I am not forgetting that. I think it is false, at least in the sense that ‘prudential judgement’ is not code for ‘there is never any wrong answer, only wrong justifications’.

In some cases, that is, for some ballots in some circumstances, of course, there might be perfectly reasonable proportionate reasons for voting for any of the candidates. There is no reason to even suspect that that is the case for all ballots and circumstances. Someone who has not even considered the possibility that it might be morally wrong to vote for the candidate he plans to vote for is not reasoning properly in anticipation of the act.

The problem is people judge others through their own fallible reason.

That, again, is a straw man. If I were to conclude that it was morally wrong to support the initiation of the Iraq war (I have indeed concluded that by the way) I am making a determination about objective reality: indeed just the sort that I am required to make. That my own judgments are fallible is doubtless true; but the fallibility of my judgments does not constitute a license for me to make morally wrong ones. Indeed I have (everyone has) a moral obligation to correct my erroneous judgments.

That there is a fine line between judging objective reality and judging the subjective culpability of persons is doubtless true; but that also does not constitute a license for me to make and act upon morally wrong judgments.

To wit, your statement:

It makes it clear a vote for an individual, when it is made despite what evil that person supports, is not complicit in that evil.

… is at best incomplete. Material cooperation with evil is only licit where there is a proportionate reason. And proportionate reason, while assuredly a difficult subject, refers to objective criteria. Thus it may well be objectively immoral to support the Iraq war, to vote for Obama, and/or to vote for McCain.

The Church is indeed the moral guide. When it pronounces a judgment based upon its moral authority (such as the immorality of the Iraq War), it is to be followed. A politician who might not be following it can still be supported without one supporting this action of the politician. However, the voter cannot support them because of the war itself. Nor can they support the war, when it is declared by a definitive judgment, that it is unjust.

On the other hand, when the Church gives a general guideline, says “here are intrinsic evils” but also says “you can vote for someone who supports them as long as you have proportionate reasons to do so” (which can include, lack of choices) “and as long as you do so, not because of their support for such evil, but inspite of it” then it is up to the person to use their conscience, wit, and listening tot he Church to determine, from the choices involved, who they think best fit with the Church’s moral teaching. If the Church, however, makes a definitive judgment against a certain politician, then it must be followed. But it hasn’t. Therefore, there is an opennes.

You are not dealing with the issues and going with strawmen. I have not argued one can support immoral means. I have, however, argued one can work with people who are using immoral means. Those are two different issues. The point is a significant one and needful one.

I think one of the big problems and what lies behind this attempt to equate a vote for someone as complicit with all that person does is the modern world’s idolatrous understanding of politics. It has turned politics and the person you support into a religious issue. It has made politics religion. Thus, the one who votes wrong is a heretic. That is, of course, what happens when politicians are turned into something they are not: messianic figures.

Nonetheless, unlike what you have proposed the Church gives much more flexibility to the person and their ability to act within their conscience under certain guidelines. It makes it clear a vote for an individual, when it is made despite what evil that person supports, is not complicit in that evil. That is what is being ignored. The person’s vote is not a vote of support for evil. However, in working with an individual, even voting for them, it does not remove the duty for the Christian to be critical in response, and work with the person as far as morality allows, and criticize when necessary. Thus, the Pope himself works with Bush; is he complicit in the Iraq War? No, he is also criticial despite his work with Bush. Thus, no matter who you vote for, that must not be seen as the end, and it is only seen as the end because votes, not what happens after, have become ends in themselves. And that’s why people make out of a vote more than what it is.

In this way, the Church has consistently told priests: you can’t become a partaker of partisan politics in the pulpit. If, however, one or more candidate was, de facto, one that a Catholic can’t vote for, the Church would issue forth such a decree. Instead, it has made itself clear: the possibilities are open. Make the decision yourself. This is also why when priests do make claims about it being illicit to vote for a certain candidate from the pulpit, the Church reacts.

It doesn’t say much to say that something is in dispute though. I’m hard pressed to think of anything that is not in dispute, other than perhaps Descarte’s cogito. (Probably someone will dispute that).

And I think, as has been made clear from the Church, there are prudential reasons for which one can vote for either McCain or Obama (or someone else) this year.

That is wayyyy more than the Church has said. Never has the Church said ‘it is morally licit to vote for McCain’ or ‘it is morally licit to vote for Obama’. (It would be extremely out of character for the Church to do so).

I could as easily argue that because the Church has articulated a Just War doctrine, and because the JWD says that the responsibility lies with the competent authority, She has granted permission to the Faithful to support the Iraq war specifically. In fact someone rather prominent in ‘Conservative’ Catholic circles has argued just that kind of thing. I didn’t think much of Weigel’s argument that supporting the Iraq war is necessarily licit because of what the Magisterium has taught about war in general, and I don’t think much of a similar argument that voting for Obama or voting for McCain is necessarily licit because of what the Magisterium has taught about voting in general.

The issue is that such proportionality is also a thing in dispute. I agree, as I point out, not all means are valid. However, we can’t be legalistic Pharisees either. There is a middle road which allows for prudential decisions. And I think, as has been made clear from the Church, there are prudential reasons for which one can vote for either McCain or Obama (or someone else) this year. However, those reasons must be valid and must keep in account the whole. Yet, because the Church has made it clear that a vote for a candidate is not a support for all that candidate stands for, it is the first step to realize that cooperation is indeed possible, and necessary, in this world.

That is very true, as stated. However, means-end relations are not a subjective matter. Either a given means is objectively proportionate to a given end, or it isn’t. We can’t judge the subjective states of a person, and I for one would not want to. But the objective relations between means and end are very much subject to judgement: indeed we are required to judge them.

There is nothing wrong with a statement of the form ‘there is no proportionate reason to vote for Obama/McCain, and therefore voting for Obama/McCain is always morally wrong, though we can never know the subjective culpability of the voter in doing that wrong’.

Indeed, the statement is either objectively true or it isn’t, and is just the sort of objective statement which ought to be the subject of our debates on the morality of voting.

Once again, thanks!

I really hope people get the message of this post.

Thanks. With all the debates around us, and the ease some people have of condemning someone for those they support politically, I thought something like this was needed. Originally I was planning to do a “study” on St Alexander Nevsky to open up the question, but decided this kind of essay worked better.