There is a powerful strain in Burke which holds that tradition is *opposed* to reflection. The notion of a tradition that is self-reflective seems to Burke to be a conflict in terms. However, this–according to Macintyre and before him Newman–is precisely the sort of tradition provided both by the history of the Church itself (rightly understood) and of Aristotelian-Thomist moral enquiry. That Burke polarizes Tradition and Reflection, that so much of what constitutes Tradition for Burke is and must be unconscious, organic, etc., reflects his buying into a powerful prejudice of enlightenment thinking, not his resistance to such thinking.

“To the Sophists Socrates said: ‘You do very well in considering and in testing by critical thought all that exists or does not exist; the pity is that you are bad thinkers, and have no idea whatever either of the aims or the methods of real criticism or dialectics.’

“Socrates pointed out, and, what more, demonstrated beyond question the intellectual bankruptcy of his opponents. This, of course, was an unpardonable offence. Reconciliation was henceforth impossible. And even if Socrates never had directly accused the Athenian city fathers of being bad Conservatives, or the Sophists of being bad thinkers, the position would not have been changed. All the same he had accused both parties by his very personality, by his moral character, and by the positive significance of his speeches. He himself, as the personification of truly conservative and truly critical principles, was a living offence to bad conservatives and bad critics. Until he appeared, even if both parties were dissatisfied with one another, they were, on the other hand, serenely satisfied with themselves.

“As long as the Conservatives could see in their opponents godless and irreligious men, they had the feeling of their own moral superiority, and in anticipation celebrated their victory. It might appear in very truth that they were defending faith and piety itself. There was an appearance of a dispute about principles and ideas, in which they represented the right and positive party. But when they came into conflict with Socrates, the position changed completely. They could not defend faith and piety, as such, against a man, who was himself a pious believer. It fell to them to defend not faith itself, but only the distinction between their faith and that of Socrates’, and this distinction lay in the fact that Socrates’ faith had vision, while theirs was blind. Thus the poor character of their faith was revealed, and in their eagerness in asserting this particular unchanging blind faith its weakness and insincerity became evident. On what ground could they defend absence of enlightenment in faith? Was it on the ground that every faith was bound to be unenlightened? But there, before them, was Socrates with an obvious refutation of such a supposition by the very fact of his enlightened and perceptive faith. It was clear that they defended unenlightenment, not in the interests of faith, but in other interests having no connection to faith. And, as a matter of fact, the Athenian Conservatives of that time, at least the more cultured among them, were men who had no faith. It could not be otherwise. When in the given society an intellectual movement had once begun– when philosophy appeared and developed– a direct faith requiring a childlike mind became impossible for everyone touched by the movement. What has passed away cannot be conserved, and the faith of ‘obscurantes’ is only a deceptive mask covering their actual unbelief. In the case of the more active and gifted men among the Athenian Conservatives, Aristophanes for instance, their true feelings broke through the mask; exposing the so- called impiety of the philosophers, Aristophanes at the very time by his coarse mockery of the goods displayed his own. What was conserved by such Conservatives, and what was their motive? It is clear it was not the fear of the Divine, but only fear for the old and familiar way of life which was up with a given religion.”

Vladimir Solovyov, Plato, VII

Before ‘neoconservative’ became an epithet synonym for ‘bad, and I don’t like it,’ the term was used to describe social scientists (amateur and professional) who came to have serious qualms about the direction of the welfare state and its impact upon behavior. They provided significant intellectual energy to the conservative moment, but were always suspect because many of them were Jewish and secular, tended to be disinterested in the Anglo-American school of philosophical skepticism, and had sympathy for figures the ‘old guard’ (the so-called ‘paleo-cons’ of today) hated, Trotsky most notably. (Pointing to a larger rift over the possibilities of ideology and utopia…Hitchens, for example, dialogues with conservatives of all stripes and is an admirer of Trotsky). Professor Gottfried (ironically, someone connected to some of the same libertarian institutes as many of those he criticizes) lets loose with both barrels on this issue here: http://www.takimag.com/site/article/the_trotskyist_hour

As to your last question, there is not much of Burke in the current administration. People who admire Burke can still vote without any problem, however, as Burke in rhetoric and in long parliamentary example advocated for active involvement, reform, and compromise. My own view is that Burke would be against ‘speculating’ about his own career for our times, but he would very much be in favor of importing his “sentiments” (such as caution and respectful dialogue) to our present politics.

A fantastic post! I am glad to see someone actually define a term that has been lurking in the halls of ambiguity in almost every modern usage; and you do so by refering to the right people.

I wonder: having understood conservatism in this Burkean light, what do you perceive to be the major differences between traditional Burkean conservatism and Neo-conservatism, as it has played itself out in American politics over the last (what, ) half-century? What resources are there within this stock of values to critique the current regime’s particular, historically embedded form of conservatism?

Pax Christi,

You say this sort of thing very often, but it’s not obviously true to me.

It’s certainly the case that many Medieval and Renaissance states were monarchies in which a succession or specific lineages held power over a gradually changing area — though you also had entities that were clearly recognized to exist (Florence and Venice spring to mind) even as major changes in government occurred from time to time. States in that period also lacked formal founding dates and documents in nearly all cases — though with cases such as Britain you have the gradual accumulation of something like a constitution.

Going back to Classical times, you have very clear ideas of national identity, which were not strictly ethnic or tied to a specific royal line. The Roman Republic at the time of Polybius and Periclean Athens both strike me as being nation states in just about every sense that the modern US is — except in being organically (and obscurely) developed rather than intentionally constituted at a specific point in time.

What exactly about the modern nation state is it that you see as being so different than nations in other times and places?