think there are indeed many mysteries, to be sure, but I also think there are ways to look at it (like Ficino) what seem plausible.
I think some readers here would be very interested to read about Miroslav Volf’s theology of the last judgment. It is, in my view, sublime. It comes out in his classic Exclusion and Embrace, but also in many articles.
As a side note, and not to have this go off the rails, I find it hard to imagine a better example of how humans live only “in relationship” than that of a pregnant woman and her unborn child.
brett,
Agreed about the pregnant woman and child!
David said:
“Now, if “[h]uman beings are relational, and they possess their lives -– themselves -– only by way of relationship,” one might ask in what sense a human organism incapable of having human relationships (as, for example, an fertilized egg or early embryo) is a person at all.”
David,
I caution you against going down the road of categorizing human organisms as person or non-person by using the test of whether this individual is capable of actively engaging in a relationship or not. The 6-month old infant, the 21-year old in a coma, the 95-year old with Alzheimers, David Nickol while he sleeps: these are all human organisms which are not capable of actively engaging in a relationship.
The key is to define a human person, not by what he or she can do, but by what he or she is.
Now, if “[h]uman beings are relational, and they possess their lives -– themselves -– only by way of relationship,” one might ask in what sense a human organism incapable of having human relationships (as, for example, an fertilized egg or early embryo) is a person at all.
But a fertilized egg or early embryo is a culmination of human relationship and survives by relationship with another human–the mother. Not only is an early human organism capable of relationship, he will not survive without it.
Brett, Thales, Jenny,
I think you all are not using relationship in the same sense that Cardinal Ratzinger intended it. In fact, I am a little amazed you claim to get this out of the quote. May I point out that he said, “We receive our life not only at the moment of birth but every day from without . . . . ” He did not say, “We receive our life not only at the moment of conception.” In the full quote (09/03/2010 – 4:48 pm), Cardinal Ratzinger is trying to explain sin, and Orginal Sin, in terms of damaged human relationships. It is a tremendous stretch to include the dependence of a baby in the womb on its mother to the kinds of interpersonal relationships he is talking about.
I caution you against going down the road of categorizing human organisms as person or non-person by using the test of whether this individual is capable of actively engaging in a relationship or not.
Thales,
I am perfectly willing, if we set aside the possibility of an immortal soul, to go down this road, but not here and now. This is a debate that has taken place countless times, and neither side convinces the other. I am quite sure, although I haven’t watched the video yet, that this was Peter Singer’s position in responding to John Finnis at the Princeton conference recently. (I do not endorse every position held by Peter Singer, but I am quite prepared to argue that a fertilized human egg is a potential person, not an actual person.)
If we accept the idea of an immortal soul, then I am perfectly willing to agree that if conception is the moment of ensoulment, then a fertilized egg is a person.
David,
I think that the Cardinal’s explanation of Original Sin regarding relationships applies just as well within the womb as without. We all know that how a mother (and, more debatably, even others beyond the mother) interacts with a child in utero can damage (or promote) human relationships. We hear about the benefits of reading and singing to the child and the detriment of stress and foreign substances. I really don’t think I have stretched things at all.
And I’m reasonably confident Ratzinger would consider my reading a sound one. After all, we are born already under the influence of Original Sin. If it is to be interpreted relationally, then something about our pre-birth relationships fits somewhere.
Brett,
I think you are lucky Cardinal Ratzinger has moved on to the papacy. If he were still at the CDF, he might put you under investigation for misinterpreting him so wildly. :-)
Actually, when Fr. Komonchak reproduced that quote, he told us to do a Google search for “Ratzinger” “original sin” “heresy,” and we would find criticisms that this opinion was so heretical Benedict wasn’t even a legitimate pope. In my mind, it calls into question the idea of being born already under the influence of Original Sin, and it also calls into question the Immaculate Conception. If Original Sin is as he describes it, how in the world can one be conceived without it?
There is, of course, a relationship between a mother and an unborn child, but anything having to do with sin, or not loving, is only from mother to child, not the other way around. I remain convinced you are really stretching the kind of relationship Cardinal Ratzinger was talking about. And he did say from birth, not from conception.
There is, of course, a relationship between a mother and an unborn child, but anything having to do with sin, or not loving, is only from mother to child, not the other way around.
As a woman with tremendous morning sickness during pregnancy, I can tell you there were times I felt virtually under attack by my unborn children. Is the damage inflicted on the mother by the existence of the child a result of Original Sin already present in the child? Or is that still on the mother?
“The key is to define a human person, not by what he or she can do, but by what he or she is.”
Exactly my point. A mentally challenged individual fundamentally *is* a mentally challenged person. That is the essence and makeup of who they are from birth. If that’s not who they are, then the person you know on earth is an impostor, and nobody, neither the individual nor their family, has ever seen, heard, or had a relationship with the real person.
I think David’s line of questioning is extremely valid. A person is shaped by their relationships, both to others and to themselves. If I were to wake up tomorrow morning as a poor black woman in Africa with 15 children, my sense of self as I previously existed would have no impact, bearing, or recognition on the person I would be at that point. There would be such a disconnect between my self-identity and my relational reality that I would be utterly lost. Why do we assume that heaven must be that way?
Dan,
So an infant is a different person than a 21 year old, because their mental abilities are vastly different? Again, I suggest you are confusing an accident for essence.
So an infant is a different person than a 21 year old, because their mental abilities are vastly different? Again, I suggest you are confusing an accident for essence.
You continue to ask this question without first addressing mine. The answer to this question is irrelevant to the question of a mentally challenged person, who is that way from birth and will not naturally progress into a state of greater reason.
