Do we still need Aristotle for Transubstantiation?
Seems the Jesuits are at it again, rejecting the true and authentic teaching of the Church. Fr. Michael Kelly, Jesuit CEO of the Asian Catholic news agency UCA News has this to say about the doctrine of transubstantiation:
Regrettably, all too frequently, the only Presence focused on is Christ’s presence in the elements of bread and wine. Inadequately described as the change of the “substance” (not the “accidents”) of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, the mystery of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist carries the intellectual baggage of a physics no one accepts. Aristotelian physics makes such nice, however implausible and now unintelligible, distinctions. They are meaningless in the post-Newtonian world of quantum physics, which is the scientific context we live in today.
I think it might be helpful to break this quote down, not simply possibly to absolve Fr. Kelly, but to try to get at what he is trying to say. 
So, the first line:
Regrettably, all too frequently, the only Presence focused on is Christ’s presence in the elements of bread and wine.
Fr. Kelly is right. Henri de Lubac often distinguished between the historical body, the sacramental body, and the ecclesial body of Christ. Each is intricately bound up with the other and cannot be separated. The eucharist points us to the historical body, since it is only in the historical sacrifice actually accepted and suffered that we are saved and healed. And it is a sacrament, a symbol of what the Church is meant to be, the one eschatological body of Christ. His simple point seems to be that one presence is highlighted often at the expense of the others.
Inadequately described as the change of the “substance” (not the “accidents”) of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, the mystery of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist carries the intellectual baggage of a physics no one accepts.
Notice that Fr. Kelly does not here say “inaccurately” but “inadequately.” In other words, if I was a catechist who simply taught my students that the eucharist is the accidents of bread but the substance of Jesus, I would be inadequately describing the fulness of the mystery. I would simply be giving them a basic minimal definition, the same way as a person as a “rational animal” does not fully describe a person, but only that which distinguishes him or her from other animals.
Of course the last line is the big kicker:
Aristotelian physics makes such nice, however implausible and now unintelligible, distinctions. They are meaningless in the post-Newtonian world of quantum physics, which is the scientific context we live in today.
Well, they may not be completely unintelligible. And they are helpful concepts particularly in regard to the question of permanence of identity over time when discussing persons.
The big question is whether or not we need to understand a doctrine like that of transubstantiation in strictly Aristotelian terms. I ask because I recall a story that Fr. Norris Clarke — a recently deceased Jesuit philosopher — told me about the philosopher Gabriel Marcel. When considering entering the Church, Marcel was held back in part by the Aristotelian nature of the doctrine of the eucharist. He felt that, because he could not accept Aristotle’s metaphysics, he could accept the Catholic definition of transubstantiation. His fears were put to rest by his spiritual director who assured him that the Church has no official philosophy, and that these are helpful ways of affirming truths about the eucharist. But if he would prefer to think of Christ’s presence in the eucharist in another way that philosophically grasps the meaning of what transubstantiation implies (as opposed to consubstantiation, for example) then he was free to articulate this meaning in other ways.
I’ve often wondered about this. Fides et Ratio 49 for example famously points out:
The Church has no philosophy of her own nor does she canonize any one particular philosophy in preference to others.
How can one square this statement with the formula of Trent, for instance? After all, John Paul II reaffirmed in Ecclesia de Eucharistia in paragraph 15 the doctrine of transubstantiation:
The sacramental re-presentation of Christ’s sacrifice, crowned by the resurrection, in the Mass involves a most special presence which – in the words of Paul VI – “is called ‘real’ not as a way of excluding all other types of presence as if they were ‘not real’, but because it is a presence in the fullest sense: a substantial presence whereby Christ, the God-Man, is wholly and entirely present”. This sets forth once more the perennially valid teaching of the Council of Trent: “the consecration of the bread and wine effects the change of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood. And the holy Catholic Church has fittingly and properly called this change transubstantiation”. Truly the Eucharist is a mysterium fidei, a mystery which surpasses our understanding and can only be received in faith, as is often brought out in the catechesis of the Church Fathers regarding this divine sacrament: “Do not see – Saint Cyril of Jerusalem exhorts – in the bread and wine merely natural elements, because the Lord has expressly said that they are his body and his blood: faith assures you of this, though your senses suggest otherwise”.
Yet notice that what John Paul II draws out of Trent is the mystery of faith involved in the Eucharist. In other words, it seems at least possible to me to accept that the “substance” of the eucharist is entirely Jesus, while not accepting Aristotelian metaphysics or physics. This would only be the case if the implication of “substance” in the way that the Church uses it can be described as meaning “that which that thing most truly and really is in relation to all other things on earth” or something like that.
As a possible example, Marcel drew a distinction between “problem” and “mystery.” A “problem” is something I can attempt to place myself outside of in order to observe it in a static sort of way. Problems have answers. A “mystery” however is something that I can in no way stand outside of. I am so bound up in it, that its incapacity for definition lies not in the inadequacy of my language, but in the fact that I am wholly immersed in it. ”Being” would be one such mystery. We are so immersed in “being,” that while we can define particular “beings” to some extent, “being” itself remains a mystery.
It is possible that Marcel thought that to articulate the eucharist in terms of Aristotelian philosophy was to reduce dangerously a mystery into a problem. I’m not sure. Nor am I sure that we should absolve Fr. Kelly. But I think that we can give him a fair reading and try to understand the point he is making.
Comments are closed.
I guess I’m not sure why there’s any reluctance at all to “abandon” Aristotle. There are any number of modern schools of thought which provide a helpful way of talking about the mystery of the real presence. Of course they can’t prove the real presence. . . but then neither can Aristotle. He only provides a framework for showing how the idea is not contradictory.
