What Is So Wrong With Using Torture, If It Will Save Lives?
Whenever I’ve heard that argument given, I’ve always feel uneasy around the people who give it. What constitutes torture? Whose lives are they concerned about? Whose lives are expendable? Why do we have to objectify subjects, and when we do that, how can we say we support the dignity of the human person?
Slavoj Žižek rightfully took on Alan Dershowitz’s support for torture, showing how it leads to the justification of terrorism:
Just as one should torture a terrorist whose knowledge could prevent the death of many more innocent people, should one not fully condone terror, at least against military and police personnel waging an unjust war of occupation, if it could prevent violence on a much large scale?
-Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 37.
That sounds just about right. We find many who support torture also support other evils, like unjust wars, if they think it will save them from harm, without considering the values they have to destroy in the process to justify such action. No wonder they are the ones the terrorists look to and cite in order to justify their own evil.
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I am firmly opposed to making provisions for torture in the law. People are always bringing up the ticking time bomb scenario, but (a) it it extraordinarily rare, and (b) you don’t make laws based on improbably, worst-case scenarios.
However, it seems to me that strict adherence to the principle of never doing “evil” so that good may come of it is impractical. A lie is intrinsically evil. Suppose I have been a prisoner of war and have been released when others remain in captivity. I have been warned to say I was well treated even when I was not, or the others left behind will be severely punished. If a reporter asked me if I was well treated, you can bet I am going to lie and say yes.
How much of diplomacy is lies? It seems a lot of it is to me, if polite fictions are lies.
There are plenty of circumstances in which it is acceptable to kill someone in extreme circumstances. Suppose Terrorist A is about to set off a bomb on in a crowded marketplace, and it can be prevented with a shot through his head. It is perfectly licit to kill him. Suppose you have captured Terrorist B and you have every reason to believe he is going to allow a bomb to go off at a location he knows and you don’t. It seems a less extreme measure to torture Terrorist B than to kill Terrorist A.
The objection will be raised that you could be wrong, and Terrorist B doesn’t really know where the bomb is. But how many times have law enforcement officials killed innocent people because they mistakenly believed (or claim they believed) they were in a dangerous situation and had to fire. The latest incident that comes to mind is the killing of Sean Bell here in New York. Five policemen fired a total of around 50 bullets into a car containing three innocent, unarmed men. The police were tried and acquitted.
So I believe torture should be against the law, and in the unlikely event of a ticking time bomb, the people in charge should do whatever they believe is necessary to save lives. If they do something heroic but illegal, they should be tried (and probably acquitted).
As I always ask in these cases, if the Nazis had knocked on the door of the house where Anne Frank was being hidden and asked if there were any Jews there, should the person who answered the door have told the truth? We were taught in grade school that you should never tell a lie even to save the world. I would hope I would have had the courage to tell as many lies as was necessary to save Anne Frank from being found by the Nazis.
Having said all that, I think the Bush administration seriously damaged the country by discarding the Geneva Conventions and essentially legalizing torture, and I believe war crimes were committed.
That may be the most lucid thing I’ve ever read by Žižek. He’s absolutely right.
it seems to me that strict adherence to the principle of never doing “evil” so that good may come of it is impractical.
Talk about an understatement! If moral principles are limited to cases where following them is practical, then they aren’t really moral principles.
In any event, Žižek’s point is that the same argument used to justify torture in certain circumstances will also justify terrorism in certain circumstances. I take it that you don’t disagree with this, it’s just that whereas Žižek (presumably) rejects both you accept both, at least in extremis. Is that right?
BA,
I am not sure I understand what would constitute “terror” used against “military and police personnel waging an unjust war of occupation.” If an enemy unjustly invaded the United States and became an occupying power — say that in an alternate history we had lost World War II and German forces occupied the United States — wouldn’t Americans have had the right to violent resistance in a number of forms? Guerilla warfare? Sabotage? Wouldn’t Americans have had the right to kill occupying forces? How do you deal “morally” with military personnel who are occupying your country unjustly?
Now, of course, there are things you can’t do, like kill their wives and children. But it seems to me that occupying police and military personnel are fair targets. Isn’t this what the French Resistance did?
And what about lying, which is an intrinsic evil? May an undercover policeman assume a false identity? May we feed misinformation to an enemy? What about the elaborate deception the Allies concocted to mislead the Germans before the invasion of Normandy.
Just one further thought. The header to this thread is “What Is So Wrong With Using Torture, If It Will Save Lives?” If it had been “What Is So Wrong With Killing, if It Will Save Lives?” the answer would be that killing to save lives is morally justified in many circumstances. If killing can be justified, why not torture (under very grave circumstances)?
there are things you can’t do, like kill their wives and children. But it seems to me that occupying police and military personnel are fair targets.
You’re right, and to that extent Žižek’s quote doesn’t pack the full punch that it could have. Still, if the standard in extremis arguments about torture are correct, then it’s hard to see why a similar argument couldn’t apply to killing the wives and children of military personnel, or even random civilians, if the circumstances were right.
And what about lying, which is an intrinsic evil?
If killing can be justified, why not torture (under very grave circumstances)?
These are both longer conversations. In law school, I once had a long argument with some classmates over whether it was necessary to lie in the sort of Ann Frank scenario you described above. I believe I was eventually able to convince them that this wasn’t necessary, so long as you planned ahead (which someone hiding Jews in a Nazi regime ought to do in any event). But that was a really long conversation.
Similarly, to explain why torture is intrinsically evil whereas killing is not would involve running down a lot of dead ends and tangents, and isn’t really the sort of conversation that’s designed to be carried on in a combox.
Chomsky makes similar arguments.
I’m no expert, though the wife is pretty good, on the intricacies of moral theology, but I thought I had heard it argued that in order for a lie to be considered a lie it must be withholding the truth from one who deserves it. Just as one is not obliged to obey your parents if they are order you to do something wrong or intend some abuse, one is not obliged to give the truth to one who intends to use that information for evil.
Am I wrong here?
Nevertheless, good post Henry! Consistent life ethic! It all goes hand in hand
David
While one should never sin, the fact of the matter is we live in a world of sin; one can say all sins are intrinsic evils, but not all similar actions would be sins. Lying is an intrinsic evil, but one must define what lying is. And obviously it is better not to lie than to lie. However, some situations, all actions one would have will end up with some sin or another committed (at least, I would suggest this is the case following Solovyov), and then one must act in prudence and look to the objective level of evil involved and not just the question of whether or not something is always evil. Grave and mortal sins are worse than venial sins, and just because something is intrinsically evil does not mean it is grave, nor if some action is not, as a universal rule, always evil, that a specific case of it will not be objectively grave or mortal. In this case, prudence would say lying — while to be avoided, is more understandable than a graver objective evil; not as something which must not be answered for, but rather, to explain what to do in a confused situation.