You can say that mental disability is an accident, but my point is that if personhood and identity is defined via relationship, both external and internal, then in the case of a mentally challenged person, then the accident is a fundamental part of the essence. Removing it would change the person as much as me waking up as a poor black woman in Africa. I would have no self-identity nor recognizable external relationships – I am a fundamentally different person.
I keep asking because, if your theory holds true, then an infant is a different person than the one who is an adult. Their relationships are different. Their capabilities are different. They are quite different in all kinds of things, in things which appear fundamental. But, the problem to me, is that you are doing a physical reductionism and ignore elements of the person which are fundamental, such as their spirit. For example, if you have someone who is brilliant, just brilliant, get in an accident and end up, through physical blows, becoming mentally challenged, is it the same person or not? It is the same person. Their relationships, personality will change — as an effect of the physical problem. But this is not to say the person is a different person from the one before the accident. The same thing can be said about other physical changes, such as chemicals — if someone was being given drugs every day of their life after 21, they will be a “different personality” than if they had not; yet the person beneath will not be the person from the accident of the drugs. This whole point is that physical defects are not the person, but rather, are a physical defect which limits the real person’s ability and actions. Now the real person is acting in it – but we do not see the fullness of the person acting because of the defect.
Henry,
Everything you have said is valid and worthy of discussion, but I must re-iterate that you have not answered my question or addressed any of my points. A crude summary of your position is that changeable elements are accidental to the person and therefore can not be considered essential. But that’s not what I’m asking. The scenario I’m presenting does not involve change, but a fundamental defect propagated through the entire existence of the individual. Let me give an example: Alvin Law is a Canadian personality born without arms, but who managed to overcome those obstacles and can do some amazing things like drive, play the drums, etc.. He currently tours across the country giving inspiration speeches. His identity is fundamentally tied to his disability. He is a hero with no arms. Give him arms, and he is an average nobody. If he died and arrived in heaven with two arms, he may not even want to accept them.
Dan
The fact is that the “defects” are also physical defects. That is still the point. You are ignoring the whole of the person, including the spiritual qualities. And the fact that Alvin Law, if he has arms in the eschaton, is still the same person does not denounce what he did without the arms; you are assuming he would have done nothing grand if he had them.
I would recommend you read Aquinas on the resurrection.
In summary, my proposed scenario directly calls into questions the premises of your scenario, so by ignoring my question and re-presenting yours, nothing is being accomplished besides sound and fury.
Henry,
What is the very core, the essence, of a person that does not change from fertilized egg to death at, say, 100?
One of the things you hear from relatives of Alzheimer’s victims is, “He’s not the same person.” Are they right or wrong?
If a mild-mannered, devout man of 25 is stricken with schizophrenia at age 30 and becomes a serial killer, who is he when he dies?
Here’s an interesting thought (if I do say so myself). Suppose you believe in reincarnation. Does it make sense to say a person who was a male soldier in the civil war is the same person when reincarnated as, say, Hillary Cllinton?
What is the very essence of a person that can never change? And if reduced to that essence, are all persons identical?
What is it about you, Henry Karlson, that would allow God to say, “It’s Henry! I’d know him anywhere!” Assume he says that of you as an embryo and as you are now.
I think it’s possible the continuous self may be an illusion. Don’t Buddhists believe there is no self?
The Buddhist anatman is much more complex than that, and the answers given differ depending upon the Buddhist tradition. There is a reason why there are different Buddhas with different personalities associated with them. But the question of how one is to read a process/stream is an important question. It is partly why I keep bringing it up. There are different ways to deal with this, but first one must recognize that it exists for all — which is in part why I keep pressing with “ordinary” people first.
Has everyone read Flowers for Algernon?
The idea of multiple selves has a lot of appeal to me. “The good that I would do, I do not.” Maybe it’s multiple selves. How can I, over and over again, eat a bunch of cookies, or lots of chocolate, and immediately afterwards say, “Why did I do that?” How can one person be “torn” between one thing and another? What about people with true multiple personalities? Is a person depressed because her brain chemistry is out of whack, or is her brain chemistry out of whack because she is depressed? Or is she really not depressed at all? Is depression like being drugged, and her essence is not changed. What if she commits suicide while depressed? Is she responsible? Did her essence commit suicide, or was it something accidental that was not of her essence?
Ficino’s own answer to the “naturally stupid” is that God, as the divine healer, can heal them; that they can still form habits for or against God, despite their physical condition, but in eternity, God can heal them — just as others with physical maladies get healed. He also says what one can offer is a conjecture here, and as all conjectures, should be treated as such.
Henry,
The fact is that the “defects” are also physical defects. That is still the point. You are ignoring the whole of the person, including the spiritual qualities.
I would gently argue that it is you that is ignoring the whole of the person. You’re essentially equating personhood with spirit, and indirectly postulating that anything changeable (physical, psychological, emotional, etc..) is accidental to personhood.
If you strip away all that is accidental, you also strip away all that is identifiable; spirit becomes the only continuity. But herein lies the problem: The only way I can relate to myself or to others right now is through our accidents. Strip those away and how will I even know who I am?
Remember, Christ still had his wounds after he was raised.
Dan
No, I am not doing that. I once again suggest you read Aquinas on the resurrection. I am not here to debate all fine points in comments, especially when it would take considerable exposition to go through everything. I have suggested the direction in which you can continue your exploration if you want to understand things further.
Thank you for the wonderfully condescending reply. On record, I will still note that nobody made any attempt to address my question. All I got was a series of questions in response. When I mentioned that such questions were not helpful, they continued more forcefully. And now I’m being shooed away to go and consult a book because you don’t have time to lower yourself to my level.
