Mill v. Durkheim
Jonathan Haidt has a very worthwhile piece that seeks to explain a root of differing political visions in contemporary American politics. A psychologist who studies morality, he generalizes about “two rules:” a) feelings come first and tilt the mental playing field on which reasons and arguments compete, and b) moral domain varies across culture. A liberal, Enlightenment morality of justice and rights does not capture the concerns of all groups – those inclined to justify judgments with talk about respect, duty, and family roles. Thus morality is not just about how humans treat each other. It is also about binding groups together, supporting essential institutions, and living in a sanctified and noble way. Many tend to operate not under the social vision of Mill, but Durkheim: a stable network composed of many overlapping groups that “socialize, reshape, and care for individuals who, if left to their own devices, would pursue shallow, carnal, and selfish pleasures.” This vision values self-control over self-expression, duty over rights, and loyalty to group. If people do operate as ever-changing group members in the struggle of obtaining and exercising political power, Haidt’s characterizations are, I think, useful.
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One of Haidt’s findings is that liberals tend to be unable to see things from the conservative point of view and understand what motivates conservative beliefs. Conservatives, by contrast, are much better at comprehending the liberal point of view with regard to various political issues. The reason, according to Haidt, is that the liberal conception of morality tends to be largely confined to matters of fairness and care for others, whereas the conservative conception includes as fundamental values not only fairness and concern, but also loyalty, respect for tradition, and purity.
While my own experience matches Prof. Haidt’s conclusions to some extent, I’ve found that self-described liberals are often not very receptive to conservative political positions even when framed in terms of fairness and concern.
Right – the “culture wars” are, to a large extent, about….culture.
As a side note, the term “liberal” here fits both in its modern American political meaning and in its classical meaning in that the extention and protection of individual rights is paramount.
One of the better posts on this subject is a very old post from Dan Kahan at Balkinization, where he uses the gun debate to illustrate the general point that culture is prior to fact.
Here’s the take-away point from the Balkinization post I linked above:
“Conflict over guns is, at bottom, an artifact of a type of cultural status anxiety. Persons naturally identify strongly with the their cultural values and with those who share them. When a societal conflict seems to pit the values of their cultural group against those of another, individuals instinctively adopt a defensive posture, blocking out messages that they believe emanate from or ultimately bolster the position of their cultural adversaries.”
The general points about “liberal” and “conservative” are largely irrelevant in a society that is divided between one type of liberalism and another. One little hint: real conservatives don’t mock elitism, they relish it.
Haidt is writing assuming our current jargon, which is necessary when making points about current political differences. And conservatives (that is, those opposed to the left) have embraced populism far too much for my tastes, although “relishing” elitism would only fit a few historical characters in North America (Nock most especially, although his influence was small). As for European conservatism, elitism has played a much larger role. We can discuss how “real” that is, although I don’t think any threads to modern times exist before E. Burke, who was a Rockingham Whig and not much of an elitist compared to many in the political chattering classes of the time.
Haidt’s data is, I believe, based on people’s self-description as liberal or conservative. If one wants to argue that those who call themselves liberals are the true conservatives or visa versa one can, but it won’t make any difference as to the substance of what he says.
I found the Balkinization post intriguing, though not entirely convincing. He cites survey data indicating most people who support gun control say they would still support it even if they thought it would increase crime, and that people who opposed gun control say they would still oppose it even if they thought it would decrease crime. I’m sure that the people in the survey were giving their honest opinion as to how their views would change if they acquired different factual beliefs. But the high correlation between one’s views on gun control and one’s beliefs about the factual consequences of gun control suggest that this isn’t really true.
The authors of this study have a story to explain this correlation, namely that people alter their factual beliefs to fit their cultural values. But the reverse is also a possibility. It is just as plausible to think that people who come to believe that guns are socially beneficial will alter their views on the cultural value of guns as it is that people’s views on the cultural value of guns will determine their factual beliefs about gun control, etc.