JB
There are many questions as to what entails a lie or not, as well as the gravity of the lie when it is given. One feature is it must be willful deception (so ignorance and false statement is not a lie). I think Lombard’s work on the issue of lies in Book III of the Sentences is good, and, maybe sometime I will do a post on it to further engage this otherwise difficult issue. There are just too many dimensions to the question of the lie than people normally consider.
BA
Right, there are many other ways Žižek could have made his point, although I think it is obvious as to why he did so in this case.
MI
Right, Chomsky makes many similar (and good) points, especially in relation to Israel and the United States in current world events.
I thought I had heard it argued that in order for a lie to be considered a lie it must be withholding the truth from one who deserves it.
People do make this argument, but it’s not the Catholic position on the matter.
Henry,
I understand that intrinsically evil does not necessarily imply gravely evil. A little white lie is intrinsically evil but not gravely evil. However, as I understand the teachings of the Church, an intrinsically evil act may never be performed. Consequently, a little white lie to save the lives of everyone in the world would be an evil act, and a virtuous person would let the everyone die rather than tell a white lie. Can you go along with Cardinal Newman here?
Now, if people want to redefine lying, then people can redefine torture (say, as “enhanced interrogation techniques”). Merriam Webster says torture is “the infliction of intense pain (as from burning, crushing, or wounding) to punish, coerce, or afford sadistic pleasure.” It would be easy to modify that. Let’s say instead of “coerce” we say “coerce to do something that legitimately should not be done.” A terrorist has no right to withhold information about a ticking time bomb, so it is legitimate coercion to torture the information out of him. (I am not necessarily making that argument. I am pointing out that if you can redefine lying to permit exceptions, you can redefine torture to permit exceptions.)
The Catechism says
Someone recently pointed out to me that in the first English translation, paragraph 2483 read
However, apparently that phrase that I have boldfaced was an unauthorized addition, and it is not in current versions of the Catechism.
David
I will go more into the issue of lies later (when I get to doing a post on Lombard’s interpretation of them), but for now I will restate what I said: because the world is fallen, there are times when whatever option we find in a given circumstance will include some sort of sin (and lying by misdirection is often a common example here) in order to avoid a greater evil. Saying that something is intrinsically evil only says that it is inherently a sinful action; again it does not tell how to act in given situation. The issue of the quality of evil in regards to an act is in part the issue vs whether or not an action is inherently evil.
Not sure what Zizek is talking about here. Does violence against military personnel count as terror? I always thought terror is the use of violence against civilians in pursuit of political, etc. ends.
1) There is a difference between lying (not giving a person what they are due, the truth) and not giving a person the truth when they are not entitled to it. The two activities are fundamentally different.
2) Torture is an intrinsic evil, war itself is not (unjust war being a specific type of war)
3) A person is always free to choose to follow Christ in any set of circumstances, because the morality of an action does not revolve around its consequences. Every sinful act is a denial of Christ, and as such we can rephrase every moral question in terms of Christ. Instead of “Tell a lie or I’ll kill 100 people” it can be rephrased as “Deny Christ or I’ll kill 100 people.”
4) Consequentialism is wrong and un-Catholic. Double effect is acceptable, but only with proper intent.
5) Being placed under duress (as above, with either one’s self or others threatened) does not absolve us of the responsibility to act morally.
6) It all really comes down to this: how badly do you want to be a Saint in Heaven, and how high of a place do you want there?
Henry,
It is my understanding that the Catholic Church teaches that an intrinsically evil action, no matter how grave or how slight — for example, one willful untruth that harmed no one — may never be performed, no matter what the circumstances.
From the Catechism:
I assume Newman says “tell one willful untruth, though it harmed no one, or steal one poor farthing without excuse” because a lie is intrinsically evil no matter what, whereas stealing is not intrinsically evil and may under certain circumstances be justified.
. . . there are times when whatever option we find in a given circumstance will include some sort of sin (and lying by misdirection is often a common example here) in order to avoid a greater evil.
Where is Zippy when we need him?
I don’t believe it is Catholic teaching that one may commit a lesser sin in order to avoid a greater sin. I would say there are circumstances where one is forced to make a choice between two evils, but in that case, the person is being coerced and is not sinning. Zippy and I had an extended argument in which he claimed that a woman who was threatened with rape or death, allowed to have ample time and resources (consultation with experts, getting a degree in moral theology, etc.) to make a fully rational decision, with no impairment of the will (by drugs, alcohol, terror, etc.) must choose death, because under those highly unlikely circumstances, she would be giving “full consent of the will” to having sex outside of marriage, so she must choose death rather than commit a mortal sin. (This is why Saint Maria Goretti was canonized, he said, because she chose death over mortal sin.) I maintain that no matter how coolly rational and well informed you are, doing something with a gun to your head or a knife to your throat is being coerced. So I believe Zippy will disagree here even more than I do. He will say, “One may not do evil so that good may result from it.” He will also quote Pope John Paul II to the effect that people may be prevented from doing good, but they can always resist doing evil, particularly if they are prepared to die.
In any case, I am not arguing my own opinion here, since I would lie to the Nazis to save Anne Frank and would commit any number of intrinsically evil acts to save the population of the world from starving in agony. I am arguing what I understand the position of the Church to be. Or was Cardinal Newman misrepresenting the teachings of the Church?
I look forward to you comments on lying.
David
No sin may ever be performed. That’s always the case. Intrinsic evil does not dictate, however, what one is to do in a situation where the only options are sins (and remember, sin of omission is also a sin). That’s the problem, again, with a fallen world. Knowing that the only options are sinful indicates that we will be stained by sin, and sometimes, that will happen no matter what choice we make. That means there will always be some sort of guilt when that happens, since sin is sin and must be dealt with (thus, we can understand why the Church would have soldiers, even in just wars, do penance; the just war does not remove the sin involved with war). The whole point of intrinsic evil is to say “This will always be a sin.” But it does not dictate the quality of the sin, and, of course, that is where we come to a different issue when engaging prudential reason for actual action.