This reminds me of why I should never participate in a blog to try and explore philosophical questions…
Dan
You were never willing to answer my question. You were not interested in dialogue. The question I gave you was to help you understand how your perspective would lead to problems you are, as of yet, unwilling to recognize. And it is interesting that you complain about a condescending reply when your own replies have been just that. Oh, the irony. I really DID offer something if you were willing to take it on.
I once again suggest you read Aquinas on the resurrection.
Henry,
Could you please provide a reference? Is this what you are referring to?
It certainly doesn’t answer Dan’s questions, and it raises many others. Is the fact that I can’t sing like Pavarotti a defect, or is it just me? Will Jimmy Durante have an average-sized nose? Will we not eat in heaven, or will we just not need to? Imagine all of us walking around as 32- or 33-year-olds with perfect bodies . . . and no sex. :-) Will savants like the real-life Rain Man have conventional personalities but lose their special abilities? How heavenly is heaven if everyone is the same age and there are no children? Are characteristics like a sense of humor present in our DNA, and will embryos who die have those characteristics when they become perfect 32-year-olds? Or is lack of a sense of humor a defect, and everyone in heaven will have a sense of humor? Will we all be as witty as Oscar Wilde, or will different people have different gifts and personality traits? Is who we are at the core really all nature and no nurture? If someone has a conversion experience as an adult, haven’t they really changed in some profound way?
David
There is more in Aquinas’ other works — ST and SCG (the commentary on the Sentences is not in English yet). As I pointed out to Dan, comments are not going to be exhaustive in response to questions. There is, after all, a limited time for everything. I was suggesting a direction for him to consider. He was unwilling to do so. You at least understood it and took it on. The question is indeed the question of identity; he doesn’t yet take it to its full extent. When one understands that defects are not the same thing as essences, part of his problem has been addressed. Does this mean there is no differentiation? Obviously not, but to say “well, if you don’t accept what I demand to be differences everything becomes the same” is not a valid response. And I have explained how and why one can look at the issue. He won’t answer why an infant or someone struck on the head is not a different person…
In First Things a few years back there was a very touching piece by a woman with a Down Syndrome child asking some of these questions. She didn’t come up with any real hard answers (I think she kind of concluded that that wouldn’t be helpful), but it was insightful and moving. Anyone else read it? For some reason I think the woman’s name was Amy.
St. Paul uses the seed and the plant metaphor. Definitely the same organism, expressed in wildly different ways.
Also, “not only at the moment of birth” strikes me as pretty broad and certainly not exclusive of the relationship between mother and unborn child. Of course, that relationship is a bit one-sided from the perspective of sin. I can tell you that it remains so for a good while after birth. Further, having cared for a grandparent who had lost his mind, I can affirm that there are other relationships beyond this one that are one-sided. I don’t see how that makes much difference.
As for Ratzinger being accused of heresy, it does warm the cockles, doesn’t it? Being a theologian in general, and a Vox Novan in particular, does imply putting oneself in harm’s way in terms of such accusations. It’s nice to know the man at the top can sympathize.
My .02,
I think Dan and Dave are overthinking too much. Right now, I am one person: I know I have a body because I’m moving it right now, a material part; and I know I have a mind because I’m thinking right now, which has some kind of non-material or spiritual element (Aristotle would say that this is because I’m a rational creature with an immortal soul; Catholicism would similarly say that I have an immortal soul created by God). I know that my material part and my spiritual part are somehow connected together. Why? Because I’m confident that I’m ONE PERSON. I don’t think that I’m many persons, even though I was someone who was hungry at dinner but I’m not now, or I was someone who was sleeping at night but I’m not now, or I was happy yesterday but I’m not now, or if I have all my fingers now but have one amputated tomorrow. All those “someones” were the same person: me! To be sure, it was “me” in different emotional and physical states. But it wasn’t a bunch of different persons disappearing and appearing out of thin air.
It’s sometimes easy to overthink concepts and abstractions, such that we get tied in a loop. Start with what we know best and what we know first, and keep that as a first principle: here, the first principle is that I know that I am one person with a material part and a spiritual part who may undergo different emotional and physical changes, but that I’m still one person, me.
(As an aside, I think this is an argument against reincarnation – a concept which is contrary to Catholicism. I’m “me”, one person, and it doesn’t make sense for “me” to have existed in a different body at a different time and place.)
Thales,
I believe people can think to much, but in this case, I believe Dan has raised some very profound questions. Here’s a good example:
It occurs to me that the definition of death in the Catechism is “when the soul leaves the body.” We have no problem with the idea of the souls of people who die going to Purgatory and Heaven to await the Resurrection of the Dead. So I don’t think counting your body and your soul together as yourself really works. You can go somewhere without your body. But if you are severely mentally disabled — say you have the intelligence of a 2-year-old — is that your body, or your soul? Can your soul be intelligent without your body?
My niece, who is in her 20s now, is developmentally disabled, cannot read or write, and is emotionally and mentally much like a 5-year-old. Is that really her? Or is the real “her” an individual with a much greater capacity to know and feel, only her current body prevents her. The person her parents know and care for is disabled. If she is of genius-level intelligence and emotionally mature in heaven, how will her parents recognize her?
It is impossible to think of St. Paul without thinking of his conversion experience on the road to Damascus. If Paul’s mother had miscarried when she was pregnant with him, would St. Paul after the Resurrection of the Dead be brought to the level of spiritual development the earthly St. Paul experienced? Wasn’t his experience of conversion an essential part of who he was?
