On Lying: A Moral Guide Based Upon Lombard’s Sentences. Part I: Introduction
Lying, because it is an affront against the Truth, is intrinsically evil. Truth, Goodness, and Beauty are one; an attack on one is an attack against all, which is why lying can never, in any circumstance, be said to be a good. Any lie will be a sin, and will require penance. But this is not the whole of the story.
Sins are not of equal importance; there are two dimensions to any sin, the objective evil produced, and the subjective guilt implicated upon the one who sins. The objective evil in an act could be great while the doer themselves are implicated with little to no subjective guilt; or, in theory, one could have great subjective guilt based upon a small objective evil (for example, the object of one’s could be greater than the effect one produces, because one is prevented from achieving one’s aim, like a would-be killer who is stopped before achieving the kill). Obviously, this also means one could produce little objective evil and have little subjective guilt, or, worst of all, one could do some great objective evil, knowing what one is doing, and freely doing it, thus accruing great subjective guilt. Talking about evil, one must not misunderstand what is being discussed and think of it as a substance; if one thinks of pure evil as substantially existent, one would be embracing dualism, a heresy.[1] Saying an act is intrinsically evil is not saying a thing which is evil in being is produced, but that the act does not accord with the greater good expected out of the person who is acting. Evil is the grasping for and engaging of a good which is out of place; it is not holistic; it is the embrace of a relative good in the place where a real, objective good is expected.[2] Objective evil is accomplished when one’s willed end does not achieve a proper good, while an act is said to be intrinsically evil when, in whatever situation one can consider it, one will always do something less by performing that one ought to do. But this does not tell us the quality of the evil, and the context of the act can be the only basis for that.
This should lead us to our question, what is it that we mean for something to be a lie? To begin with a simple explanation, we can say the following: A lie comes out of the willful intent to hide the truth from someone else. An opinion, even if it is wrong, is not a lie, because it presents one’s view of a contingent reality. One can be mistaken in one’s opinion, state it, and not lie, because you will to say what you think to be the case. Moreover, even if one’s statement is accurate, it does not mean one is not committing a lie. One can will to deceive, and present something one thinks is false, only to find out later what one thought was false turned out to be what was true. Thus a lie does not necessarily relate to the accuracy of one’s statement, though it always relates to the intent behind one’s declarations.
Because a lie is intrinsically evil, and whenever one lies, one commits a sin, theologians have found it important to map out the boundaries of the lie, to determine when it is that one commits a lie and when one does not, and to determine what moral culpability is had with particular lies. The issue is not simple, for the category of the lie is a genus with many different species, each which must be considered in kind. Moreover, since Scripture indicates many situations in which it appears one person or another lied, theologians have found it important to discern if they did indeed lie, and what it says about the person who lied, especially if the person in question is otherwise presented as one of the exemplars of the faith.
Peter Lombard’s Sentences, because of the influence it had on the development of Christian doctrine, provides a good foundation for our discussion on lies, and so, in order to understand what it is to lie, and what it means if we lie, we will explore Lombard’s presentation on lying and consider the implications of what he said.[3]
Footnotes
[1] Existence is a good, and if existence is a good, then anything which exists, would share in the good of existence. If evil existed, it cannot as pure evil, because it partakes of a good. Evil should be seen as a parasite upon the good, making it less than it should be.
[2] This is how St Augustine understood we could will evil: the good within the evil makes us believe that it is something which we can will, but in the end, all we are doing is willing something which is a lesser good than we ought to will. “Therefore, when the will cleaves to the common and unchangeable good, it attains the great and foremost goods for human beings, even though the will itself is only an intermediate good. But when the will turns away from the unchangeable and common good towards its own private good, or toward external or inferior things, it sins,” St. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will. Trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 68.
[3] Lombard’s discussion on lying begins in Book III, Distinction XXXVII c6. The primary word being used, in various forms, is “mendacium,” which can either imply a lie or a falsehood. But, once he gets beyond the lie in itself, he discusses the lie in the context of error, through “erro,” which means “I wander astray” or “I error.” Finally, he looks at the grave situation where one lies under oath, using ”periuro” which means “I commit perjury” or “I am giving a false oath.”
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- On Lying: A Moral Guide Based Upon Lombard’s Sentences. Part III: The Initial Classification « Vox Nova
- On Lying: A Moral Guide Based Upon Lombard’s Sentences. Part IV: The Secondary Classification « Vox Nova
- On Lying: A Moral Guide Based Upon Lombard’s Sentences. Part V: Definitions « Vox Nova
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A lie comes out of the willful intent to hide the truth from someone else.