I would point out the modern American political situation is an example where, no matter what choice you make (vote, don’t vote) there will be some corruption involved, and that is something Pharisees do not really note.
If you want a good source for the foundations of my moral theological position, get Solovyov’s “Justification of the Good.” It’s, pardon the pun, a good text. And I will deal with lying — not sure when, so much to get to, but I will — since this is a theme which constantly comes up here and other places. Might as well do a bit of commentary from the Sentences.
Being placed under duress (as above, with either one’s self or others threatened) does not absolve us of the responsibility to act morally.
LCB,
You work as a bank teller. A man walks in and hands you a note. It is from your wife and it says, “Dear LCB, The children and I are being held hostage. They have already killed Grandma. They say they will kill us all if you do not hand over all the money or if you sound an alarm. Please! Do as they say!” The bank manager is passing by and says, “Is everything okay?”
What do you do? Do you lie to the bank manager and say there is no problem? Do you hand over the money? Being under duress does not absolve you of the responsibility to act morally. Also, if you hand the money over to the bank robber, you are materially cooperating with evil. It is surely a mortal sin to rob a bank. If you hand over the money, is it an evil act on your part?
In response to your first post:
Okay, I think I see why we are at an impasse. If you will allow me a bit of space to go into detail, I suspect I can settle this Anne Frank matter:
1) What is sin? Sin is an offense against God and neighbor.
2) How is sin an offense against our neighbor? Sin is an offense against our neighbor because it denies him what is rightly his. For our purposes, we are herein dealing with matters related to JUSTICE: That by which every man receives his due.
So, what much of this revolves around, is what someone is rightfully due. A legitimate government is rightfully due taxes. A parent is rightfully due honor and respect from their children. An officer of the law, in his capacity of enforcing the law, is rightfully due truth from the citizenry.
So, knock knock, and the Nazis are at the door for Anne. “Have you seen her?”
And now we evaluate: Is this person an officer of the law? For all intents and purposes, yes. Is the government a legitimate one? Well, for this experiment let’s say yes. Is the law that this officer is seeking to enforce a just law? Ahha, no it is not.
Therefore, in matters related to the enforcement of an unjust law this officer of the law is not entitled to the truth. We have not sinned against him by denying him what is rightfully his.
Is this clear? Our intent the entire time could have been to follow the law fully, but unjust laws have no force (and we are also bound to follow the eternal law at all times). We have followed the law fully, as per our good intent.
get Solovyov’s “Justification of the Good.”
Henry,
I ordered a used copy through Amazon, but Solovyov’s been dead a considerable long time (since 1900), and I don’t put no stock in dead people.
David
I can’t say I understand why you “don’t put no stock in dead people,” but I am glad you will read Solovyov. I hope you find something within it which you will like.
I would point out the modern American political situation is an example where, no matter what choice you make (vote, don’t vote) there will be some corruption involved, and that is something Pharisees do not really note.
When you say that sometimes we must do evil (if that is indeed what you are saying) you are not pointing out something true. You are asserting an heretical falsehood.
Look up mediate material cooperation.
Henry:
I know the difference between remote material cooperation with evil (licit with proportionate reason), proximate material cooperation with evil (not licit), and formal cooperation with evil (not licit). I think David is right in his assessment of what you have written here. The statement “no matter what choice you make, some corruption is involved” is either trivially and uninterestingly true, or false heresy, depending on what you mean by it.
Zippy
I would highly suggest, before you bring up the word “heresy” you actually know what you are talking about; material cooperation with evil is not trivial nor uninteresting. Indeed, it is quite important in relation to what is being discussed here — the fact that there are multiple levels of cooperation with evil; if you study the situation in more detail, you will find out that moral theologians discuss the evil of the non-vote in a democratic society (which confirms what I said above). But hey, you can keep taking a few documents as your only source, without the background needed to properly understand them, read them like a Protestant with a Bible, choose a few passages you like and use them out of context, and call people who study the matter further and deeper “heretics” because they don’t interpret just like you. You would do better to stop being the heretic hunter (you don’t have the training nor the authority) and instead engage and learn.
You aren’t a heretic if as a general matter what you are suggesting is some different interpretation from what you take to be mine. You are a heretic if you are suggesting that sometimes it is impossible to avoid doing evil.
For example, when you say:
“Knowing that the only options are sinful indicates that we will be stained by sin, and sometimes, that will happen no matter what choice we make.”
… you are publicly asserting a flat out heresy. And stamping your feet and yelling “Protestant!” at me can’t change that.
Henry,
I don’t know if you’re using “sin” in a different way from what I’m used to it being used in the following sentence.
“Intrinsic evil does not dictate, however, what one is to do in a situation where the only options are sins (and remember, sin of omission is also a sin).”
Why would a loving God put us in the position where any choice would remove us from Him? I realize that He calls us to the cross, but that doesn’t remove us from Him. I realize that under certain circumstances we may have to tolerate evil in some way-hence the “proportionate reasons for remote material cooperation” discussions. But you ask me to believe that God will call me to do something that will push me away from Him; you ask me to believe that God will call me to disobey Him.
Another issue: why would something be called “intrinsically evil” if it weren’t always and everywhere, by virtue of what it is (the definition of intrinsic) wrong to do? Why would the Church define a specific category of acts that you can’t ever do if you can do them?
Sorry for the long post.
Ragekj
God does not put us in situations, but humans can, and the complexities of moral judgments is that morality has many different levels, from a personal dimension, to a social one. No sin is permitted — all sin has to be dealt with (penance; as per my example: the sin of killing in war, even in a just war, does not become non-sin just because it is a just war); but the subjective guilt (venial, mortal) differs accordingly (“just killing” would be venial sin).
Moral quandaries are always more complex than most realize — and simplifications, like tutiorism, get rejected. I’m just pointing out what is recognized by those who study the matter: the complexity.
Henry,
I was making a reference to Huckleberry Finn:
I do have a bias in favor of reading nonfiction that is newer rather than older, since I assume the newer will incorporate the older and expand on it, but it’s a personal quirk, not a defensible theory.
I do hope there are no heretical ideas in this book. :)
David
One would wish that were the case, since it would make things simpler; but the truth of the matter is that it is easy to lose sight of gains from earlier ages, and people then try to re-invent the wheel (with all the problems which comes out of that). Solovyov is one of the philosophical power-houses of Russia; the book you ordered was translated and published once (very early in the 20th century), but its impact was not equal to its value. You will find he is a challenge — but yet, a worthy one.