Besides, Philosophy thrives on disagreement. It doesn’t honor Aristotle to believe everything he says without question.
I think you’ve given about as charitable a reading of Fr. Kelly as one can give, Nathan. But I think the nuances you point to are all but entirely covered over by that final statement. When he claims that the Aristotelian distinctions are implausible, unintelligible, and ultimately meaningless, one wonders if there is even a real difference anymore between “inadequate” and “inaccurate.” That last point saps the statement of any nuance.
I find it extremely difficult to square Fr. Kelly’s position with Magisterial teaching. He doesn’t strike me as one terribly educated on the issue, as he seems to entirely miss the distinction between a metaphysics of substance and quantum physics, as if these were just competing theories about the same thing. His position amounts to the claim that quantum theory has made metaphysics itself- and not just this Aristotelian distinction- unintelligible. Not only is this untrue, but I believe it is contrary to what the Church has always taught about the matter.
Frankly, I find this whole modern worry over “Aristotelian categories” and the urge to get away with a non-Aristotelian transubstantiation to be something of a non-issue. The vast majority of people struck with the guilt complex over Aristotle’s philosophical irrelevance often simply accept the long unchallenged prejudices of folks like Locke rather than bothering to actually read Aristotle himself (oh no! Aristotle was WRONG about physical motion!). It doesn’t seem clear to anyone who panics over this why substance and accident are no longer meaningful nor how these are connected with his inadequate physics. Why exactly is substance no longer a meaningful principle of reality? Because Locke and Hume say so? Does quantum physics commit us to a Humean empiricist ontology? Has Fr. Kelly wrestled with all of the metaphysical issues involved in those debates?
Were that the case, I’d venture to say we wouldn’t find a single Catholic willing to be as consistent a Humean as Hume was in denying substance. It doesn’t seem clear to anyone what is really at stake in denying these categories. Just try to give an alternative “non-Aristotelian” metaphysical account that doesn’t somehow imply something like substance and accident. If you can pull it off, I dare say the negative consequences for ontology would be so vast that such a vision would be even less appealing for Eucharistic theology than mean old Aristotle’s.
And if you can’t really avoid even something like substance and accidents in describing reality metaphysically- let alone “transubstantiaton”- then why worry so much about being branded “an Aristotelian?”
Of course there is infinitely more than this that must be said about the sacrament. But Kelly’s point that this kind of description has been falsified is just silly.
Pax Christi,
One way of seeing it that helps me is this: one of God’s primary jobs is to continually make things what they are. God is constantly keeping creation in existence. So for Him to change from making the accidents (the physical characteristics) of the bread and wine into the substance of bread and wine and instead make them into the substance of Jesus is simply Him making a change (in a special way) from doing what He is already doing.
Now that I’ve written that down, I don’t know if it makes any sense, but it does help me in thinking about it.
Sorry, I’m not entirely sure I understand how this is a rejection of Church teaching…? I’ve read the quote many times and all he seems to be doing is disagreeing with the antiquated terminology used to describe the underlying truth.
“Sorry, I’m not entirely sure I understand how this is a rejection of Church teaching…? I’ve read the quote many times and all he seems to be doing is disagreeing with the antiquated terminology used to describe the underlying truth.”
Exactly. Aristotle wasn’t a Catholic. And X-Cathedra’s worries about Hume are just as antiquated: Idealism (of the Humean kind) has come under severe criticism on several fronts. Realism. . . that is the belief in mind independent objects. . . is alive and well in several different forms. Essentialism is back, in a more logically rigorous form than Aristotle could have imagined. And indeed catholics such as Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach played a significant role in the formation of modern analytic philosophy.
We really could do without Aristotle; indeed his continued influence is mostly for ill.
Lutherans don’t try to explain how or why that Christ True Body and Blood are in the Sacrament, we just take Christ at His Word when He said ” This is …” and believe it.
As a former student of the late Fr. Clarkewho wholly accepted his creative retrieval of Thomistic metaphysics, and as someone who self-identifies as a Thomist, I am a big fan of Aristotle, but I have long thought that “inadequate” might be a fair description for applying the substance-accident terminology to the Eucharist provided that one’s use of that terminology remains very strictly Aristotelian. Considering that bread is an artifact, in what sense is it a single substance prior to the consecration? Not in the strictest Aristotelian sense, I dare to speculate. Not in a way that Aristotle would himself approve, I suspect.
From the very beginning of the Church, Christians have believed that the Eucharistic bread and wine are the body and blood of Christ. But for centuries, they did not try to explain how this happened.
Beginning about the 12th century, theologians began offering an explanation in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics. Hence “transsubstantiation”, which, it must be remembered, is not the name of the Eucharistic mystery, but of one particular explanation of the mystery using the categories of a particular philosophy.
But the Magisterium made — or seems to have made — transsubstantiation an article of faith. What are the consequences of this, given that one can’t have transubstantiation without Aristotelian metaphysical categories? Two possibilities:
1. Since transsubstantiation is an article of faith, then the Aristotelian metaphysics of substance and accident is now also an article of faith.
2. Since the Christian faith does not imply a particular philosophy, transsubstantiation cannot be an article of faith. Anyone who has reason to believe that there is a better metaphysics than that of Aristotle is free to offer a different explanation of the Eucharistic mystery, provided it preserves the perennial belief that the Eucharist is the body and blood of Christ.
Are these the only two options?
“We really could do without Aristotle; indeed his continued influence is mostly for ill.”