I am glad this piece is getting attention. I found many of his insights very true
“It is just as plausible to think that people who come to believe that guns are socially beneficial will alter their views on the cultural value of guns…”
Blackadder: I’m not sure I entirely understand your point. If the above were true, then wouldn’t a change in the individual’s belief about the social [i.e., safety] benefits of guns create a change in their belief about the cultural value of guns? Yet when asked this precise question, an overwhelming majority on both sides of the issue indicated that a change in their beliefs about the facts [i.e., safety] of guns would not provoke a change in their views on the cultural value of guns.
If the above were true, then wouldn’t a change in the individual’s belief about the social [i.e., safety] benefits of guns create a change in their belief about the cultural value of guns?
That’s right.
Yet when asked this precise question, an overwhelming majority on both sides of the issue indicated that a change in their beliefs about the facts [i.e., safety] of guns would not provoke a change in their views on the cultural value of guns.
Yes, but from the fact that someone says “if I believed x I would also believe y” it does not follow that, if they believed x, they would in fact believe y.
I see now. That’s a fair point, though I have trouble imagining a study which could prove or falsify it. (I can imagine the authors of the study sitting down with each individual respondent, and spending a year or two carefully arguing them into reversing their original position on the safety of guns… Heh.)
Having the authors of a survey spend a couple of years presenting facts and figures to survey participants does seem infeasible. Fortunately nature, in her infinite wisdom, has provided an equivalent substitute: college. If culture trumps fact, we would expect the views of those who have studied a given subject to be no different than those who have not.
Not really, as it is well accepted that college also exerts substantial cultural pull on students. Education (and this is especially true the closer one gets to education and academia as a career) is in fact arguably best described as an inculcator of certain cultural values; any actual facts conveyed are secondary at best. See, e.g., Disciplined Minds. Those who go to college find a new peer group, a new set of expectations and cultural norms.
In any event, it’s impossible to tease out the cause and the effect.
Come to think of it, I recently read about a study where they asked the subjects about their opinion on a particular political issue. They then present the subjects with a piece of paper which listed arguments for and against the issue. Now some of these arguments had clear and obvious logical flaws. Yet they found that, overwhelmingly, those who already agreed with one side or the other were less likely to notice or accept the fallacies. Notably, this result held regardless of the level of education – those who were more politically sophisticated were simply better at marshalling facts and arguments to fit their preconceived notions.
I’ll try to find the link later this evening, when I’m off work.
Thanks for introducing Haidt, Jonathan and this very provocative article. Here is a quotation from another work of his that I *often* think about when reading blogs:
How Can the Sometimes Vicious, Sometimes Silly Culture Wars Be Calmed?
“Realize that all combatants are morally motivated. It seems to be part of the nature of moral argument that one’s opponents are seen to be motivated by evil….But such moralization and demonization obscure the true nature of the conflict and make moderation or compromise into a moral failing – one should not negotiate with the devil. It is more accurate, and certainly more conducive to cooperation, to acknowledge that both sides are driven by their moral commitments…The two sides differ in their conceptions of the good, not in the goodness of their motivations.
“Recognize that American morality is plastic and pluralistic. American morality has, from the very beginning, been woven out of two strands, which Bellah et al. (1985) call the republican and the biblical strands. It has always struggled to grant independence and autonomy to individuals within a society that believes strongly in Christianity and in some elements of Puritanism….If history is any guide, neither side can ever win the culture war and eliminate the other.
“Recognize that moral discourse is an ex post facto product. One of the most frustrating aspects of moral argument is that the other side is not swayed by one’s arguments, no matter how good they are. The failure to respond to reason makes the other side seem unreasonable, and invites charges that their ‘real’ motivations are hidden and sinister. But this inference is based on the naïve idea that moral reasoning drives moral judgment, so that one can change people’s minds by refuting their reasons. The present findings are more compatible with an intuitionist model of moral judgment in which moral judgments are based on gut feelings and emotional intuitions. People then create moral arguments by drawing on a priori moral theories, which they put forth as social products, required by the discourse of an argument (i.e., one must provide reasons for one’s judgments.) The refutation of such arguments does not cause people to change their minds; it only forces them to work harder to find replacement arguments.”
Jonathan Haidt and Matthew Hersh, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2001, 31, 191-221.