With the reading of old books, I follow Lewis: old books, written within a context we do not have now, allow us to understand errors which a whole culture enjoyed and avoid them, while see things in a new perspective which can help us judge the errors which we would normally be blinded to by our own.
Henry,
I’ve never heard that legitimate self defense (or just killing in a just war in this case) is a venial sin. Could you give me a citation for that when you get the chance? If sin is an offense against God (the definition used by the Catechism), why would that ever be licit?
This is from the Summa, question 41. It applies to strife, not just war, but the principles seem to apply here:
But in him who defends himself, it may be without sin, or it may sometimes involve a venial sin, or sometimes a mortal sin; and this depends on his intention and on his manner of defending himself. For if his sole intention be to withstand the injury done to him, and he defend himself with due moderation, it is no sin, and one cannot say properly that there is strife on his part. But if, on the other hand, his self-defense be inspired by vengeance and hatred, it is always a sin.
end quote
I could conceive of a circumstance where one would have to kill his attacker-a case of the attacker having a gun would be one such example. Are you arguing that this is a sin, contra St. Thomas?
I recognize that the Summa wasn’t issued by the Magisterium , but I think we all recognize it as an important work that must be taken seriously. I would think that this would disprove your argument of being forced to sin, since it shows that justified killing isn’t necessarily a sin (assuming right intention, of course).
At any rate, I’m concerned that your position takes away from the effect of the original post, since your argument implies that it may be licit to torture someone in some circumstance, a position that the Church rejects and that, as members of that Church, we do as well.
Ragekj
Nowhere do I say it is licit to torture anyone! You are missing the point if you think that is what I said (I am rejecting the use of torture). And it is a matter of history that soldiers who went to war, just wars, were given penance (I think it was 7 years) when they came back. It was widely accepted that their role, while necessary, did produce objective evil and sin. St Thomas Aquinas is one view, but not the only (and he is often wrong). St Augustine was, for example, much more strict and said a private individual could not kill in self-defense (he believed the authority was only designated to officials of the state). But others have an even stricter view, and I would suggest, the earliest church held such a position. The Church has no one clear idea here, but many positions which are possible (probabilism, for example, is a possible moral position one can hold, though it is not the only one).
http://incommunion.org/articles/previous-issues/issue-40/st-basil-on-war-and-repentance is a good discussion on St Basil and war and soldiering, in case you want a good article to read.
I’ve never heard that legitimate self defense (or just killing in a just war in this case) is a venial sin.
The reason you haven’t heard that is because it is not merely false, but heretical.
Not according to the early Church Fathers, but regardless, as Henry said, that not for you to decide. One of the problems which comes with a more educated laity is the presumption that knowledge = the authority to discern and judge. This is patently false.
JB
You have to remember, the internet allows people to be authorities of one, and they can condemn without even understanding the complexities (notice how what I’ve said is ignored for the sake of the condemnation itself).
The question of what acts are and are not legitimate self defense is perfectly legitimate. But stipulating a licit act of self-defense, it is completely wrong and materially heretical to state that it is a sin. There is no such thing as licitly sinning.
The issue of doing penance after material cooperation with evil is really not complicated or difficult to understand. When we cooperate with evil, even licitly, we incur a duty to mitigate that evil through additional positive acts – directly and/or through penance. For example, if we justly kill an enemy soldier we incur some duty to help look after his widow and orphan children; more generally, we incur duties to the foes we vanquish. People who voted for Obama have a duty tp do penance for his abortion policies, even if their votes were not sinful. That in no way implies that our acts of material cooperation are venial sin, yet it is OK to do them anyway. If it is a sin, venial or mortal, it is not OK to do it, by definition.
This notion Henry is pushing of a kind of “licit venial sin” is nonsense on stilts.
Another thing about the Internet, and really life in general, is that putting on airs doesn’t turn heresy into the truth.
But stipulating a licit act of self-defense, it is completely wrong and materially heretical to state that it is a sin.
Zippy,
So in the case we have been discussing [a woman is given the choice to submit to rape or be killed, or a woman is given the choice to submit to rape or have all her children killed] you are saying that if she is able to kill her assailant in self-defense, she commits no sin, but if she submits to rape she is committing a mortal sin?
As in previous discussions, I stipulate the woman has nerves of steel and is making her decision coldly, logically, and analytically. Or that she has adequate time to consult authorities, fully inform herself about the teachings of the Church, and make the right decision without fear or surprise impairing her judgment.
You seem to be saying that killing in a legitimate act of self-defense (where it is kill or be killed with no other choices) is not objectively evil and the person who kills in self-defense is objectively blameless. But that a woman who is given a choice to submit to rape or be killed would at least objectively be committing an evil act. You concede that it would be next to impossible in real life for her to give full consent of the will in a situation like that, but you say if she had all her wits about her and could make a cold, rational decision, submission to rape would be a mortal sin. (And this was why St. Maria Goretti was canonized.)
The point I am making is that it is not giving “full consent of the will” when you make a choice (no matter how coldly and logically) with a gun to your head or a knife to your throat. Full consent of the will requires not merely a will that is not in some way impaired (by drugs, alcohol, mental illness, and so on), but it requires a free choice. A choice made under a death threat is not a free choice, no matter how unimpaired your thought processes are.
A thought that may have already been registered:
It is quite difficult to discuss the nature of a “lie” in a context that reduces truth to an epistemological category. We would do well to bear in mind that important ancient Greek distinction between ‘orthêtes’ (correctness) and alêtheia (truth); the former is a mental category, determined by abstract criteria, while the latter is an ontological category corresponding to the way things are.
The Church clearly teaches about ‘truth’ rather than ‘correctness’ even in the CCC.
Consider: In CCC 2483, one finds the following explanation: “to lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead into error someone who has the right to know the truth.” (as LCB noted though with different wording.) The Church rightly recognizes a (Dionysian) proportion between one’s place in the world (stated with intentional ambiguity – we might also say one’s place in the hierarchy of being) and one’s consequent capacity to ‘understand’ being (i.e., make right judgments in conformity to the divine mind).
For many, the ‘truth’ – that is, the intelligibility of reality – is in many places so overwhelming that it inhibits a truly divine judgment on the part of the recipient (again, stated with intentional ambiguity since there are too many instances to provide one universal standard of what that might involve.) Thus, that person must ‘grow’ in order to receive that aspect of reality. Jack Nicholson may have been right: some people can’t handle the truth (in certain respects).