You were never willing to answer my question. You were not interested in dialogue. The question I gave you was to help you understand how your perspective would lead to problems you are, as of yet, unwilling to recognize.
We must have been married in a previous life, because we are talking past each other, not to each other. If you remember, I asked the first question, which I never received a response to. You responded with another question – one that did not adequately address the question I asked. Now you’re accusing me of failing to enter into a dialogue. But I asked the question first, and never received a response, but rather anger and condescention because I never abandoned my original question to address yours. How is that my fault?
And it is interesting that you complain about a condescending reply when your own replies have been just that.
That was never my intention. Did I not say that your line of questioning was valid and worthy of discussion? Nevertheless, if my comments came across as condescending, I apologize – your questions are very insightful, and it was not my intention to cast any negativity on them.
Oh, the irony. I really DID offer something if you were willing to take it on.
No, you did not. You responded to a question with a question. I explained that it was unhelpful. You then asked the same question again – ergo demanding that I engage you on your terms, rather than address the original question on the terms that were asked. That is not dialogue.
For the record, I fully understand the implications of your questions. I chose not to address them because they did not provide an answer to the specific case I am referring to, and it would have derailed the conversation into another direction which I did not want it to go. I feel I made that clear.
Henry,
I owe you an apology. Due to the delay caused by the moderated comments, I apparently missed an important post where you DID try and answer my question:
I keep asking because, if your theory holds true, then an infant is a different person than the one who is an adult. Their relationships are different. Their capabilities are different. They are quite different in all kinds of things, in things which appear fundamental. But, the problem to me, is that you are doing a physical reductionism and ignore elements of the person which are fundamental, such as their spirit. For example, if you have someone who is brilliant, just brilliant, get in an accident and end up, through physical blows, becoming mentally challenged, is it the same person or not? It is the same person. Their relationships, personality will change — as an effect of the physical problem. But this is not to say the person is a different person from the one before the accident. The same thing can be said about other physical changes, such as chemicals — if someone was being given drugs every day of their life after 21, they will be a “different personality” than if they had not; yet the person beneath will not be the person from the accident of the drugs. This whole point is that physical defects are not the person, but rather, are a physical defect which limits the real person’s ability and actions. Now the real person is acting in it – but we do not see the fullness of the person acting because of the defect.
Dan
Ok. Well, I did try to show where I was going with it. The question of person is difficult, but I was trying to show it continues in other instances, and if one can find an answer to similar issues, it might help us understand the question at hand. Even if you do not agree with my point, I am glad you see now where I was going with it.
David,
Certainly, the spirit/soul/intellect is, in some way, more “important” than or “prior to” the body. The spirit is, after all, immortal and immaterial, and the body isn’t. Aristotle noted this, and would say that the spirit is the form and the body is the matter. So, in a sense, I’m still “me” when my body dies, because my spiritual side remains (and goes off to Heaven or Purgatory, hopefully). But it is still fair to say that I’m both my body and my spirit: I’m not truly complete if my spirit is not connected to my body, because, I am, by nature, a “rational animal” – in other words, my very nature is a body (animal) animated by an immortal, immaterial soul (rational). This is why the Catholic Church is so adamant about the “Resurrection of the Body”. We won’t be complete in Heaven until we have a body reunited with our spirit, because that is how we were created by God: as a “rational animal”, a body with a spirit.
As to your questions about a severely mentally disabled person, it’s traditionally understood that since our body is made of matter and matter is imperfect, breaks down, etc., then our body sometimes impedes the action of our spirit/intellect. This is easy to see with a blind person. A blind person still has a spirit/soul/intellect that has the capacity to see, create images in the mind, and later recall previously seen images – but a blind person can’t do this because his bodily eyes don’t work. Sometimes medicine can fix the bodily problem, and then all of a sudden a blind person can see. But the point is that the blind person still had a spiritual side that was able to see if the body was healthy.
So it is with the intellect. If I get a concussion and go into a coma, I’m still a being with a spiritual side that has the capacity of thinking, reasoning, etc. The only problem is that my body is damaged in such a way that my spiritual side is being impeded from thinking. Similarly, with a person born with a mental disability, that person still has a spiritual side which is capable of perfect reasoning, but his body is at least partially impeding it.
Now in Heaven, with perfect, resurrected bodies, we will be able to see, hear, think, know perfectly. What will that be like? No one really knows. Will we be able to recognize each other in our perfect and resurrected bodies? Yes, I’m sure, since we will be able to see and know each other perfectly. But what this will be like, no one can say. Remember, in Heaven, we will also be able to see God face-to-face and know him immediately and perfectly. What that would be like is simply unfathomable to us still on earth.
Re: your question about St. Paul. Good question. Will our experiences on earth shape how we are in Heaven? I think so, since Jesus seems to say as much – that our holiness on earth corresponds to “treasures” in Heaven, that there are different “seats” in heaven. But won’t we all be perfect in Heaven, so how can there be different degrees? The analogy I’ve heard is the one of different sized cups, filled to brim. Each person in Heaven will be perfectly happy and joyful, just as each cup is filled to the brim; but there just as there are larger cups and smaller cups, there will be people with greater “degrees” of perfection in Heaven.
You raise plenty of good questions and I’ve tried my best here to respond. Anything I miss?
Thales,
I think David raises some important points, which were echoed by me. I think both David and I understand the traditional answers to the questions that you are putting forth. The problem lies in that these traditional answers leave much unaddressed:
1) We observe that our identity appears to be shaped by our relationships. This is self-evident.
2) Our relationships in this world have a certain impact on our soul (If they did not, there would be no hell nor purgatory as our spirit would be unaffected by our actions in this world).
