This statement confuses two separate things: 1. The question over whether or not a war is just or unjust; 2. The actual judgment over whether a war is just or not. If a war is unjust, no amount of opinion will change that fact. The real question how do we judge? Well, if justice and injustice are objective values of an act, it seems that a “plurality of opinions” will do nothing to affect those values. So “plurality of opinions” is irrelevant in the objective status of a war. Can we make a moral judgment on war? I suggest that we can in light of very clear criteria. In this case, “plurality of opinion” is nothing but a bunch of true and false judgments. Best to be among those making the true judgment.

Since the Church’s teaching (e.g. from the Pope, or teaching organizations under the direct approval of the Pope, or the bishops collectively) has repeatedly ruled out condoms as an AIDS-prevention method, it could hardly be called an entirely open issue. The URL you gave is extremely unclear as to what kind of study it actually refers to. In any case, there is some clarification here.

“Could you please explain how murder is involved in the situation I described? There could be no moral objection to a pregnant woman undergoing chemotherapy to save her life, even if it risked the life of the fetus.”

However, the issue you brought up was actually something significantly different from that. You said: “But God forbid that a woman struggling to survive cancer and unwilling to conceive a child that would be killed by her treatment should engage in a sexual act that is not open to the transmission of life!” I.e. that is the case of someone currently not pregnant, who then goes on a type of chemotherapy that will be fatal to any subsequently conceived child, and wishes not to kill that child. Indeed in that case, abstinence avoids the killing of any child.

It’s different if there is a mother who is already pregnant, and later finds that she is prescribed such a course of chemotherapy. In that case, the mother might indeed be able to choose to undergo the chemotherapy.

“In some types of infertility, women have no problem ovulating or conceiving. The problem lies in consistent failure of the early embryo to implant. Such a woman may conceive repeatedly, and every time she does, the embryo is destined to die. Are you suggesting that if these women know of their condition, they must abstain from sex?”

That is again a different case. That type of infertility is not something chosen. The mother is not choosing an act which kills her children.

“Shooting a man through the head is not intrinsically evil.

That’s exactly correct. But if you ask the shooter two questions: “Do you know that shooting someone through the head is virtually certain to kill them?” and “Are you freely choosing to shoot them?” and receive an affirmative answer to both questions, that is sufficient to establish the fact that the killing is intentional, entirely apart from any other intentions or goals that the shooter might additionally have.

One of the “fallacies of intention” is to claim some goal as “the” intention. But in fact, it order to establish a level of intentionality, it is only necessary that the effects of the act are understood, and that the act is chosen.

I believe you are incorrect in stating that HV rules out the use of condoms to prevent transmission of HIV. So far, it is an open question, otherwise how could it be under study?

Cardinal Javier Lozano Barragan conducted a novel study on condom use with help from scientists, theologians and other experts. The study was done to explore the significance of condom use in curtailing spread of AIDS.

The senior Cardinal and his office prepared the study on a request from Pope Benedict XVI. The cardinal has highlighted the significance of fidelity in marriage and premarital abstinence from sex in the fight against AIDS. . . . .

This study on condoms was conducted only on married couples in which one of them tested for HIV virus.

http://www.bio-medicine.org/medicine-news/Church-u2019s-View-On-Usage-Of-Condom-16842-1/

Could you please explain how murder is involved in the situation I described? There could be no moral objection to a pregnant woman undergoing chemotherapy to save her life, even if it risked the life of the fetus. In fact, a woman with cancer of the uterus may have surgery that will, as a side effect, kill the fetus, and that is perfectly licit within Catholic thought. I can think of no principle that would forbid a woman undergoing chemotherapy to risk pregnancy.

In some types of infertility, women have no problem ovulating or conceiving. The problem lies in consistent failure of the early embryo to implant. Such a woman may conceive repeatedly, and every time she does, the embryo is destined to die. Are you suggesting that if these women know of their condition, they must abstain from sex?