Anyway, amidst this fruitful discussion, it might be helpful to remember that when we use a “lie” as an example, we are invoking a term loaded with the residue of modern philosophical thought, which reduces it to ‘volitional incorrectness’. But this is not a Catholic approach to the matter.
There is no lie involved in telling Nazis that you are not harboring Jews when in fact you are. Why?
First, because the Nazis relinquish their “right” to that “knowledge” based upon their actions. The truth that is communicated by denying the Nazi this information is simply greater than the issue of ‘correctness’ involved. Life for human beings is true; death for some based upon hatred is not true. Conceding or being implicated in any way in the latter, then, can never be true. On the contrary, it is the greatest of falsehoods.
Second, because the knowledge that is being exchanged is never merely epistemic, the circumstances in which the exchange occurs must be involved in the assessment. As with all cognitive exchanges, there is a happening, an event at stake. So while it is incorrect to willfully deceive the Nazis, it is not a lie, nor is it in any way immoral.
Now, unless one firmly holds to the Godwin principle, the preceding may prove helpful in this discussion. If, however, one rejects the preceding on the ground that it is an argument ‘ad Nazium’ (the Godwin principle), then my humblest apologies.
Henry,
Continuing to engage Zippy in a discussion that tries to consider the surplus of meaning beyond the limits of declared heresy is like trying to explain a Picasso to Dr. Spock.
Behind the battle cry of ‘heresy’ in today’s blogosphere is a great deal of fear, and the one who mounts the charge brings only an end of conversation in his wake.
That one fails to understand the context in which heresy is authentically declared by a proper authority, and assumes that ‘heresy’ is a universal declaration of absolute status. As the example of Galileo proves, such a view is simply in error.
btw: if Zippy were to reread the initial thought that got his ball rolling in the first place, he would perhaps have noticed something important: you, Henry, stated that it is not possible in the context of the American political system to act without a degree of corruption. But Zippy entirely ignored that aspect of the comment (“in the context of the American Political system”), abstracting it as if you were making a universal declaration. This is the typical kind of thinking of a logic-chopping, heresy-declaring inquisitor: motivated largely by fear, they reduce what they don’t understand to its simplest common denominator and attack it accordingly. Too bad.
First, because the Nazis relinquish their “right” to that “knowledge” based upon their actions.
Brendan,
We don’t need to resort to the case of the Nazis searching for Anne Frank in the lying debate. The Catholic Encyclopedia article on lying points out that the example of the person being kept in hiding to protect him from those who want to kill him goes back to St. Augustine:
I confess that, apparently heretically, I don’t have much use for the idea of “intrinsic evil,” and I would say that lies are sometimes justifiable, but it seems to me that if you take Aquinas’s definition of a lie (“a statement at variance with the mind”), there is no way to get around defining a lie as any statement a person utters, with the intent to deceive, knowing it to be untrue. Saying someone is not in your house when you know that person is indeed in your house can’t possibly be anything but a lie. I would say that if it saves a life, it is justifiable. But if you accept the teaching that a lie is an intrinsically evil act, then there is no way it can be justified.
It seems to me that redefining the type of lying one wants to do as non-lying is analogous to what the Bush administration did by redefined torture as “enhanced interrogation techniques” and saying that torture had to be something that caused serious bodily injury (and so on). It’s figuring out what you want to do first, and then coming up with a justification for it.
It seems to me that saying a lie is intrinsically evil, and then redefining some willfully untrue statements as something other than lies is a way to get all the benefits of being a consequentialist without admitting it.
As I said above, you only need to add a couple of words the Merriam Webster’s definition of torture to make the “enhanced interrogation” of terrorist suspects into “not torture.” Torture is “the infliction of intense pain (as from burning, crushing, or wounding) to punish, coerce, or afford sadistic pleasure.” Just change coerce into coerce a person into doing something he has a right to refuse to do. A terrorist has no right to withhold information about a ticking time bomb, and consequently to force that information from him is not torture.
It seems to me that if you can justify executing a terrorist on the grounds that he has forfeited his right to live, you can force the truth out of him on the grounds that he has forfeited his right to remain silent. If you can figure out a way to justify electrocuting someone to death, you can figure out a way to justify waterboarding him.
You write, “I don’t have much use for the idea of “intrinsic evil,”
By that, do you mean, “I don’t believe there are intrinsically evil actions?”, or, “I believe in them but I dislike the conception”, or something different?
Because denying intrinsic evil has significant implications, like creating difficulty in maintaining intrinsic human rights, and absolute truth, etc.
Behind the battle cry of ‘heresy’ in today’s blogosphere is a great deal of fear, …
Oh yeah, I’m a-quaking in my boots. And every time I say “the proposition that sometimes we have no choice but to do evil is flatly heresy” what I really mean is “gee, what a scary bunch of metrosexuals they are at Vox Nova”.
David:
Part of the problem with the discussion of rape is the stipulations involved. If a woman is dispassionately choosing to engage in sexual relations with someone not her husband as a means to some end, then that is always wrong. But that is stipulating a dispassionate, clear-headed decision, and I think both of us agree that in the real world it is a rare person indeed – though clearly St. Maria Goretti was such a person – who can make dispassionate, clear-headed and deliberate decisions at the nasty end of a gun.
By that, do you mean, “I don’t believe there are intrinsically evil actions?”, or, “I believe in them but I dislike the conception”, or something different?
LCB,
I believe the concept of intrinsic evil leads to conclusions that are untenable. I quoted Cardinal Newman above:
I take Newman to be classifying a willful untruth that harms no one as a lie and an intrinsic evil. He seems to absolutely forbid it. On the other hand, he does not absolutely forbid stealing a farthing. He forbids stealing it without excuse.
A white lie (“No, that dress does not make you look fat”) is to be avoided at all costs, even to prevent the starvation of millions in agony. No sane person would avoid a lie that harmed no one and saved millions from starving in agony.
Part of the problem with the discussion of rape is the stipulations involved. If a woman is dispassionately choosing to engage in sexual relations with someone not her husband as a means to some end, then that is always wrong.
Zippy,
I make that stipulation not because it is realistic, but because my point is that making a choice with a gun to your head or a knife to your throat, no matter how clear-headed you may be, is not giving full consent of the will!