Soooo, the guy who basically invented logic, gave us the criteria for scientific knowledge and the first workable realist metaphysics is a bad influence?
Charles
You do realize Christians had their faith before the use of Aristotle, and many have never thought they needed to use his philosophy for the sake of eucharistic discussions?
Excuse my point here. Right now it is difficult to concentrate with so much input. What is Mary’s part in the Eucharist, since it was her body in union with the Holy Spirit that gave God human body? When he says this is my body and blood, it is also Mary’s body and blood.
How we observe something has an effect on it. Mary’s mitochondria which are the life support of every cell in a human body gave Christ his life support throughout his life and death. It was her blood which was also shed.
When he states this is my body and blood who else is it connected to?
Gargano,
I would suggest that there is room for more than the two options you name. I offer a third – that transsubstantiation is an article of faith, but that the term substance, and even the substance-accident distinction, can be understood dynamically and modified in light of what we have come to know since Aristotle, even in ways that Aristotle might not himself approve of, in order to retain a useful distinction and also to understand transsubstantiation better. The doctrine of Transsubstantiation itself would probably have been judged by Aristotle as nonsense, so right away, there was a departure from Aristotle even as we made use of a certain terminological distinction of his.
Although I offer this third option for consideration, I do not commit to it. I remain open to all three. (Even option 1 – I have a better-than-the-average-layman’s understanding of quantum physics, and it has not made me doubt the usefulness of a more-or-less vintage Aristotelian substance-accident distinction).
Fascinating post and discussion all.
I’m not sure quite how to start.
First, I think it is worth noting that Thomas didn’t adopt Aristotle whole-cloth in his discussions about Eucharist. Many have pointed out that transubstantiation is impossible in a purely Aristotelian system. Ergo, the Church’s canonization of transubstantiation is not quite the canonization of Aristotle that some suggest it is.
Second, with or without Aristotle’s categories, any attempt to describe Eucharistic change is going to need to distinguish between appearances and ultimate reality. (I think X hints at this point.) One need not be a full-on Aristotelean to accept this basic distinction. (I think phosphorius hints at this point.)
Thirdly, regarding Luther and Lutherans, it is true that the early Luther was quite happy to let philosophical speculation pass and simply affirm Christ’s words. In this was he was much like the early Church. However, he was eventually forced into a more and more explicitly philosophical description by his encounters with what he called “the fanatics” (Zwingli et. al.) who denied Real Presence. What he chose was something like Occam’s explanation, which Catholics would call consubstantiation, though Luther himself did not.
This actually parallels the development in the medieval Church. Everyone was quite happy to affirm Christ’s words without much explicit philosophy until Berengar. Once faced with an explicit denial of Christ’s presence based in philosophy, the Church responded with a more philosophical description of that presence. The Orthodox have not yet had their hand forced on this issue.
Fourth, I am, with X, quite skeptical of Father Kelly’s suggestion that modern physics has much at all to do with the matter at hand. Surely the only metaphysics we can derive purely from the science lab is a non-metaphysics.
Fifth, I think Bruce has grabbed something useful even if it is not fully articulated. At one point Thomas says that transubstantiation involves taking away what kept bread from being Jesus. This makes no sense outside of John chapter 1. But, if Jesus is the ground and goal of creation, what prevents something from being Jesus is simply ontological independence. Take that from bread, and Christ is all you have left.
The same process is supposed to be happening to us, by the way, but human freedom means our own “transubstantiation” is a touch more complex than that of the bread. To explore this is, of course, to tie the Eucharist to the Church in the way de Lubac demands, as Nathan helpfully points out.
The Church’s use of “substance” and “accidents” certainly originates with Aristotle, but is not reducible to him or any other system. The Church’s dialogue with and extraction of language from philosophy is more complex than Fr. Kelly implies.
If we look at the historical journey of this language into dogma, it has surprisingly little to do with Aristotle and much, much more to do with more obscure medieval figures like Paschasius Rabertus, Ratramnus, Rabanus Maurus, Berengar of Tours and Alberic of Monte Casino. The dogma of transubstantiation originates centuries before the Aristotelian synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas and, indeed, rests on a much firmer foundation than Aristotle.
“Soooo, the guy who basically invented logic, gave us the criteria for scientific knowledge and the first workable realist metaphysics is a bad influence?”
Yes.
In as far as his word is taken to be the final word, then yes. Logic has moved on since Aristotle, and so has science.
“It is not that I love Aristotle less, it is that I love the truth more.”
In the original article, Kelly could have addressed the question of Japanese translation without questioning the “Aristotelian” understanding of the Eucharist. (As noted, Thomas was not merely an Aristotelian.) I don’t know what Kelly’s purpose was for writing the article, but it made him look like he’s itching for a fight about the Real Presence. He should have at least anticipated that impression and stated the orthodox understanding of the doctrine, out of respect for the Church.
“In the original article, Kelly could have addressed the question of Japanese translation without questioning the “Aristotelian” understanding of the Eucharist. ”
But what’s wrong with questioning Aristotle or Aristotleanism?
When you’re mentioned by name in the Code of Canon Law, you’re a VIP. Aquinas isn’t the Church’s only theologian and philosopher, but he is the Church’s default, and that’s got to rate some respect. Kelly can state an argument in favor of a different understanding of the Real Presence if he wants to, but he shouldn’t be dismissive toward Thomism. He appears that way in the article.
To disagree with a philosopher is not to disrespect that philosopher.
Philosophy thrives on disagreement.
Phos, I didn’t mean that he disrespected Thomas. He disrespected (or gave the impression of being dismissive of) Thomism. And while it’s true that philosophy thrives on disagreement, he should have articulated his reasons for disagreeing with the Church’s default position more thoroughly.