My real point, in any case, was not to rehash the arguments about HV, but to try and get at exactly what is meant when something is labeled “intrinsically evil.” It seems only in sexual and reproductive matters where the Church totally discounts intentions in asserting that something is intrinsically evil. Shooting a man through the head is not intrinsically evil. It depends on why you do it. Bayoneting people on the battlefield is not intrinsically evil. It depends on whether the war is just. Taking something that doesn’t belong to you is not intrinsically evil. It depends on how desperately you need it. But (according to you and many others), the physical act of using a condom is intrinsically evil even for a married couple, no matter what the intention. I believe you are wrong, otherwise it would have been evil for the Vatican even to study the issue (with live subjects, it appears). But I also am having a real difficulty understanding what the idea of intrinsic evil adds to the discussion of morality, since so much of what is considered intrinsically evil is evil by definition.

Humanae Vitae says: “excluded is any action which either before, at the moment of, or after sexual intercourse, is specifically intended to prevent procreation—whether as an end or as a means.”

So, intention enters into the definition there, too. But you are (like so many) falling into the “fallacy of intention”. In the case of HV, any level of intention is sufficient to go against it. It is not sufficient to state some long-term goal, and claim that is one’s only intention, while ignoring other intentions that may unavoidably precede it.

So if someone becomes sterile after an operation to remove testicular cancer, HV permits that operation — provided one would have the same operation whether or sex were contemplated at some point after the operation. But the same operation for the purposes of contraception would not be permitted. Some level of intention does count.

The case of wearing a condom to prevent AIDS transmission also fails to pass the test of HV. While one can entirely truthfully state that there is a goal to prevent the transmission of AIDS, it’s also the case that the knowing removal of sperm during an act of sex is what is intended. And that goes against HV. The two intentions occur simultaneously, and one cannot pick one intention only.

David Nickol said: “But God forbid that a woman struggling to survive cancer and unwilling to conceive a child that would be killed by her treatment should engage in a sexual act that is not open to the transmission of life!”

Rather than possibly murder a human being (and, after all, that is what the issue is, despite all the syrupy violin music playing in the background), one should choose a small amount of suffering. Saint Paul has said “better to marry that to be on fire”. He would have regarded it as obvious that it is “better to be on fire than to murder”.

Paul,

As far as I can determine, theft is considered intrinsically evil, but the definition of theft is as follows:

2408 The seventh commandment forbids theft, that is, usurping another’s property against the reasonable will of the owner.

It would not be theft to take another’s food while starving, since this would not be against the reasonable will of the owner (unless he was starving as well, and didn’t have enough food for himself). So the exceptions are built in to the definition.

Likewise, murder is intrinsically evil but is not merely “the taking of a human life,” but rather the unjust taking of a life, or the taking of an innocent life. Murder is certainly one of the gravest sins, and yet the definition of murder excludes executions, self-defense, and killing in war. Again, the exceptions are built in to the definition.

It seems that it is only in sexual and reproductive matters that intentions don’t matter. You can kill or steal with good intentions, but you can’t use the pill as a contraceptive.

I don’t think it’s possible to make a blanket statement, applicable to all individuals, about what a minor matter it is to give up sex. (Now to the unmarried and to widows, I say: it is a good thing for them to remain as they are, as I do, but if they cannot exercise self-control they should marry, for it is better to marry than to be on fire. ) For a married couple in which the wife is undergoing treatment for, the sexual aspect of their relationship might bring significant comfort to both. But God forbid that a woman struggling to survive cancer and unwilling to conceive a child that would be killed by her treatment should engage in a sexual act that is not open to the transmission of life!

Right, one must not be consequetionalist. But the problem of the consequentialist is that they think the perverted good is good enough. Indeed, they will work with an incorrect understanding of intrinsic evil, using it as essential evil (which is wrong), and then show “see, there is good in my position, therefore it’s not intrinsically evil.”

1) If one wants to engage issues, you can start with the Catechism but if you end with it (which is what you seem to do) you will probably not even understand the Catechism when dealing with technical/difficult questions.