As I said before, if dying rather than submitting to rape is the objectively good thing to do, women should be carefully trained to do the right thing if threatened with rape lest their wills be impaired and they submit. I simply can’t see a Catholic education program for young women that drills into their heads that they must resist sexual assault at all costs, even if it means death.
and I think both of us agree that in the real world it is a rare person indeed – though clearly St. Maria Goretti was such a person – who can make dispassionate, clear-headed and deliberate decisions at the nasty end of a gun.
While I don’t want to take anything away from St. Maria Goretti, she was an 11-year-old girl being attacked by a 20-year-old man. I doubt very sincerely that she made a dispassionate, clear-headed and deliberate decision. It almost certainly as emotional a decision as any 11-year-old would make under the circumstances. I don’t think Maria Goretti was canonized because she remained calm and rational enough under the circumstances to arrive at the conclusion that submitting to rape was a mortal sin and she would rather die.
Addendum: From the little bit I have read, Maria Goretti was concerned that what her attacker was doing was a mortal sin, and she would not cooperate. It seems to me that her concern for him under the circumstances was what made her actions heroic.
I make that stipulation not because it is realistic, but because my point is that making a choice with a gun to your head or a knife to your throat, no matter how clear-headed you may be, is not giving full consent of the will!
By definition, presumably.
But that obviously isn’t so, or else, as Pope John Paul II pointed out any number of times, Christian martyrdom would be meaningless.
But that obviously isn’t so, or else, as Pope John Paul II pointed out any number of times, Christian martyrdom would be meaningless.
I doubt that most heroic acts of any kind, including martyrdom, are done with “full consent of the will” in the way we have been discussing it. That doesn’t make acts any less heroic, in my opinion. It often makes them more heroic. Someone who acts instantly, with no real time to consider the cost, to risk his or her life to save another or to stand up for something they believe in, would get at least as much credit in my book as someone who was able to weigh all the odds.
As I keep saying, and you keep ignoring, if the only objectively correct option were to die rather than submit to rape, this should be drummed into every woman’s head so that she doesn’t perform an evil act “just because” she has a knife to her throat or a gun to her head. If the expected response is to do something evil under high-stress conditions such as having one’s life threatened, the risk of doing objective evil should be minimized by appropriate preparation. The thought of training women to accept death rather than submit to rape strikes me as outrageous, but it seems to follow directly from your viewpoint.
I can’t believe any women are reading this exchange!
David:
I doubt that most heroic acts of any kind, including martyrdom, are done with “full consent of the will” in the way we have been discussing it.
Many martyrs were martyred precisely because they refused to sin even under the threat of death. If doing X (say verbally renouncing the Faith, to get away from the rape example) were not a sin under the circumstances then it would be evil not to do X in order to save themselves. So the idea that free consent of the will (in the sense pertinent to evaluating an act as sinful) is not present in those kinds of circumstances (including the stipulated subjective condition of the acting subject) is refuted quite directly by Christian martyrdom, just as Pope John Paul II taught in a number of places.
At least we understand where we disagree rather clearly, at this point. Thanks for the discussion.
David writes:
“No sane person would avoid a lie that harmed no one and saved millions from starving in agony.”
To which I reply:
It all really depends if you believe in heaven and God. A lie harms God.
And refusing to tell the Nazi where the Jews are hidden is not a lie, because the individual is not entitled to the truth. Just because you dislike the justification doesn’t mitigate it’s truthfulness.
David,
Those are good points, and I share your concern for the clarity of language. But I must respectfully part ways with the idea – implicit at least in your observations – that the English language is somehow normative when it comes to bestowing meaning.
Aquinas and Augustine are being translated, and translation is constituted by interpretation.
So when we read those original words, we of course carry into the reading our already established notions of honesty, dishonesty, truth, etc. So my point, which is a cross-linguistic point, is not the same as Bush’s desire to manipulate English from within the language itself. I approach the English terms from outside the language, looking to history, philosophy, etc. to help shape our understanding of meaning. The Bush administration manipulated, on the grounds of legal jargon, the language internally.
If I had time, I’d go to the ipsissima verba in Augustine and Aquinas and propose a reading of the matter that doesn’t carry the burden of truth as an epistemological category. But must of your insights are, it seems to me, too loyal to the epistemological domination of thought; that is, that thought and its “tools” (language, words) are really mental object, with little ontological momentum. I suggest the need to move beyond this.
Zippy –
“Oh yeah, I’m a-quaking in my boots. And every time I say “the proposition that sometimes we have no choice but to do evil is flatly heresy” what I really mean is “gee, what a scary bunch of metrosexuals they are at Vox Nova”.
The reduction of the point about fear to some particularity here on this blog does not rebuff the claim. It only verifies that there is nothing on this blog, or about these bloggers, that inculcates fear. Fine. No argument there.
I was referring to a much broader, darker fear that runs through the lives of those who are unable to dialogue in any way other than polemic and defense.
Reducing a person’s thought to its nearest heretical shadow is the modus operandi of one riddled with fear.
Perhaps it is a fear of not being able to immediately understand what one means. Perhaps it is fear that one’s thought is discrediting one’s allegiance to a political system. Who knows. Only that fearful one can really discover what that fear is. But it is there. Unquestionably.
One other important distinction concerning the matter of lying –
It is commonplace, though grossly misleading, to use examples in matters of taste in order to make a point about lying. Let’s call this the Howard Stern syndrome.
As many may know, this pop culture figure (a vapid, boorish ignoramus in my opinion, but that’s neither here nor there) is thought by many to be ‘honest’ because he says what all are thinking but are unwilling to say. Even a momentary listen to his drivel will indicate that his thoughts are nothing more than the spontaneous gurgling of his unreflective opinions.
That some would consider him honest for this indicates the alarming degree to which our society classifies what are matters of taste with matters of truth. Whether or not I personally like or dislike something is in no way a matter of truth, because reality does not consist of the externalizing of a person’s taste.
Now, one’s initial inclination or desire for a thing is not always true, because it may have been formed in falsehood (again, e.g., the desire to kill Jews in Nazi Germany; or in the case of Stern, the desire to make fun of baseball players who died in a boating accident). So merely spouting opinion is not related to truth, and therefore is not in the category of lying.
So it can hardly be a lie for me to tell my Aunt Tillie I think her dress is lovely when that is not my initial opinion. I could, in reflection, critique my own opinion and actually find her dress lovely. It is completely under the dominion of my autonomous will.
Or I could, upon reflection, realize that there is a truth that holds priority over my opinion. For example, maybe my Aunt Tillie really loves the dress and so my opinion of the matter is not as important as her affirmation.
