Postmodern Theology and Jean-Luc Marion: From ‘ego cogito’ to ‘ego amans’
Previous posts:
Postmodern Theology and Jean-Luc Marion: Being and Giveness
Postmodern Theology and Jean-Luc Marion (a brief opening move)
Marion’s critique of being is not only rooted in the history of giveness (which I described in the previous post in this series). It is also attached to his own critique of modernity’s neglect of the person as a lover. He traces this neglect back to Descartes’ cogito, the blue print for the modern person. This critique is crucial for understanding Marion’s thought in general (he began as a Cartesian scholar and translator) and his critique of being (treated in the previous post) which leads to his postmodern stance to theology.
In The Erotic Phenomenon (2007), Marion notes that in the original Latin of Descartes’ Meditations the ego is described excluding love. The first translator of Descartes from Latin into French, Duc de Luynes, added, “which loves, which hates” to the opening of Descartes’ Third Meditation. To see this for yourself, follow this link where you can compare each translation with the other.
Marion favors this revision (albeit unintended by Descartes) and exhorts us to take up Duc de Luynes’ addition to the ego and see ourselves “as the cogitans that thinks insofar as it first loves, in short as the lover (ego amans)… substituting for the ego cogito, which does not love.” Marion goes on to write, “It will be necessary, then, to take up the Meditationes from the starting point of the fact that I love even before being because I am not, except insofar as I experience love, and experience it as a logic.”
In short, Marion challenges the ontological structure of the widely accepted, and distinctly modern, cogito and argues that we do not think and therefore exist. We are given prior to being. We give before we think. We love first.
This philosophical move from ego cogito to ego amans that he makes in The Erotic Phenomenon follows his earlier, theological point about God without Being that we will return to in my next post. In short, it is this: Once we abandon the inferior category of being we can locate God within the realm of love as an iconic gift.
Making this point by distinguishing between Marion’s “icon” and “idol” will be next. Unless, of course, you see this as premature.
Trackbacks
- Derrida on Deconstruction and Christianity « Vox Nova
- Postmodern Theology and Jean-Luc Marion: An interlude on the ‘theological turn’ « Vox Nova
- Postmodern Theology and Jean-Luc Marion: An interlude on the ‘theological turn,’ continued « Vox Nova
- Postmodern Theology and Jean-Luc Marion: Recap « Vox Nova
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While I would concede that there are problems with the cogito, I do not think it is recieving fair treatment here. Cognition is not the cause of the ego, but evidence for the ego. Descartes certainly does not say anywhere that the ego does not or cannot love. His identification of the ego as the thinking thing is his indubitible proposition and his attempt to ground knowledge again. He is making an epistemological claim in the cogito, not a metaphysical claim. Those come later, and they are indeed problematic, but not because the cogito doesn’t speak about love.
BTW, I still don’t see how the statement I AM is a gift. The Cross? yes certainly; the burning bush? yes; but the I AM? it seems this must precede the gift. The Father is sufficient unto Himself. His gift is not necessary, it is a manefestation of His Love.
I’m not sure that I want to call God an Icon either. Icons are beings that point to the divine, I can see how they could give God to us in a mediated way, but God is greater than that.
ben: Three points:
1. Descartes — I think Marion sees the exclusion of “which loves, which hates” to the ego as something important for the development of the modern idea of many things. As you note, there is a great deal of epistemological emphasis here, and that is why Marion sees the experience of love as a Pascalian addition to modern rationality; however, there is also an ontological point to be made that supports the previous notion of being and giveness.
This move from rationality to ontology is not strange at all to critics of Descartes, none more eloquent about this (to me) than Pascal.
2. I AM and Gift — All I mean by suggesting that Marion would say that “I AM” is a gift is because “the I AM” is an excessive gift. Revelation, an apt way to describe “I AM,” is always a gift, I think. Again: “To show oneself, a thing must give itself.”
3. Icon — Here Marion’s meaning of icon (as opposed to idol) is not as you describe it here. But I will try to offer a careful description of it in the next post.
Ben, Thanks so much for reading and engaging with this series. As you can see, I am trying to make my points briefly and descriptively, but that certainly limits what I can say or want to say.
Peace.
Descartes epistemology ultimately lead to a dulistic metaphysics that came with a whole host of problems. Phenomenlogists have done a good job diagnosing these problems, but should remember at the same time that this dualism was not present in scholastic thought.
I might recommend the dialogue written by St. Theresa Benedicta of the Cross (Edith Stein)between St. Thomas and Edmund Husserl.
It seems that in case of God, He IS prior to showing or giving to creatures.
Now it may well be that Moses or Adam or ben experience God a a Gift, but that is because Moses and Adam and ben are finite creatures. Their finitude means that they experience God as He gives Himself to them, and not as he is in Himself.
One of the difficulties I have with phenomenology is that it seems to reduce metaphysics to epistemology by simply re-labeling it ontology. But God is not fundamentaly a phenomenon. He is fundametally who IS, and HE IS wholly independent of and prior to creation. I don’t know that phenomenology has a language to talk about that sort of transcendence.
ben: What is the title of that dialogue? Sounds fascinating.
I understand your critique of phenomenology and, of course, this is something that cuts into this descriptive series and into the tradition as a whole.
I think that after noting the “idol”/”icon” distinction I will explain the kind of phenomenon the icon is: saturated phenomenon. This theory of excess accounts for the “prior”-ness of God and, most importantly, the mystery God. It also alleviates some of what you rightly are concerned about with phenomenology at large.
Thanks again.
I beleive the dialogue is in this volume:
Knowledge and Faith (The Collected Works of Edith Stein) (Stein, Edith//the Collected Works of Edith Stein)
I was able to check it out of the local seminary’s library
Does gift have to do with the Father’s eternal giving himself over to the gift, the Son, who is the former’s very self-expression?
Thanks ben.
Mark: This seems like a very rich theological explanation, but, for Marion, “gift” or “donation” is still steeped in phenomenological discourse. So “gift” simply refers to the thing given. Theological commentary come with the iconic nature of the gift and its excess. That is what is up next (icon and, then, excess).
Marion states, “It will be necessary, then, to take up the Meditationes from the starting point of the fact that I love even before being because I am not, except insofar as I experience love, and experience it as a logic.” There is, of course, a sense in which you discover yourself in loving. But that refers to self-discovery and not to being. Strictly speaking, only an existing being can love, a non-existing being cannot do anything, including thinking and including loving. It seems to me that Marion is incoherent with this comment.
When Descartes speaks of the “cogito,” I personally think he refers to personal, conscious acts in general, including cogitation as well as loving, willing, deducing, promising, etc. All these acts require a personal being to perform them.