2) Hence, as I have already said, the problem is categorical. Nate, for example, points that wars of aggression are intrinsically evil.

Genus: killing, war; Species: abortion, war of aggression. But arguing not all of a genus is intrinsically evil (not all wars are) does not mean a specific species is not.

Though, one has to steer away from that turning into a form of consequentialism. So one has to be careful that the “result” of any action doesn’t merely end up being some kind of casual balance-sheet of good and bad consequences. This can be done by making sure that the consequences include internal, personal effects. Someone freely wishing for an intrinsic evil has already introduced evil into their own person, utterly regardless of what may causally happen as a consequence of making that choice.

David Nickol said: “Maybe it would help if someone could mention an act that was evil but not intrinsically evil.” A type of act is intrinsically evil if there is absolutely no way whatsoever of knowingly choosing to do it without sinning. For example, adultery. Most other kinds of actions may be evil or not, depending on the circumstances. For example, going into a stranger’s house and taking money would usually be an evil thing to do, unless one were literally starving to death, and needed the money to buy food.

David Nickol said: “Suppose the mother is undergoing chemotherapy or some other drug treatment that would be a terrible danger to an unborn child.” Despite all you may have been told by the world, giving up sex is a fairly mild suffering, and would be the only reasonable non-selfish response to such a dire situation.

It still seems to me that everything depends on intentions. Maybe it would help if someone could mention an act that was evil but not intrinsically evil. I am still trying to understand the case of the use of condoms in the case of a married couple where one of them is infected with HIV. There would be no contraceptive intent. Condoms could be used solely to prevent transmission of the virus, in the same way that the pill could be used for treating endometriosis. So far it seems to me that the principle that every sexual act must be open to the transmission of life is one that, in most cases I can think of, an observer could judge without knowing anything about the thoughts of the persons involved. If a condom is being used, the couple’s thoughts don’t matter. But if the pill is being used, everything depends on intentions.

There are all kinds of good reasons why a couple might use contraception for nonselfish reasons. Suppose the mother is undergoing chemotherapy or some other drug treatment that would be a terrible danger to an unborn child. Or suppose the couple chooses to use the pill for the exact same reason other couples use NFP.

I still don’t get it.

1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action. The end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. The intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity. It aims at the good anticipated from the action undertaken. Intention is not limited to directing individual actions, but can guide several actions toward one and the same purpose; it can orient one’s whole life toward its ultimate end. For example, a service done with the end of helping one’s neighbor can at the same time be inspired by the love of God as the ultimate end of all our actions. One and the same action can also be inspired by several intentions, such as performing a service in order to obtain a favor or to boast about it. ”

The object which the will moves towards is different in the situations your proposed. An object is what we actually are choosing to do, the intent is what we hope doing this will accomplish. When we say that evil can not be done for a good outcome, it means an evil object (I choose to lie) can not be done for a good intent (so as to bring about some good, say, not hurting someone’s feelings).

I believe you actually gave two separate situations:

In one, the object is the (actual) good of treating some medical condition. In this one, the person chooses to treat some valid medical condition. The intent (basicly, what we want to happen) is to ease suffering, improve health, or some other valid medical reason.

In the other, the object is the (perceived, disordered) good of contraception. In this one, the person chooses to prevent conception and shut God out. What is their purpose/intent? It may be “to live the lifestyle I desire” or to “have sex with whomever” or some other reason still. Rarely it may even be “to prevent contraception and to force God out of these things.” In which case the person would be in deep deep moral doo-doo.

Of course, it’s been a while since I’ve wrestled with formal ethics, so I might be a bit wrong.

This is even more difficult to understand than the difference between most types of contraception and NFP, and many would say they don’t see a difference there, either.

CCC 1756: It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

If we describe an act as an “unjust act” it implies that the action can be done in a just way. An intrinsic evil is always gravely illicit by reason of its object.

Abortion is intrinsically evil because the object of the act is always gravely illicit under all circumstances. War is not gravely illicit under all circumstances.