Let me quibble here and note that it appears licit frequently to hide the truth. Things that I have read on lying offer licit alternatives, like evasion and obfuscation. Withholding information is hiding the truth, but it is not lying.
Saying an act is intrinsically evil is not saying a thing which is evil in being is produced, but that the act does not accord with the greater good expected out of the person who is acting.
This is kind of like the question about the tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it, but assuming someone performs an intrinsically evil act in all innocence, totally unaware that it is evil, and there is no harm done, does it make sense to say an evil act was done, or would it be more accurate to say an act was performed that under other circumstances would have been evil? There is no culpability, and no unfortunate consequence. It would appear that only God would be aware of the act as being evil (if it was).
David
To the first, you have a bit of logical confusion going on. I did not say that all attempts to hide the truth would be a lie, but, when one lies, there is a desire to hide the truth. Notice within the context, I also bring up the desire to deceive. Just like an apple is a fruit, but not all fruit would be apples.
The second is a necessity, though I could have gone further into it than I did — if you start assuming ontological evil as an existing thing, you have problems. It can only be a corruption, a misplacement of one good, taking it out of its proper place, thus corrupting its purpose and use. An intrinsic evil is an act which has something, in its nature, where it cannot be done without some misplacement of the good. And despite your assertion, our conscience would be able to lead us to know certain things are always wrong — lying is one of them.
Nonetheless, this is only the beginning of a longer text.
Henry,
I like your explication of this topic, and am glad you further explored this theme.
I do think, though, that certain development in modern thought allow us to emphasize aspects of premodern thought that went unemphasized but that were certainly there.
In the context of lying, I think one thing to draw out, as you do, is the transcendental link between the good, the true, the beautiful (and in Aquinas, at least) the ‘one’ (unum), something (aliquid), and thing (res).
By emphasizing the context of being and its transcendentals, we consider a lie in relation to its broader context, again, something you rightly include.
In this broader context, what also has to be considered is the act of communication, which necessarily involves meaning. Meaning is crucial when a lie is considered in the context of a response to a question, rather than a promulgation of a thought. Many of the schoolmen who wrote on this, e.g., Aquinas, really had in mind a volitional promulgation rather than an answer to a question. But when answering a question, one is immediately, de facto, brought into the context of the ‘world of meaning’ of the one asking – which, as in the Nazi case, is not at all the world of the good, the true and the beautiful.
I bring this up because I think one of the most widely used example – ye old Nazi/jew harboring example – tends to distort the issue greatly. But in the light of what you explain here, and in light of a great deal of premodern thought, some clarity can be put forth.
In the context where a Nazi asks a question, when we bear in mind the importance of communication and meaning, regarding whether or not a person is harboring a Jew, I would still submit that it is not a lie to say ‘no’. My reasons are as follows:
1) there is a tremendous disparity, if not an absolute one, between what the Nazi means by a “Jew” and what the one harboring a Jew understands as a “Jew” – not, perhaps in a strict logical way (i.e., a person of Jewish descent), but clearly in the greater context of being; the ‘world of meaning’ of the Nazi is, as I’ve already stated, not the world of meaning of the good, true, beautiful, etc., and so not the world of meaning of the person opposing the Nazi.
As we know, the premodern world would never have thought to reduce the whole of a context, the whole of being, to the logical order, so we are on firm ground when we reject this. Aquinas is the strongest opponent of such a maneuver, continually criticizing those who Platonically confuse the logical order with the real order. Thus, when the Nazi comes a’knockin’ asking about Jews, he does not mean “a person of the covenant,” or some such affirmative understanding of a jewish person; in fact, the Nazi does not mean a “person” at all. But the one harboring a Jew believes himself to be harboring a person. This disparity, through which meaning is communicated, sets the ground for the negative reply, which, although a logical contradiction, is not a real contradiction (i.e., not a contradiction of the good, true, beautiful etc.) and so not a lie.
Only a strict logicist would see this as ultimately nitpicking. Being, meaning, and reality are participated gifts, not static, univocally objective, gifts of thereness. For the majority of premodern thought, anyway, the real order was not superimposed as a discrete object. It was, rather, given to be in the beings themselves, and so constituted by participating entities.