Either way, the point is the same: matters of taste/opinion must be distinguished from matters of truth in any debate about lying/truth/falsehood etc.
I was referring to a much broader, darker fear that runs through the lives of those who are unable to dialogue in any way other than polemic and defense.
Internet psychologizing cracks me up.
Just out of curiosity, Zippy, what heresy was being obstinately promulgated by Henry’s comment?
And of course, you who are so well versed in heresy, do realize that a remark that merely allows one, like you for instance, to interpret an erroneous teaching in it cannot be heresy, since heresy is not a declaration of an error, but a judgment over its obstinate promulgation, right?
“Internet psychologizing cracks me up.”
This would indeed explain a lot. You must read a lot of “internet psychologizing” whatever that is…
what heresy was being obstinately promulgated by Henry’s comment?
I didn’t say “obstinately”. Henry is free to retract it or clarify it, and there were plenty of “if you mean X’s” in my comments, for those capable of reading.
And it is right here:
“Knowing that the only options are sinful indicates that we will be stained by sin, and sometimes, that will happen no matter what choice we make.”
It is never the case that the only options are sinful options. Sin is never necessary, ever.
If I say “denial of the Immaculate Conception is heresy” that is the straightforward truth. Likewise when I say “stating that it is ever the case that the only options are sinful is heresy.”
You must read a lot of “internet psychologizing” whatever that is…
This was a prime example of it:
Behind the battle cry of ‘heresy’ in today’s blogosphere is a great deal of fear, …
Zappy,
No, denial of the immaculate conception is an error against doctrine. Obstinate promulgation of this error after being reprimanded is heresy. There are nuances involved in the matter of which you seem to be alarmingly ignorant.
You need to either do a bit more reading about these distinctions, or be more careful with your words.
One thing is certain, you are not a very accurate reader of a person’s comments. Here’s the proof:
In your first response, you entirely distorted Henry’s comment. Henry wrote, (and you yourself cited, which means you had to at least have read it twice):
I would point out the modern American political situation is an example where, no matter what choice you make (vote, don’t vote) there will be some corruption involved, and that is something Pharisees do not really note.
Now, here’s your reiteration of this comment:
When you say that sometimes we must do evil
Huh? Where did he say that? Corruption is not the same as evil. Moreover, Henry is really referring to the the context of the “American political system”. But regardless of how one sees it, it is a statement that requires some nuance. You bypass any recognition of this nuance, and instead assault it with your Inquisitional myopia. Your inference is grossly distorting, which you even acknowledge in your parenthetical comment that immediately follows:
(if that is indeed what you are saying)
It seems that your reading is incapable of recognizing important nuances that would be germane to a true dialogue. Instead, you reduce and condemn. This is the MO of a very impoverished mind, and one laden with fears deeply embedded.
Then you conclude:
you are not pointing out something true. You are asserting an heretical falsehood.
Now, here is where you raise the issue of heresy when you state it is an “heretical falsehood.” The connection to heresy is overt, and not implied. A bit of knowledge about the term heresy, though, is in order.
Heresy, according to the Church, is a nuanced notion with a few features. The first is stated as follows:
- “Pertinacious adhesion to a doctrine contradictory to a point of faith clearly defined by the Church is heresy pure and simple, heresy in the first degree.”
So, I asked you which “point of faith clearly defined by the Church” is Henry, through his comment, “pertinaciously adhering” to? You provided no answer, but persisted in reiterating your very loose use of the term.
But, perhaps you mean something other than heresy in the first degree. So the Church also states:
- “But if the doctrine in question has not been expressly “defined” or is not clearly proposed as an article of faith in the ordinary, authorized teaching of the Church, an opinion opposed to it is styled sententia haeresi proxima, that is, an opinion approaching heresy.”
Maybe you meant that Henry’s comment, as inferred by your reading, is “approaching heresy”. But to support this position, you would have to revert to the heresy in the first degree and clearly indicate which “authorized teaching of the Church” Henry’s comment, as inferred by you, was being opposed – and provide its definition verbatim so as to allow for the nuanced discussion that even Church authority would require for the condemnation of heresy.
In the absence of evidence, one can only assume that you were perhaps invoking yet another qualification made by our beloved Mother Church:
- “Next, a doctrinal proposition, without directly contradicting a received dogma, may yet involve logical consequences at variance with revealed truth. Such a proposition is not heretical, it is a propositio theologice erronea, that is, erroneous in theology.”
If Henry was in fact saying that “only options are sinful options” universally – which in fact is NOT what he was saying, but something your myopic reading inferred – then this third statement indicates the only fault he would have been guilty of. He would have been promoting an erroneous theologoumenon.
So, Zippo, I second what Henry commented above – you ought to get your theological terms straight, or be more careful how you dole out criticism.
As for the internet psychologizing; my diagnoses are free of charge, lucky for you. I hope they stimulate some introspection on your part. My recommendation is that you perhaps adopt a mode of dialogue that is more amenable to the spirit of Christian charity, and abandon this angry polemic hauntology that subsumes you. You only end up eating your words (bon appetit!)
Again, free of charge, Zip.
Brendan
It is clear, Zippy’s authority is all he has, for there is no dogmatic treatise which takes the proper interpretation of my words and declares it heretical, nor is it derived from some heretical notion. Zippy, when asked for him to define the heresy and to authenticate it, can’t. He can only do as he does — play games, going around in circles, but never to the point of contention itself. It’s because he doesn’t know.
Now, here is where you raise the issue of heresy when you state it is an “heretical falsehood.”
That is right. “Mary was conceived with original sin” is also an heretical falsehood.
I would think Henry (and you) would be more worried about the fact that he is publicly stating as true something clearly against doctrine than about the fact that I characterized his proposition in a blog comment box using the term “heretical falsehood”.
Btw, Zipster,
Henry hit you spot on when he criticized the way you pulled his one comment out of this larger context. He wrote:
No sin may ever be performed. That’s always the case. Intrinsic evil does not dictate, however, what one is to do in a situation where the only options are sins (and remember, sin of omission is also a sin). That’s the problem, again, with a fallen world. Knowing that the only options are sinful indicates that we will be stained by sin, and sometimes, that will happen no matter what choice we make. That means there will always be some sort of guilt when that happens, since sin is sin and must be dealt with (thus, we can understand why the Church would have soldiers, even in just wars, do penance; the just war does not remove the sin involved with war). The whole point of intrinsic evil is to say “This will always be a sin.” But it does not dictate the quality of the sin, and, of course, that is where we come to a different issue when engaging prudential reason for actual action.