Also, I don’t think that theology necessarily thrives on disagreement.
Fourth, I am, with X, quite skeptical of Father Kelly’s suggestion that modern physics has much at all to do with the matter at hand. Surely the only metaphysics we can derive purely from the science lab is a non-metaphysics.
Not so surely. Concepts such as relativity and the potentially stochastic nature of reality at its fundamental levels as described by quantum physics can certainly call into question the deterministic nature of “common-sense” metaphysics. It is not unrealistic to assume that if nature is relativistic, shouldn’t metaphysics be as well?
Let me give a concrete example: Assume substance is relativistic. Therefore, a chair is only a chair insofar as the observer considers it a chair. To the human, who can sit, the chair has “substance”. To the mouse, who is incapable of sitting and has not the rational capability to grasp the concept, a chair and a tree are substantially equivalent.
Now let me stir up some real controversy – consider the Eucharist under this relativistic model. The Eucharist is only substantially Christ to the degree in which the observer considers it so. For the faith-filled Catholic, the Eucharist is “substantially” Christ. For the mouse, the Eucharist is substantially bread. For the fallen-away cradle catholic under the effect of mortal sin, it is somewhere in the middle.
Even though this is only a thought experiment, doesn’t this seem acutely in tune with the general human experience regarding the Eucharist?
I have to admit that from the early days of my catholic upbringing the concept behind “Transubstantiation” seemed a rather odd one – one that had human fingerprints all over it IMO. Personally I find Fr. Kelly’s reflections much more timely and appealing than the in my view dated official concepts defended by a number of fine catholics here. Sure a number of humans like a bit of classical hokus pokus – but what is wrong if others seek and discover deeper meaning along other venues.
I was reading today this post over at Andrew Sullivans blog and found it a very attractive articulate description.
“…I don’t need miracles (suspicious of them, actually), and I don’t need God (the Father restricts me from my spiritual quest), and I don’t need God miraculously in the flesh performing miracles until he miraculously vanishes back into God again. ”
http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2010/05/jesu-1.html
“Also, I don’t think that theology necessarily thrives on disagreement.”
All the more reason to distinguish quite clearly between theology and philosophy. . . we must be clear about what can be disagreed with and what can’t.
Thomism is fair game, philosophically speaking. The real presence is not.
Dan, the whole point is that the truth of the Real Presence isn’t dependent on human experience. Like the song says, praestet fides supplementum sensuum defectui.
Ditto to Grega. Andrew Sullivan may not need God to perform miracles, but He does anyway. It’s not Andrew’s call.
Dan,
I think that the traditional idea of substance has already anticipated and met these objections.
Substance is defined as that which is present to the intelligence, while accidents are present to the senses. Included then, in the definition, is the fact that substance will not be accessible to those without intelligence. To say that, for the mouse, Christ is not substantially present is roughly equivalent to affirming that, for the blind man, the sun neither rises nor sets. (We are forgetting, for the sake of the example, that the sun also warms, but we could just as easily posit someone who lacks the sense to perceive warmth.) There is a certain truth behind the statement, but I think it is much more accurate to indicate that the reality of the sunset exists independently of one’s capacity to perceive light (or warmth).
To return to the mouse, for it not even the bread is “substantially” bread. For mice nothing is “substantially” anything.
Dan, the whole point is that the truth of the Real Presence isn’t dependent on human experience. Like the song says, praestet fides supplementum sensuum defectui.
But it is. A mouse does not consume Christ when it eats the Eucharist, at least not in the same sense a human does. Frankly, even though it is just a thought experiment, I feel that the “relativity” framework above is actually more logical and consistent than the current explanation based on Aristotelian metaphysics.
And by “observer”, I don’t necessarily mean sense perception. The Eucharist analogy above would not be a sensory observation.
I think that the traditional idea of substance has already anticipated and met these objections.
…
There is a certain truth behind the statement, but I think it is much more accurate to indicate that the reality of the sunset exists independently of one’s capacity to perceive light (or warmth).
Herein lies the subtle difference in my proposition. Quantum physics asserts that such an independent existence is actually unreal. The sun does NOT in fact rise and set if nobody is there to observe it. It is a direct violation of common sense, but it has been proven on the quantum scale. Nature does, in fact, behave this way. If you think through what this means, it definitely does have metaphysical connotations. It is entirely plausible that Aristotelian metaphysics, while helpful at the common sense scale, do not accurately represent reality. There may be a “quantum metaphysic” that is more consistent with observed reality.
Therefore, to bring this around to my post above, using such a metaphysic, you could potentially say without heresy that Christ is objectively and substantially more present in the Eucharist to the believer than the non-believer. Using Aristotelian metaphysics, you’d have a scarlet letter for even suggesting such a concept.
Folks, the elephant in the room is that “transubstantiation” was dogmatically defined in 1215 at Lateran IV, i.e. BEFORE ST. THOMAS AQUINAS WAS BORN. This was a period in Church history when Aristotle’s works were not well known, and among those in the hierarchy who did know them, they were generally regarded with suspicion and contempt.
The debate that lead to the definition of this dogma took place without ANY REFERENCE to Aristotle. I strongly recommend “Theology, Rethoric, and Politics in the Eucharistic Controversy, 1078-1079″ (Columbia University Press) for anyone who might be interested in the historical facts of the matter.
“Quantum physics asserts that such an independent existence is actually unreal. The sun does NOT in fact rise and set if nobody is there to observe it.”