To put it in terms of a concrete example: if, during the civil war era, a person was helping slave to escape, and a southerner approached such a person and said “are you harboring any of those slave dogs? (or any other derogatory term)” the person is perfectly justified in saying ‘no’. Similarly, because the broader context allows one to understand the meaning behind “Jew” in Nazi Germany, it means that one does not lie in disagreeing with the context.
In fact, it could be argued that one actually lies if one concedes affirmatively; for in that case, one has submitted to the Nazi meaning of a Jew, which is itself a lie.
The point is that the Nazi question is a loaded question, embedded in the context of lies. For the respondent to assume a simple, common world of meaning is a mistake; for there isn’t one. To acquiesce to any of the Nazi’s terms is to concede their meanings, and thus to concede a lie.
2) My second reason concerns what was already stated in a previous post, echoing the Catechism: that in considering the truth of something, we must consider the person’s “right” to it.
This may not be explicitly stated in any premodern account, but it is a formulation garnered from the wisdom of tradition.
I think a nuance reading of Aquinas, for example, on the matter would uncover a lot of these points. Unfortunately, there are so many poor translations of his genius floating around, interpreted through the neoscholasticism of the manual tradition, that his thought is left a distorted version of his actual thought.
I once sat in a grad class where Aquinas was characterized as the “ever-rationalist”?!?! As if he was a follower of Sigur of Brabant and the so-called ‘radical Aristotelians’?!?! I do think, though, that this is indicative of the great prejudice that surrounds Aquinas even among loyal Catholics.
I may yet submit such a reading of Aquinas as a response here. Time pending.
Great post Henry. Not a whole lot of new info here for me, but having it presented clearly and in order is helpful. I look forward to the rest of the series.
Interesting thoughts Brendan. I’ll have to think over them further. I’m what, if anything, Henry has to say in response.
pax
Brendan,
Please do submit such a reading from Aquinas, when you have time — though, of course, many of the issues you bring up here, I do also relate, sometimes only in passing (and not as well), as I engage the issue as it is brought up in Lombard. Certainly the issue of signification is important — in Augustine (and therefore in Lombard), and I would say, from Lombard to Aquinas (who also, I would say, adds to Lombard — and in my discussion, I do make some references to the ST)
Your point also brings into issue the whole post-modern linguistic question which must be addressed, and would not have been clear to the schoolmen. Perhaps the best way to address what you said is the question: can one say something, knowing full well that it could be interpreted validly and correctly and as being true, but say it in a way, expecting people will misinterpret it? Obviously, as you say here, there is no lie — and that would be a way to deal with difficult questions (such as you raise with the Nazis), though, I would say, in my understanding (which is nuanced, as you know), there would still be here, even if necessary and “justified,” even if it is not a lie per se, something slight which would be wrong and needing to be attoned for. Indeed, it presents why I would say that in real world situations, the corruption of sin gets in the way and would make no way out without its stain affecting us. And I find a couple places in Lombard where I can, and do, directly discuss this, because there are places where he had difficulty finding an answer, and it is clear it is because the situation is as I describe: one which has no real way out, a “catch-22.” Of course, more of that later — since I’ve put together a rather lengthy composition which I am cutting up into readable chunks.
JB
Thanks. I hope the rest remains clear — I admit, I don’t have a complete Latin text of Lombard to look at as I go through this, when I have questions over a translation (I did have access to a partial text, and all the chapter headings, so it helped), and there were a couple places I found the translation confusing, uncertain whether or not it is the translation or Lombard himself (though, for various reasons, I think it is the second, where he is pondering some things, but does not say it all, making it difficult to understand).
Henry Karlson,
Thank you for what looks to be a promising and intriguing series.
I look forward to the next installment.
In any case (and perhaps the answer to this particular inquiry might be addressed in a later episode of your series, but would like to ask it nevertheless), you said at the beginning of your entry here:
“Lying, because it is an affront against the Truth, is intrinsically evil. Truth, Goodness, and Beauty are one; an attack on one is an attack against all, which is why lying can never, in any circumstance, be said to be a good.”
I would like to ask if the manner in which Catholics in Europe helped Jews evade imminent persecution by the Nazis (or even, quite similarly, the bishops and presbyters of the early church who did likewise for fellow Christians in local churches in periods of persecution by the Romans) by engaging in well-intentioned lies in order to deceive these as to their own whereabouts — if they could be classified as actually having committed intrinsically evil acts especially given the particular predicament which seemed to warrant the necessity of such acts in order to produce the good of saving lives against what ultimately was a grand evil.