So, out of this rather dense statement, packed with meaning, you pull out…
Knowing that the only options are sinful indicates that we will be stained by sin
..and condemn it. Clearly, in the larger context of his statement, Henry is not saying “the only options are sinful options,” as you infer, but something much less universal. He has already stated “in the case where the only options are sins,” so his comment should be read with that antecedent in mind.
Now, if you disagree that cases like this – where one’s only options involve a degree of sin – ever arise, maybe that would have been a better point to bring out. Why you universalized his comment is beyond me. Clearly the context did not call for it.
Your methodology is akin to someone taking out of Scripture: “No one is good but God alone” (Mt 5:48) and saying, “See, humans are intrinsically evil,”
Or someone taking “better for that one (Judas) to have never been born” and arguing that Scripture justifies abortion, or when Christ states, “unless you hate your father and mother…” you insist “See, Christ is telling us to hate.”
All part of an impoverished MO incapable of nuance. Your methodology, it seems, violates the catachetical recommendation found at 2478:
“To avoid rash judgment, everyone should be careful to interpret insofar as possible his neighbor’s thoughts, words, and deeds in a favorable way”
and the citation that follows, from Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises is instructive also :
Every good Christian ought to be more ready to give a favorable interpretation to another’s statement than to condemn it. But if he cannot do so, let him ask how the other understands it. and if the latter understands it badly, let the former correct him with love. If that does not suffice, let the Christian try all suitable ways to bring the other to a correct interpretation so that he may be saved
Clearly, you have not followed this with respect to Henry’s initial comments. So I have tried to let you know “how the other understands it” and am aspiring to “correct you with love.” You may call it internet psychologizing, but that doesn’t mean it is.
Henry,
Spot on, brother, spot on.
Again, Zippo, you continue to identify your reading of his comment with some absolute, clearly defined truth.
As I hope you now see, your interpretation of Henry’s initial comment is what in fact is in error. And again, you are guilty of failing to follow the Catechism’s guidelines for charitable interpretation.
But you are the authority, so why should this bother you?
He has already stated “in the case where the only options are sins,” so his comment should be read with that antecedent in mind.
Right. There is no case where the only options are sins.
Let me help you out, Zip:
Which is the grave error that Henry has stated?
1) that it is impossible to act without sin?
or
2) that there are some situations where it seems the only options are sinful ones? (NB: the words “seems” and “sinful”)
If 1, then you are merely condemning your own inferential reading of his comment, and as I have already demonstrated, it is a poor reading.
If 2, which I am more amenable to discussing, since it is indeed debatable, then you either have to:
i) show where the Church makes a universal declaration over every particular situation that arises, and give its exact wording
ii) provide evidence how you know that a situation like this could never arise in practice, embedded in the circumstances relating to the agent in question
iii) furnish a philosophical reason why this could never be the case.
If you choose option 2, you are already advancing beyond your initial knee-jerk reaction, and …WELL! We are getting somewhere!
But even then, the word “sinful” ought to be fleshed out, as one bright respondent point out above already.
Still, I suspect you are less interested in any sort of discussion and more interested in fancying yourself the RCC’s Grand Inquisitor and Self-Proclaimed Guardian of the Faith.
right. There is no case where the only options are sins.
Ok. Now, if we are to follow the Catechism’s guidance, we would have to inquire into Henry’s meaning of sin in this case, since his original thought actually used the word “corruption” rather than sin.
And, to be charitable to Henry, let’s bear in mind that he is writing in haste given the nature of a blog (as we all are), and that – especially when facing the condemnation of heresy – may be inclined to respond in hopes that one will concede particular nuances.
Is it possible, in your view, for a person in a given situation to act without a degree of corruption?
Hey, if Henry wants to say “Zippy is right, there are no situations ever where all choices are sinful, but that isn’t what I meant to say” he is more than welcome to do so. Note that my comments to him were of the form “If you mean X, then…” etc. He didn’t respond by saying “I don’t mean X”. If he had, that would certainly have cleared up any confusion. But it is more fun to pretend that you know anything about me, to impute unreasoning and unsubtle “fear” or whatever. Because it is a blog and all that.
I mean, lets be frank here. A simple, straightforward, unequivocal statement from Henry that there are definitely no situations ever where all the options are sinful would clear up the whole thing.
A thought as you ponder a response (assuming you are interested in the discussion)
If we state that there are situations where a person can act with no degree of “corruption” (and to be charitable to Henry, and in light of his original statement, we are justified in using this word rather than “sinful”), we imply the following claims:
1) that, if there are no situations where a person faces a degree of corruption, it must follow that in every situation, a person is capable of acting in the perfect goodness.
2) consequently, that a person, in every situation, is capable of possessing perfect moral clarity
3) that, in so acting, a person embodies perfect goodness.
We use the word perfect, since “do degree of corruption” would entail perfection, or ‘completion in the good’.
These are some heavy implications if we deny any degree of corruption.
Now, of course, the matter depends on how one understands corruption. But certainly, one plausible conception is that corruption signifies a general lack in the intellect, what is also referred to as ignorance.
Your claim, if it is indeed your claim, that a person can in fact act in every given situation with perfect moral clarity, seems to approach a denial of original sin – after all, original sin is the general cause of human ignorance. Original sin, if I understand it correctly, is a Church doctrine. Denying it, then, would be a position of error approaching heresy.
How would you respond to this?
My bad –
I was writing as I was waiting.
As for Henry I don’t think he is much interested in the discussion. After all, you drew first blood, so to speak. Condemning one’s thought as heretical without a general, polite inquiry is never a good way to start things off.
Condemning one’s thought as heretical without a general, polite inquiry is never a good way to start things off.
Oh please. If Henry publicly states something prima facie against doctrine it is his responsibility to clarify it. I frankly don’t think he likes me much, is probably still cranky about the Gerald Campbell subsidiarity-justifies-pro-choice debate-club-at-auschwitz thing, and I really couldn’t care less if he chooses to unequivocally clarify in the manner in which he should. In fact I don’t expect it, because it would be atypical.
But for the benefit of anyone reading, who might take Henry at his prima facie word that sometimes it is impossible not to sin and that just killing in a just war is still sinful, it should be said that that is a false heresy.