Could you explain this claim in a little more detail? I appreciate that that may be difficult to get across to those of us who don’t study quantum physics, but I’m not sure I can engage you if I don’t know what this claim means. Thanks.
It is absolutely false that modern physics obviates the need for a metaphysics of form.
I’d go so far as to say that the many good and intelligent people who THINK this is the case did not properly understand Aristotle’s or Thomas’s metaphysics in the first place.
I got my Aquinas and Aristotle from Copleston, which is maybe why I’m puzzled. If you think by “form” or “substance” they’re talking about some physical entity or an ethereal thing, this is a poor way to look at what they’re saying. The doctrine of substance, form, accident was an attempt to place a technical language around knowledge we have about how things work, but that is not reflected. We know things are substances, but as Copleston said, not in the sense we know whether or not there’s a snake under our chair, but in the sense that when someone points it out to us, we nod in agreement that yes, things have causes, and yes, there are intelligible patterns in our experience.
Purge the magic from how you think about Aristotle & Aquinas, and transubstantiation still makes sense.
I agree with Flannery O’Connor: “If it’s ‘symbolic,” then TO HELL WITH IT!”
And I, too, would like a further explanation of the light that quantum physics sheds on the ‘theory’ of Transubstantiation–but, even without knowing this ‘theory,’ I still feel that there’s logic behind it; after all, Christ established the Eucharist for us–it’s part of His relationship with us, and without us, it wouldn’t exist (viz. He and us, together, make it happen)–just as, perhaps, according to your quantum physics, without us, the sun wouldn’t “rise” or “set.” (Is it possible that the true issue of THAT discussion lies in the terms “rise” and “set”–which are, strictly, speaking phenomena only describable in terms discernable by human sensory perceptions?)
Could you explain this claim in a little more detail?
This is a complex topic that cannot be adequately condensed into a single post. I would suggest looking up Schrodinger’s Cat and the Double-Slit experiment to get a better perspective on just how bizarre things get in the quantum world. The latter may require some scientific literacy, so I’ll do my best to give an imperfect analogy below.
If I have my hand behind my back and tell you to guess how many fingers I’m holding up, there are six possible states: no fingers, one finger, two fingers, etc… (for simplicity, ignore the possible combinations for now). Common sense indicates that my hand can only be in one of these states, and that this must be the case, even if nobody is looking. However, quantum physics asserts that, until you actually see my hand, the objective reality is that I am simultaneously holding up only one finger, AND only two fingers, AND only three fingers, etc; my hand is in every state simultaneously. However, once you observe my hand, the state “collapses” into only one of the six possible states and becomes deterministic. The actual act of observation is what determines how many fingers I’m holding up, not some pre-existing reality that you’re confirming when you observe it.
This sounds absurd, but it’s been proven, and you can do some amazing things if you’re clever enough to manipulate the system without observing it. For example, if you slid a piano behind me without looking at my hand and told me to play a Mozart composition requiring two hands, I could easily play it with one hand – even easier than playing it with two, because under this “superposition” of states, I have 5! fingers available to play with.
This is only one example of quantum weirdness. It gets much worse as you dig deeper. And I haven’t begun to talk about general relativity yet, which is another fly in the ointment of what we consider objective reality.
Here’s the definition of Lateran IV for anyone who’s interested:
“Una veri est fidelium universalis Ecclesia, extra quam nullus omnio salvatur, in qua idem ipse sacerdos est sacrificium Iesus Christus, cuius corpus et sanguis in sacramento altaris sub speciebus panis et vini veraciter continentur transsubstantiatis pane in corpus et vino in sanguinem potestate divina” (Lateran IV, Can. 1).
It’s a long way from Schrodinger’s thought experiment to the abandonment of the concept of objective truth. Schrodinger certainly wouldn’t have made that leap.
Dan you are a bit misleading with your various fun examples – you know full well that to freely translate forth and back between quantum physical effects and the macroscopic world is beyond comparing apples and oranges. To than attempt to derive lessons from this rather questionable experiMental setup for religious dogma and ” mysteries” might make for a nice brain twister but otherwise creates more of a mental mirage in my opinion than anything tangible.
Dan you are a bit misleading with your various fun examples – you know full well that to freely translate forth and back between quantum physical effects and the macroscopic world is beyond comparing apples and oranges. To than attempt to derive lessons from this rather questionable experiMental setup for religious dogma and ” mysteries” might make for a nice brain twister but otherwise creates more of a mental mirage in my opinion than anything tangible.
Yes, exactly. I’m not proposing anything concrete at all. But I don’t think I’m misleading. The macroscopic examples I give are allegorical manifestations of underlying quantum principles. Whether the sun or an electron, the philosophical impact remains the same within the context of this discussion.
The purpose of my analogies is to call into question brettsalkeld’s assertion that physics has little bearing on metaphysics, which stands in contrast to Fr. Kelly’s position is that modern physics begs a new metaphysic which supersedes Aristotelian metaphysics.
I personally don’t think either position is correct. Quantum weirdness and general relativity are philosophically problematic and cannot be swept under the rug. But neither can it be ignored that Aristotle’s categories have stood the test of time and are perhaps the most effective metaphysical system for common experience.
It is definitely premature to draw a chalk line around Aristotle, given that there is still ongoing debate as to whether quantum physics describes objective reality, or whether it is just the best mathematical model we have. However, we do need to open our minds up to the concept that perhaps there are other systems out there that may better describe reality.
In response to the original poster’s question, yes, we do still need Aristotle, but at the end of the day it may not look anything like the Aristotle we think we know.
Does “objective reality” presuppose or require substance?