3) Changes to our accidents (e.g. brain injury) change our relationships. However, if the statements above are true, then this will eventually change our soul.
4) Further to (3), if God can alter our accidents at the resurrection, it will therefore change our relationships, which will also change our soul.
5) Further to (4), if God can fix our accidents at the resurrection, with no involvement by us, which will of necessity change our soul, then God is changing our soul without involvement of our free will.
6) If God is changing our soul without our free will, then free will either:
(a) is an illusion
(b) exists in degrees for different individuals
This is very problematic to me.
Dan,
1. I feel like some distinctions are useful. You use the phrase “relationships change my soul” or “my identity is shaped by relationships.” I wonder whether you are using “shape” and “change” in two different ways.
Yes, in a way, my identity or soul is shaped or changed by my relationships: my relationship with my child might make me more loving and more selfless, and my soul more open to God’s love.
But in a way, my soul or my identity is not shaped by our relationships. I’m “me” regardless of my relationship with someone. I would be “me” if I was in a coma or if I was not in a coma.
The reason why I’m making this distinction is that I feel that your lines (4), (5), and (6) rest on this premise: “someone can change something around me without my free will, which therefore changes a relationship without my free will, which therefore changes my identity/soul without my free will.” In a way, that is true: someone could kill my mother without me willing it, which means I unwillingly lose my relationship with my mother, and then my soul might become affected (I might grow depressed, for example). Yes, in that way, my soul might have been changed by the circumstances I find myself in, unwillingly. On the other, I’m not a different person because I’m still “me.” I don’t know whether this distinction is useful or not, but that is the first thing that struck me.
2. You seem to be worried about free will. You make an argument against free will in lines (4), (5), and (6) when you talk about heaven. I think your argument is more powerful if you substitute “God” for “the man who killed my mother” or “the man who amputated my leg”. Try it:
(4)”The man who amputated my leg” alters my accidents, and this will therefore change my relationships, which will also change my soul.
(5)If “the man who amputated my leg” can change my accidents, with no involvement by me, which will of necessity change my soul, then “the man who amputated my leg” is changing my soul without involvement of my free will.
(6) If “the man who amputated my leg” is changing my soul without my free will, then free will is an illusion.
Now, in a way, this argument is correct: that amputating man can have an effect on my soul. That is just the mystery of us living in a world where we can be affected by the people around us and our relationships. In another way, however, the argument is faulty: the amputating man might have an effect on my soul, but it is still “me” and I haven’t been essentially changed — I still have the free will to not let amputating man’s actions have a detrimental effect on me, and I have the free will to enter into other relationships and to improve my soul.
3. When it comes to heaven, remember, God invites us to be with Him in heaven, but He leaves it as a choice for us. If we choose to be with God in heaven, then we will be more free than we can ever imagine, because we will be free from distractions, free from sin, and we will be able to see and know God perfectly. So it’s not accurate to say “in heaven, God will give me a new resurrected body against or without my free will.” It’s more accurate to say “in heaven, I will freely choose to be in a perfectly loving relationship with God in a new resurrected body.”
Dan,
I thought of a simpler response to your free will concern, during Mass this morning (the readings were on the resurrection of the body!).
Yes, many things can affect my soul (like losing a leg, getting diabetes, losing my mother, finding a wife, getting a resurrected body). But my soul is not affected or “changed” in a purely deterministic, non-free-will way; I’m not a computer or machine with only one possible result after the events of losing a leg, getting diabetes, etc., happen to me. Instead, at every instant of my life, whenever these events happen and my “accidents” or relationships change, I am always free to respond to this change in a loving or in a non-loving manner. I always have the freedom to receive God’s grace or to reject God grace’s in dealing with the events and changes and people I encounter, thereby changing my soul in a positive or a negative manner.
When it comes to heaven, remember, God invites us to be with Him in heaven, but He leaves it as a choice for us.
Thales,
But the whole discussion began with those who can never make a choice, or at least not the way you or I make a choice. Suppose person A is born to loving parents who raise him to be a good person and a devout Catholic. Suppose person B is born to criminal parents and grows up to be just like them, a drug dealer and eventually a murderer. And suppose person C is conceived and lives through to the 12th week of pregnancy and then dies.
Person A chooses God, person B doesn’t choose God, and person C makes no choice at all. (Or if person C somehow gets to make a choice — which doesn’t seem to be what the Church teaches — person C makes a choice based on something other than life experience. And what would that be?)
If you maintain the person’s life experiences don’t profoundly influence — perhaps even determine — who and what he is, it seems to me you’ve got something like predestination.
Instead, at every instant of my life, whenever these events happen and my “accidents” or relationships change, I am always free to respond to this change in a loving or in a non-loving manner.
I think it is quite possible for a person’s life experiences to be such that “he never had a chance.”
Now, if God take’s people’s life experiences into account, and for the person who “never had a chance,” he corrects for that person’s life experiences, what is he judging? The person minus his life experiences? And who would that be?
Here’s a question. The Church teaches the following: “Although the particular inclination of the homosexual person is not a sin, it is a more or less strong tendency ordered toward an intrinsic moral evil; and thus the inclination itself must be seen as an objective disorder.” What is disordered? The body or the soul? Can person C, who dies before birth, have a homosexual orientation? If so, he cannot act on it. But where he to be born and grow to maturity, he very well might act on it. If he does act on it, does God make allowances for person C having to cope with a “more or less strong tendency ordered toward an intrinsic moral evil,” and does God cut such a person more slack than someone who does not have such an inclination?
I am always free to respond to this change in a loving or in a non-loving manner.