At any rate, I thank you for your efforts here on such great thought-provoking topics as this and look forward, if at all possible, to a reply in this regard.
Ari
Brendan and I discussed this a bit in here; one could say, with Brendan, it was not actually a lie. Or, another thing, saying that a lie cannot be said to be a good is not to say that a lie cannot produce good; indeed the indication, as will be shown a couple posts later, is that indeed, many lies produce good, and that helps determine how the lie (and sin produced) is classified. And to continue with my own point: that there are situations where prudence requires us to act along the lines of proportional reasoning, to decide which act to do, and to do the one which causes the least wrong — this would, of course, admit that something wrong is being done and needs to be attoned for (which again, through Lombard’s concerns, we find possible examples of this in Scripture).
Henry Karlson,
Thanks for the prompt reply.
I hope to find perhaps even further explication concerning this (as well as regarding other practical matters touching on the principal topic of your essay here) in subsequent entries.
Ari
Lombard goes through a great number of issues, some which are interesting side-points (interesting to me, so I take them on). Obviously he does not answer all questions, and so when the series is over, I expect it might be good for me to do one final post, reflecting upon the comments and questions people ask as I posted sections of the text I’ve written, and provide my answers to them, based upon my understanding gained through Lombard (and other sources, if an answer cannot be found there).
Henry Karlson,
That sounds like an excellent idea.
Also, though I know this might be premature, but could you possibly provide a framework (even if tentative) of how you intend to approach the subject matter in general with respect to future installments (as in an outline of some kind in order to give a sort of preview for the audience)?
If you cannot or rather are doing the series extemporaneously, that’s fine.
I’ll still be looking forward to other installments of your series regardless.
Ari
I have a draft of most of the text done, and only have a few more chapters from The Sentences to go (it’s a significant section of the text compared to other topics). I will reveal that the next post will be the context in which Lombard discusses the question of lies, and then, I’m not sure how I will divide the posts just yet; I will probably deal with the three-fold division of lies in one day, then the eight-fold division, then the questions which are asked about lies, then the first part of the section on oaths/perjury, then the second part. But I will decide more as I edit and finalize the sections.
I bring this up because I think one of the most widely used example – ye old Nazi/jew harboring example – tends to distort the issue greatly. But in the light of what you explain here, and in light of a great deal of premodern thought, some clarity can be put forth.
Brendan,
The example of the hiding person pursued by those who want to kill him actually goes back to St. Augustine, with whom you are in total disagreement:
2) My second reason concerns what was already stated in a previous post, echoing the Catechism: that in considering the truth of something, we must consider the person’s “right” to it.
When I made a similar point about what the Catechism say about a person’s right to the truth, several people on Vox Nova pointed out to me that it is not to be found in the current English translation of the Catechism. I take it that the the part about a person’s right to know the truth was an unauthorized interpolation in the first English translation.
While I certainly don’t want to dismiss all appeals to linguistics or modern philosophy, it seems to me you are setting up a moral system in which simple folk either have to tell the truth or lie, whereas those with advanced degrees can justify any false statement made with the intent to deceive by invoking abstruse reasoning and citing modern or postmodern theories of communication and meaning to turn everything upside down.
In fact, it could be argued that one actually lies if one concedes affirmatively; for in that case, one has submitted to the Nazi meaning of a Jew, which is itself a lie.
Let me make it plain that I would simply advocate lying to protect an innocent person from those who want to kill him. It seems to me that one of the problems with what you are advocating is that it can only get you off the hook if the Nazi phrases his question in a certain way. Suppose he says, “We believe you are hiding a young girl named Anne Frank and her family, who are of Jewish ancestry. Is this true?” Is his meaning of Anne Frank different enough from yours to deny that Anne Frank is Anne Frank? And is the Nazi concept of Jewish ancestry a lie? It seems to me what you are advocating in your example is mental reservation, which I understand to be licit, although only in extreme circumstances.
Being realistic, who (if they believe they can do it successfully) is not going to lie to save an innocent person from those who want to kill him unjustly? Do you agree with Cardinal Newman here:
I would have to say that I would rather tell a willful untruth that harmed no one than see millions die in extreme agony. I can’t imagine a God who would say, “Why that man lied just to save Anne Frank! He’s going to have to serve a long sentence in Purgatory for that! Rules is rules!”