Quantum physics asserts nothing about the state of one’s hand behind one’s back, and if it did, that would be a decisive reductio ad absurdum of quantum physics. You already know what state your hand is in whether you can see it or not – YOU CAN FEEL IT, and YOU DECIDED! Quantum physics does not tell us that your hand (being, as it is, so much bigger than an electron) is ever in a state of quantum superposition. It also has nothing to say about sunsets and sunrises (which scientific people took to be appearances conceptually distinct from reality — as in “saving the appearances” — even before Copernicus and Galileo). Some physicists have advanced very dubious philosophical theories as being The One True Way to make sense of the equations of quantum mechanics. Unfortunately, the most scientifically fashionable interpretation of quantum physics is the Copehangen Interpretation, which inflates epistemological limits on what we can know simultaenously about the position and momentum of subatomic particles into unsupportable metaphysical propositions such as “The moon isn’t there when no one is looking at it” [No, I am not kidding - here is the reference: N.D. Mermin "Is the moon there when nobody looks? Reality and the quantum theory", Physics Today, 38(4) (April 1985) 38-47.]
Such absurd positions are not only incompatible with any notion of substance or Transubstantiation, they are incompatible with the Real Presence of ANYTHING ANYWHERE AT ANYTIME, let alone that of the Body, Blood, Soul and Divinity of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist. There are other ways to rationally interpret the data of quantum physics without accepting such absurdly soplisistic positions. We do not have to accept the Copenhagen interpretation. I am partial to David Bohm’s hypothesis of the implicate order, as it is in no small part a very insightful retrieval of Aristotelian hylomorphism, and it is also remarkably lacking in hostility to the notion of Transubstantiation. Change the terminology to implicate order and explicate order instead of substance and accident if you want, the difference, if there is one, is theologically trivial.
Kevin – From what I’ve seen, that extreme form of quantum-physics-as-philosophy is incompatible with the idea of an all-knowing God. If observation makes a thing definite, then God must not be looking at sub-atomic particles. But that extreme form is something I’ve never seen from physicists, only from scifi groupies. (But then again, just because I’ve never seen physicists argue it, does that mean they don’t?)
Besides the problems with moving seamlessly from the quantum level of description to the macro, there is of course the question of why any of this should apply to what has traditionally been understood as a supra-physical level of description. If we can talk about the effects of quantum principles upon physical phenomena, why should we assume that this applies to the Real Presence and the reality of Christ’s body and blood as understood in transubstantiation? This is, in short, why it is a category mistake to claim that quantum physics or any model of physics can somehow replace metaphysics. Surely, physical descriptions may force us to rethink our metaphysical categories, but the act as though quantum physics applies to the level of abstraction (supra-physical level of description) of metaphysics is simply to deny that metaphysics is something distinct. That is going beyond tweaking our metaphysics because of our physical principles. And if one’s position implies that metaphysical description itself, in its uniqueness, no longer makes sense, then one has an awfully large Magisterial hurdle to climb over.
Kevin is correct. Grega is correct. Jeff is correct. Brett is correct. Carl is correct. Carl points out one of the major reasons why the fear of being “too Aristotelian” is overblown.
Of course we could stress a hundred times over that nearly a thousand years of tradition didn’t need these categories to describe the mystery of the Eucharist. But at the end of the day we are the Church on the other side of Trent, and with Trent we acknowledge a particular development of doctrine in a particular form. In short, we need not call ourselves Aristotelians, but we simply aren’t allowed to “go back” to some golden age before the doctrine was defined in an authoritative way. Before Chalcedon, there may have been a number of ways to get across the idea that Jesus was fully God and fully man. But after Chalcedon, we have no choice but to grapple with the formulation in terms of two natures.
This is not to say that one need use the same words. But surely if one is to be orthodox, one must achieve the ideas expressed in the formulations. And if that’s the case, then why the fuss? The same reasoning applies to the use of categories like person, hypostasis, will, etc. in other doctrinal formulations. From the perspective of contemporary physics, I’d venture to say that none of the traditional categories used in dogmatic formulae make any sense. Would it be prudent then to abandon such concepts about, say, the Trinity or the wills of Christ, because from a quantum perspective these concepts are reducible to quarks and probabilistic states of being? This would be to confuse the kinds of descriptions of reality that physics and metaphysics are meant to give.
Anyone making a statement like that of Fr. Kelly has to be weary of the implicit scientism that lurks in claims that modern physics makes metaphysical concepts obsolete: there is a presupposition that the formality of physical analysis is the only meaningful one; one that gives, as it were, an exhaustive account of being. The Church has never been convinced that this is so. In other words, it is careless and imprudent to claim that categories like substance and accident (Aristotelian or not) are discredited by modern science (especially when one is not even doing the dirty work of arguing why that’s the case).
Phosphorious: your question is a philosophical one, the answer to which could be debated at the philosophical level. I would venture to say that it could not adequately be so described without substance, at least metaphysically, and whatever principle you replace it with to do the same job that substance does would likely make the two so similar, the difference would be nominal. But that kind of discussion is quite different from claiming that these kinds of categories are shown to be “meaningless” because of what modern science has achieved.
Pax Christi,
This is not to say that one need use the same words. But surely if one is to be orthodox, one must achieve the ideas expressed in the formulations.