Thales,
Doesn’t that beg the question? Also, wouldn’t it be rather bizarre if our “free” decisions didn’t spring from who we are? Also, there is good reason to suspect that “free” decisions are influenced by aspects of ourselves of which we are not aware. I was just reading about fascinating scientific studies in which people who have had the two hemispheres of their brains separated (to deal with the symptoms of severe epilepsy) can be given commands going directly to one side of the brain, which they will obey, and the other side of the brain will be unaware of the commands, but will instantly give reasons for them. For example, a person who is told to stand up and does so, when asked why he stood up, may say, “I was thirsty and I wanted to go get a drink of water.” And they will believe their own reasons. It is called confabulation, and it happens all the time. Check out this:
All kinds of odd mental phenomena need to be taken into account when evaluating human decision making. When your brain can play such tricks on you, I am not sure exactly what “free will” means. It appears that many decisions are made unconsciously, before the conscious mind is even aware of them, and in some cases at least, the conscious mind comes up with explanations for them that are basically just fabrications, although the person is unaware of this and believes himself to be completely honest.
Hence the reason I am suggesting that the only possibility that seems logically consistent is that our experience of Heaven is directly proportional to our experience of earth. If we die as an infant, we enjoy heaven through the eyes of infancy – no less perfect, simply different.
David,
When I said that line about heaven, I was thinking specifically about when we get to heaven and what life will be like there: In heaven, our will be more free than ever, and we will perfectly exercise our free will and choose to be with God forever. I was responding to Dan’s concern about the lack of free will in heaven.
Re: choosing to be with God
You’re right, many people don’t make a “choice” to be with God. The clearest example is the baptized infant who dies in infancy. We know that this infant is in heaven because the stain of original sin has been wiped away by baptism and the infant is fully reconciled with God, but obviously, the infant never made a choice to be with God.
Your questions go to the issue of moral culpability, and the Church has a lot of teaching on this topic which answers all your questions. I don’t have the space for a thorough response, but I’ll try to briefly address them.
-For baptized persons before the age of reason, the Church teaches that they aren’t old enough to have sufficient reason to be morally responsible for their actions. So they can’t choose to be with or to reject God. If they die, they’ll go to heaven like the baptized infant.
-For baptized persons older than the age of reason, the Church teaches that mortal sin is the way a person completely rejects God. If they aren’t culpable of a mortal sin, then they go to heaven. (If someone is culpable of moral sin, it can be removed by confession.) But mortal sin must be done with (1) full knowledge, and (2) deliberate consent. There are many factors that mitigate these two elements. Thus, your person B, the criminal, might be someone who has never truly rejected God, is not morally culpable for his evil actions, and is actually (in a completely mistaken way due to his poor upbringing, education, etc.) trying to seek the Good. It’s possible this person goes to heaven.
I’ve been talking about baptized persons, since baptism is the one way we know for sure removes the stain of original sin and reconciles us to God.
What about unbaptized persons, like miscarried embryos or Amazonian tribes or simply non-baptized folks? Can they go to heaven? Besides baptism of desire and baptism of blood, the Church doesn’t know with complete certainty of any other way for the stain of original sin to be removed. But the general sense of theological speculation on this subject (from what I understand), is that God is merciful and may invite the non-baptized to heaven, perhaps by taking into account the person’s life experiences. After all, all persons are created in God’s image and likeness, and therefore all have the natural law “on their heart” whereby they have an implicit desire to seek the Good, the True, and the Beautiful (and the ultimate Good, Truth, and Beauty is God).
Re: homosexual inclinations
This is a whole other topic. I find it useful to think about a person’s inclination to alcoholism or to kleptomania. These are inclinations to a moral evil; they are objective disorders. What is disordered, the body or the soul? No one really knows. Perhaps the body (due to genetic predispositions), perhaps the soul (due to environment and upbringing). Most likely, both are involved. Can we talk about a person D, who dies before birth, having an alcoholic or kleptomania orientation? I’m not sure, I suppose so, but if person D never acts on his inclinations, then there is no problem. Does God make allowances for person D when he grows up to have to deal with a strong tendency to the intrinsic moral evil of alcoholism of kleptomania? Yes, certainly. As I mentioned above, the Church’s theology on moral culpability is quite extensive and there are many circumstances which would mitigate person D’s culpability. In other words, yes, God would be “cutting some slack” when it comes to person D.
And I think that all of these considerations I mention for person D can also apply to a person with a homosexual inclination.
Doesn’t that beg the question? Also, wouldn’t it be rather bizarre if our “free” decisions didn’t spring from who we are? Also, there is good reason to suspect that “free” decisions are influenced by aspects of ourselves of which we are not aware.
No doubt our decisions are influenced by genetics, brain chemistry, our environment, etc. Because of that, some of the decisions we do are not decisions we do from free will. Obvious examples are people with depression due to severe chemical imbalances, or people suffering from insanity, or people with forms of mental retardation.
But that doesn’t prove that all decisions are completely non-free. I don’t know about you, but I’m confident that I have the free will between choosing to (1) hit the person next to me and (2) not hit the person next to me.
Re: your brain experiment
Sure, the brain can be fooled at times. So can my eyes and ears. But just because sometimes I see a mirage doesn’t mean that all of the sights seen by my eyes only see non-existent mirages. I’m confident that my eyes are actually seeing a computer screen at this moment, even though they’ve been mistaken before.
Apologies for coming to this conversation quite late, but the stream between Dan, David and Henry caught my attention.