I think this is very important, and in part, because of the history of Christian theology. As we both know, the original Nicene Creed said there was one “ousia or hypostasis” for the Trinity. One could use that to argue “this is definitive, we must use the terms in these ways.” Or we can look to St Cyril of Alexandria’s “one united nature” and use that to criticize Chalcedon. The councils and their definitions must be understood in relation to the theology they are pointing to — and not necessarily according to the words used. But in saying this, it is right, any further exploration must follow in the direction of previous tradition. I think good arguments can be made about the problems of transubstantiation, and a recognition of those problems accepted, while still using the word with those caveats; indeed, the Orthodox still dislike the word, but no one criticizes their eucharistic theology as heretical. Probably the biggest problem is how transubstantation is misunderstood to be something about the physics, and this might be a reason to look for other terminology, or at least to make it positively clear that transubstantiation is not about the physical. The second, though, becomes difficult, because people often end up saying “you are just playing with words, trying to deny the real presence.” When that happens more than not, I think that might be the time to look for other ways of dealing with the transformation — until then, it might be right to try to just use the words and explain their meaning.
This is not to say that one need use the same words. But surely if one is to be orthodox, one must achieve the ideas expressed in the formulations.
So then why this crucifixion of Fr. Kelly? Isn’t he just criticizing the words that are being used? I see nothing heretical in his statement. Granted, he does seem to complain without offering any alternative that would help resolve the issue of orthodoxy. But it seems to me that we must assume the best about his prospective orthodoxy before assuming the worst.
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Mysterium Ecclesiae (1973):
“Finally, even though the truths which the Church intends to teach through her dogmatic formulas are distinct from the changeable conceptions of a given epoch and can be expressed without them, nevertheless it can sometimes happen that these truths may be enunciated by the Sacred Magisterium in terms that bear traces of such conceptions.
“In view of the above, it must be stated that the dogmatic formulas of the Church’s Magisterium were from the beginning suitable for communicating revealed truth, and that as they are they remain forever suitable for communicating this truth to those who interpret them correctly.”
Can anyone imagine/invent/make up a case it which “transubstantiation” would occur and be recognized or acknowledged? Could a miracle be worked to “transubstantiate” lead into gold? All the physical properties down to the atomic structure of lead would remain, but what you would have is gold. Would that make sense?
Also, isn’t replacing the substance “bread” with the substance “Jesus Christ — body, blood, soul, and divinity” kind of an uneven swap? It is somewhat easier to imagine bread becoming flesh and wine becoming blood. And of course Jesus didn’t say anything except, “This [bread] is my body,” and, “This [wine] is my blood.” If he had said anything approaching the highly elaborated doctrine of transubstantiation, it would have been very bizarre indeed. It seems to me transubstantiation is an attempt to explain the inexplicable. It actually might be a stumbling block that interferes with belief in the Real Presence.
Bread is not mysteriously bread because it has the substance of bread. It is bread because of its physical properties and chemical structure. It is much easier to believe in the Real Presence without transubstantiation.
(I thought I would use my Baltimore Catechism understanding of transubstantiation to bring the discussion back to earth.)
By the way, Schrödinger’s thought experiment about the cat (or rabbit, or whatever) was not offered as a description of reality. It was offered as an argument against the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. He was basically saying, “If you go that route, look at the crazy consequences you end up with.”
X-Cathedra’s paragraph beginning “Anyone making a statement like that of Fr. Kelly, etc” is perhaps the most well-stated thing I’ve read in the last year (and I read a lot). Well done.
I am in basic agreement with X.
I think that physics can require a tweaking of metaphysics, but nothing I have read here or elsewhere makes me think “substance” has been rendered meaningless. Even if you get rid of “substance” it will necessarily be replaced with something meaning almost exactly the same thing. Substance, for all the difficulty we go through to define and explain it, is really a very common sense affirmation. It stems from the fact that all of us can tell a tree from a river, even when quantum physics can’t. It is relative to intelligence, but since we believe in an intelligent creator it remains something objective.
Lastly, about crucifying Father Kelly, I want to express my appreciation to Nathan for approaching this in a helpful and charitable way. I think Father Kelly makes a mistake, but I have no use for the kinds of things people are writing about him over at Catholic Culture (which you will see if you follow the link in Nathan’s post).
Whether or not quantum theory makes Aristoltelian metaphysics “implausible and unintelligible” (as the original article claims) is an interesting issue, one which some posters have enjoyed debating.
But let’s forget about the quantum theory aspect of the claim, and focus on the more general question: if someone believes he has good philosophical reasons for considering Aristotelian metaphysics, or more generally any substance-accident metaphysics, “implausible and unintelligible”, can he be a faithful Catholic? In other words, if transsubstantiation is an article of faith, is a substance-accident metaphysics ipso facto an article of faith?
Experience has shown that it is dangerous to draw non-theological conclusions from the Bible (the world cannot be millions of years old because that contradicts the chronology in the Bible) or from dogmas (the evolution of man from earlier primates cannot be true because then there would be no original couple from whom we all inherit original sin).
Since transubstantiation presupposes a specific metaphysics, shouldn’t we say that transubstantiation is binding only on those who share this metaphysics? For those who do not share this metaphysics, the Church has not [yet] defined how the Eucharistic bread and wine are the body and blood of Christ.
It is relative to intelligence, but since we believe in an intelligent creator it remains something objective.
That is very Platonic for an argument concerning Aristotle. :)
It took 1000 years to get to Trent – in my mind these things are not set in stone at all – sure some will vigerously insist that nothing can/ should/ is allowed to ever change – I find such a view rather naive – of course the fact that we are allowing for as rapid or slow of change in the understanding of our physical surroundings as dictated by emerging scientific data does of course influence actual peoples thoughts – even the philosophical/religious kinds.
Fr. Kelly willingness to freely ponder the issues discussed here without inhibition is a very positive thing in my view – very much within the best of catholic scholarly traditions. The sort of underlying theological and philosophical concepts – and frankly strictly human emotional desires -that lead to the concoction of the doctrine of transubstantiation in my view may very well lead us in a slightly different direction in light of our more recent understand of our place in this universe.
In my view we are rapidly approaching a juncture like Trent – just listen between the lines of many issues discussed here at Vox Nova – this is not our fathers catholic church anymore – in my view a good thing – I would not be shocked if the church will break up into a progressive fraction and a traditional one. The progressives will have married and female clergy and a God better described by the Holy spirit than by Father and Son.
I actually find it rather childish to insist
Well said, Henry.
Dan: I hardly think my comments amount to a crucifixion of Fr. Kelly. I simply think he’s mistaken and it is his judgment on the vitality and meaningfulness of substance and accident that I’ve criticized. By saying that it’s hard to square his statement with Magisterial teaching, I mean only that the tradition has never taught, and shows no sign of teaching anytime soon, that the categories of substance and accident have been rendered useless by modern physics. Nor do they show any sign of teaching that metaphysical description as such has been overtaken by quantum physics, which is, I think, what his claim boils down to.
It is not merely the words he is criticizing; it is the concepts. Perhaps I’m reading it wrong, but it seems he is denying as unintelligible the entire framework of analysis that would give those words their meaning. He simply seems to think that these concepts only derive their import from Aristotle’s phusis. Certainly part of his point is that these notions no longer make sense to anyone, but as I noted, the same applies to the concepts we employ in dogmatic statements about the Trinity and nature of Christ. It strikes me as a bit odd that he would claim quantum mechanics somehow render the words, and not the concepts behind them, of no use.
I also pointed out that implicit in many claims like his is a kind of scientism or materialism, which believes physical descriptions of reality are the only kind possible. In that case, it would make sense to rather nonchalantly assume that transubstantiation is simply a problem of physics, and that quantum physical principles directly effect categories like substance and accident. Just a warning. I am not gathering the wood to burn him at the stake.
Pax Christi,
Dan: I hardly think my comments amount to a crucifixion of Fr. Kelly.
I was referring to the general offensive against Fr. Kelly, not you specifically. I should have been more precise. Apologies.
David Nichol,
I would argue that human beings are, in some sense, “transubstantiated” in baptism. Obviously, it’s not the kind or extent of a change the Church believes to take place during the consecration of the Eucharist, but there is a change in the essential character of man, even though all outward appearances remain unchanged.
I would also make the case that while to all appearances, the earth appears as “the third rock from the sun careening haplessly through space,” it is really a kind of tabernacle at the center of the universe. In saying this, I’m not advocating a pre-Copernican scientific model, but rather pointing on a disparity between the “philosophical/theological substance of our world” and the “astro-physical accidents of our planet.” Biology and physics have no more capacity to prove that human life is not special and our world is unimportant than chemistry has the ability to prove that the Eucharist is mere bread.
I would also note that just as chemistry should not be coerced into tell me about the real presence, physics should not be manipulate into telling us about geocentrism. Let the evidence stand and speak or fall and be silent on its own merit rather than on its convenience to our presuppositions.
Dan,
;) I have thought more than once that I detect a hint of Platonism in transubstantiation. Nevertheless, I’m not sure that the afore-mocked (in a good sense, don’t worry) sentence is my best work. I would rather ground objectivity at a lower level than the mind of God, at least as a first step. Primary and secondary causality and all that. ;)
Our Lutheran Confessions state this in the Book of Concord about our ( Lutheran ) belief in Christ’s True Body and True Blood in the Sacrament of the Altar.
35 In addition to the words of Christ and of St. Paul (the bread in the Lord’s Supper “is true body of Christ” or “a participation in the body of Christ”),3 we at times also use the formulas “under the bread, with the bread, in the bread.” We do this to reject transubstantiation and to indicate the sacramental union between the untransformed substance (tr-985) of the bread and the body of Christ. 36 The Scriptures do the same thing when they reproduce and explain the statement, “The Word became flesh,”4 with such equivalent phrases as, “The Word dwelt in us,”5 or “In Christ the whole fullness of the deity dwells bodily,”6 or “God was with him,”7 or “God was in Christ,”8 and similar expressions. Thus the Scriptures explain that the divine essence has not been transformed into the human nature but that both untransformed natures are personally united. 37 Many prominent ancient teachers, like Justin, Cyprian, Augustine, Leo, Gelasius, Chrysostom, and others, have cited the personal union as an analogy to the words of Christ’s testament, “This is my body.” For as in Christ two distinct and untransformed natures are indivisibly united, so in the Holy Supper the two essences, the natural bread and the true natural body of Christ, are present together here on earth in the ordered action of the sacrament, 38 though the union of the body and blood of Christ with the bread and wine is not a personal union, like that of the two natures in Christ, but a sacramental union, as Dr. Luther and our theologians call it in the above-mentioned articles of agreement of 15369 and elsewhere. Thereby they wished to indicate that, even though they also use these different formulas, “in the bread, under the bread, with the bread,” they still accept the words of Christ in their strict sense and as they read, and they do not consider that in the proposition (that is, the words of Christ’s testament), “This is my body,” we have to do with a figurative predication, but with an unusual1 one (that is, it is not to be understood as a figurative, flowery formula or quibble about words). 39 As Justin says, “We receive this not as ordinary bread or an ordinary beverage, but we believe that just as Jesus Christ, our Saviour, was incarnate through the Word of God and for the sake of our salvation had flesh and blood, so the food blessed by him through the Word and prayer is the true flesh and blood of the Lord Jesus Christ.”