I just want to pose this question to all those who attempted an answer/response to Dan’s (and David’s) insightful questions regarding the so-called perfected person:
With respect to the issue of trisomy 21 (aka Down Syndrome), can we be so sure to include this condition as nothing more than a ‘defect’?
Especially as it concerns Aquinas and many of the schoolmen, this question seems to be off their radar.
Trisomy 21, unlike a missing limb, results not from anything defective per se. Rather, it is the result of a “too much” – namely, an extra chromosome. Now of course, if one wants to say that this extra chromosome is not ‘natural’ and thus results in a human that falls short of being fully human, then one could find justification I suppose in the scholastics. But such a conclusion assumes far too much in terms of claiming to know exhaustively the telos of nature. An extra chromosome, appearing at the microscopic levels of our being, must be treated differently than, say, an extra finger.
Now, as observed by our fallen (post-Kantian modes of thinking) world, these angelic creatures possessing that extra chromosome appear to be defective.
But I’m not so sure this is the most accurate judgment.
Aquinas, for example, is clear about how love is not only a form of knowledge, but one higher than our current mode of knowledge, when he says things like: love picks up where knowledge leaves off; and our mode of reasoning, which requires that we ‘know’ through a process of discursion involving an abstractio ad phantasmata moving from one object to another, is a very defective mode of knowledge (I could get exact references if anyone wants).
Based upon ideas like these, there is some ground to maintain that those with Down Syndrome are not the defective ones – rather it is we who are “normal” that are really defective. And it is we who will be in far greater need of transformation than they. They, in their infant/child like state of openness to the good, the true and the beautiful may in fact be much further along in spiritual development than we who rely so heavily on forms of knowing that fall far below love….forms of knowing that continue to promote the very distance we aspire to overcome, a distance overcome in Love.
Just a thought.
Brendan
When I told people to read Aquinas on the resurrection, it is because Aquinas at least deals with questions of identity and perfection, and it is these questions which I think are important here. One could look at some modern scholars on the issue of bodies/the resurrection (Caroline Walker Bynum really is top notch here) which demonstrate what is going on in the schoolmen. But Ficino also transcends them, and is not limited to them — so if one wanted to look to his answer, it would differ, to some degree, from Aquinas, because of his taking on the Platonic tradition — though he did so in wake of Aquinas and as one who saw benefit in what Aquinas did. But I wanted to start off with some basics.
As for my take on the physical, you already touched on it when you said “Now of course, if one wants to say that this extra chromosome is not ‘natural’ and thus results in a human that falls short of being fully human, then one could find justification I suppose in the scholastics.” the physical too much causes an effect on the human brain which lead it from not being perfectly aligned to the spirit, or so I think the schoolmen (and I) would say. This is not to say personality cannot be discerned in this too much; I think it can, and so that what we find here will be recognized in the eschaton, even if what is imperfect is transcended, and the spirit is fully capable of realizing theosis. However, I think we are all limited here on earth, and that must also be remembered.
Henry,
Part of the reason I would separate a ‘chromosomal’ difference from a mere physical one is that chromosomes are not merely physical. Rather, it seems that chromosomes are prior to physical attributes at least in terms of causality. There is something far more spiritual to chromosomes than say to a sixth finger.
So when you write: the physical too much causes an effect on the human brain which lead it from not being perfectly aligned to the spirit, or so I think the schoolmen (and I) would say.
…and if I take this to be a comment directed toward Down Syndrome, I would object – what you recognize as an imperfect alignment between brain and spirit cannot be defended on anything other than ‘perspectivistic’ grounds.
The fact is that all the evidence you could use to draw this judgment already derives from, as you rightly admit, another kind of disconnect between your own kind of limited brain/spirit connection. It cannot be claimed on necessary grounds that your personhood is closer to some enlightened state than a person with DS.
To regard a person with DS as having a lower spirit/brain connection not only assumes some univocal form of brain/spirit connectivity (rather than a much more relative, personalistic one – that is to say, one’s own spirit/brain connection cannot be held to a standard other than that very person’s unique life in and of itself), but it projects some fictitious mode of ‘normalcy’ as if it were this univocal brain/spirit connection. It is a position guilty of projecting one’s own experience as some sort of a priori standard and measure of ‘enlightenment.’ And it tends to privilege modes of ‘knowing’ that even Aquinas asserted were very weak.
My whole point in raising the question is to suggest that the modes of judgment that we ‘normal’ people have at our disposal, and by which we make judgments over persons with DS, could themselves be derived from a far greater brain/spirit disconnect than that found in the person with DS.
Persons with DS, after all, are practically incapable of many of the evils that we ‘normal’ people are capable of. I have never heard of a person with DS who had committed any sort of violent crime (of course, this is not to say that one hasn’t. But I’d be surprised to learn of one.) Persons with DS, apparently, have a greater capacity for joy, forgiveness, and many other Christian virtues than many if not most ‘normal’ people (so certain data analyses have suggested).
So I would be very careful to espouse any theory that hastily reduces DS persons to mere defective human status.
That extra chromosome, as Dan rightly questions, may not be some mistake added to them. In fact, it constitutes them at the deepest ontological level. It is not something that will simply be discarded when that person is “perfected.” Rather, perhaps it is our own mode of judging DS that will be perfected…..and our ability to see their true spirits – spirits that are what they are by virtue of that extra chromosome and not in spite of it – will finally be freed.
Brendan
You are misconstruing what I said: we are all defective in various degrees. As for the extra chromosome, I do think it is a physical condition, and so one can indeed suggests the problems it gives is indeed a defect, without saying the person behind it is defective. It is like saying “that axe in one’s head is material, so an extra.” What comes from an axe in one’s head will be something less, even if there is more in the physical realm. I think those with down’s syndrome certainly are able to explore elements of the human which others do not, but that is not to say that they will be limited in the eschaton in the same way we find them in history; I think, rather, one can say they might even prove to be our superior in intellectual capability.
Henry,
For the most part I agree with your point. If I understand you correctly, it seems that you are saying any attribute that a person has now, which is of course actualized in one particular way in this natural, fallen, world, will be expanded and empowered to an unlimited and, as of now, unknown extent in the ‘supernatural’ reality of the eschaton. I think you are right on this point.
But I would still not want to say that the extra chromosome is merely instrumental in the sense you explained.
First, because research in the last 50 years has barely begun to understand precisely what this extra chromosome contains. Remember that this condition was until recently assumed to be pure defect; down syndrome persons were quickly discarded to the margins. It is only within the last 30 years or so – and especially most recently in the last 10 years – that families have begun to see the gift that these persons bring.
Besides, as I understand it, a chromosome cannot carry a “lack” or “absence”. Even if a chromosomal presence results in a missing limb, it is because that chromosome actualized the growth of a type of tissue where that limb should have been. The consequential lack is really derived from our perception of the actualization of this chromosome (which does not mean it is not real, but merely that its reality is largely perspecitivally dependent).
Concerning DS, that the effect of the chromosome produces consequences that we judge to be defective (retardation, e.g.) is really a testament to our own lack of understanding this condition. Remember – these angelic persons are reared in a culture/society/condition established by us so-called neuro-typicals, and these conditions contribute or fail to contribute to their floushing.
As weak as the analogy might be, consider this: how would one’s life play out if he or she were raised in a context where no one spoke his/her language or moved the way he/she did, AND no one could understand why that person did not speak their language or move the way they do. Imagine further that this person possessed nothing that could enable him/her to overcome this condition on his/her own, and that members of this society judged this person to be simply lower in value and so not worthy of interest.
As an example, this is provided to demonstrate that the defect we recognize in Down Syndrome persons may be a mirror that really reflects our own defective conditions in which these persons are supposed to flourish.
Dan’s question, then, resonates with me: the extra chromosome may not be an ‘instrumental’ defect, but may be a gift that constitutes the personhood of a Down Syndrome person. Consequently, this will not be eliminated in the eschaton.
Part of the issue, I think, is the way that we conceive redemption in the eschaton – to wit: is it a happening only at the level of the object (defects per se will be removed)? Or is it something that happens to the relation between persons? In the latter case – which I think is a better way forward – every defect is recognized as an event occurring between persons. And it is this event-between element of our existence that seems to be what is truly in need of redemption.
I don’t think redemption can be conceived accurately as the final sweep of (what we assume to be in quite a limited way) the telos of nature reduced to what we believe to be its completion or perfection, a belief largely derived from our own fear or aversion to its incompletion.
More concretely – it cannot be the ‘curing’ of a down syndrome person’s condition because this condition may not be per se defective. One’s fear or aversion to this condition, then, ought not become the grounds for conceiving redemption as the elimination of this (and other) condition. (I’m not assuming you disagree with this; in fact, it seems more likely that you would agree, no?)
Just some more thoughts.
It would be difficult to say that just because chromosomes are different in some way, the result is a defect. After all, the reigning scientific view is that we are who we are today as the result of countless mutations, which are, quite literally, mistakes. Whether or not something is a genetic “defect” depends very much on the environment. As I am sure everybody knows who has done a little reading on this, sickle cells are adaptive where there is malaria but are “defects” where there is no malaria. Creatures with eyes that live entirely in the dark evolve to lose their eyes, which become a needless waste of resources. We need not think of them as having the defect of blindness.
If God wants their to be people with Down Syndrome, and he deliberately provided a mechanism to produce them, who is to say that Down Syndrome persons are defective?
When it comes to the Down Syndrome discussion, I think there is a little talking past each other.
To start, I’ve worked with DS people for years, and I don’t need to be told how wonderful they are and how “non-defective” they are. Brendan, a good book that you might be interested in along the lines of what you’re describing is “Becoming Human” by Jean Vanier. The message I got from the book is that in some ways, DS and other mentally-disabled people are “more human” than us “normal” people, because the fundamental human condition of needing love and giving love is more present in DS than in us “normal” people, because of all the distractions and baggage “normal” people have. DS people are wonderful.
That said, DS or Trisomy 21 is a chromosomal defect. So is Trisomy 18 or Trisomy 13. Human beings with Trisomy 22 rarely survive to birth, because of the severity of their defect. An extra chromosome is a physical defect which can affect the life of a human being. Thankfully, Tr21 is not as severe a defect at Tr22, but Tr21 still is a defect: it is a cause of physical problems (greater likelihood of heart problems, thyroid problems, infertility, etc.), and, obviously, it is a cause of mental problems.
Even though Tr21 is a defect, that doesn’t mean that humans with it are “defective.” Not at all. All of us have defects: I might be born blind, or have sickle-cell anemia, or have an extra finger, or have diabetes, or lose a leg in a car accident, or go bald prematurely, etc. These are all defects, some more severe than others, but they are all defects from an objective or scientific perspective.
God, in His wisdom, often uses our defects as means for us and for those around us to be more cognizant of our humanity and to be more cognizant of our need for His love and the love of others. So, in that way, these defects are truly gifts that enable us to be more of a human person than we could be without them. From a personal perspective, they aren’t defects at all.
So, in one way, scientifically speaking, Tr21 is a flaw in the condition of a human being. In another way, it is a gift that enables someone to be “more” human than he could be without it. That’s why I think there is some talking past each other.