The world we live in is a fallen world. Until the eschaton, it will never find perfection. This fact should not mean that we can be lazy and give up working for the betterment of the world. No, we should always strive for perfection, even if we know it is unattainable. In a sense, however, it is attainable and indeed, Christians in their experience of Christ at communion do encounter it and find it for one great moment at the Lord ’s Table.
Christians should always have their eye on the end, on perfection, while realizing the state of the world they live in. They must understand what the world is like, and how powerful evil can be and is in it. But they must engage the world. They can’t turn their backs on it. Such a gnostic response is always the response of a coward. Yet they must be realistic; what they can do for the world is good, even if it is limited. If they engage politics, it means they must understand that no political position will be perfect in and of itself. They can expect no politician or political idea to fix all earthly problems. More importantly it means that when engaging politics, they will be engaging a fallen structure, and they will have to make deals with people who do evil. There is no way out of it. There is no way beyond the fact that politics requires compromises, and the end result of any political action will never meet any ideal. People involved with a given political action will be cooperating with one kind of evil or another.
In cooperating with one who does evil, one is themselves not necessarily doing evil. Some forms of cooperation, of course, would be. But others must not be seen as such. Cooperation does not necessarily mean agreement. One must look at how the cooperation is engaged and see if the kind of cooperation is acceptable or not in itself. We really must be realistic and truly understand this fact. “Working with” someone does not mean “agreement with” all aspects of that person’s policies or decisions. St Thomas More clearly worked with Henry VIII, and was willing to help him out, even after Henry VIII’s defection from the Catholic faith. Henry, by this time, was engaging quite a bit of evil, but St Thomas More thought that not only was there a level of cooperation he could have with the king, it was required of him to give as much cooperation as he could if his conscience didn’t cry out against it. St Thomas More understood a fact which people have forgotten today: there are many ways to work for a given end. St Thomas More wanted to help his old friend back into the Church and to protect England from disaster. While his way might not have worked out, no one could have predicted failure. If he were alive today, pundits might besmear his reputation for his working with Henry; Catholics in his day understood the situation and understood there were no easy answers.
Christians are required to look for and try to bring about the good, but they are expected to use their wits and conscience to find prudential means by which the good can come about. Sometimes that means temporal cooperation with evil, but when that is the case, that kind of cooperation must have a limit (as St Thomas More also shows us). What is that limit? When a given means breaks the moral law, one can not practice it, even if the positive law of the land demands it. Many times, however, working with someone who is evil, and even enacting evil (as Henry VIII did) does not mean one is themselves working for or enforcing such evil means.
When people disagree about the best means to an end, some think that those who disagree with them must be working for evil. They don’t understand the complexity of the situation and how people will think things through differently. To argue against other possible means as being the result of some amoral motives is to judge the situation with an insight few can really possess, and if you don’t, then it is a judgment call which is itself sinful.
Yes, people can be naïve and follow or trust someone they shouldn’t. But that happens to all of us in life. To judge whether or not such an action is naïve (let alone evil) requires hindsight, the kind which can look to history and judge it, and the kind which we do not have when we are working for some future which hasn’t yet manifested itself. Of course, in political debates, it’s a common enough expression by people from all sides of an issue. It’s a kind of self-affirmation we need, because we are often in doubt of our own answer. If we can’t understand the ways of others, and so we judge what they say to be foolish just because we can’t understand it, this makes us feel as if our answer is indeed the best possible one even if it is not. Historically, indeed, such assumptions about others have often led to devastating results because the one who thought it was the one who was foolish. Perhaps one of the greatest historical examples of this fact can be found in the life and work of St Alexander Nevsky.
St Alexander Nevsky, the Grand Prince of Novgorod and Vladimir, inherited the throne in the middle of the Tatar Yoke. While it is clear that Mongol rule over Rus was terrible, and his people wanted independence from them, Alexander Nevksy understood the reality of the situation: they were not capable of attaining freedom and any attempts at it would cause severe reprimands from the Golden Horde. He knew that, for his lifetime, the best thing to do was to cooperate with the Mongols, no matter how difficult it made things, and no matter what kinds of evils were done at their hands. Not everyone agreed with him. Indeed, many thought ill of him because of it. More than once in his life he had to overcome rebellion, even against members of his own family. When political intrigue indicated that a certain region under his control was planning to revolt, he would do what he could to squash it, but if he couldn’t, he would tell the Mongols what was happening, and even help them to end the rebellion. Such tactics, of course, satisfied the Mongols: since he was seen to be loyal to them, he was able to gain many benefits from them for his people. For example, he was able to exempt his people from joining the Tatar army, a remarkable feat which could not have been done save for his acts of fidelity. More importantly, it left his people with a sort of independence, since he was trusted to rule over them, and it gave them more than enough time to eventually gain the strength needed to overcome Mongol rule (something which would happen after his lifetime). Clearly, Alexander Nevsky cooperated with evil when he worked with the Mongols, especially when he even helped enforce their rule upon his people. However, he also knew that it was such a means which was needed to buy his people enough time to grow and become strong in their own right. Without it, they would have easily perished. But with it, he was able to preserve his cultural and religious heritage intact (one of the reasons why he was canonized by the Orthodox). Those around him often considered him a traitor: he was naïve, because everyone knew that Mongol rule was wrong. Yet, they were shown to be the one in the wrong when their rebellions were overcome and Alexander Nevsky’s political aims were achieved after his death.
Perhaps it is time we realize that the difficult situation we face in politics requires people to have strange bedfellows. Arguing against someone because of those they associate with is always fallacious (though, of course, if it is more than mere association, but pure agreement with an evil means, it’s no longer guilt by association, but guilt by action). We might not understand why they think a given action will result in an ends, especially when the means seems contrary to the ends (such as St Alexander Nevsky’s cooperation with the Mongols). But it is wrong to impute upon them evil intentions, or naiveté, just because we disagree with them. If we do, we will begin to criticize actions of the saints. And it won’t be just any kinds of actions, but the actions which they followed that led to their canonization. Is this really what we want to happen as a result of our political theories?
June 14, 2008 at 2:51 pm
Great post, Henry. Really thought-provoking and a worthwhile read.
June 14, 2008 at 3:05 pm
Chase,
Thanks. With all the debates around us, and the ease some people have of condemning someone for those they support politically, I thought something like this was needed. Originally I was planning to do a “study” on St Alexander Nevsky to open up the question, but decided this kind of essay worked better.
June 14, 2008 at 3:54 pm
Great post, Henry – your erudition just floors me, on a regular basis.
June 15, 2008 at 5:26 am
Matt
Once again, thanks!
I really hope people get the message of this post.
June 15, 2008 at 10:49 am
We might not understand why they think a given action will result in an ends, especially when the means seems contrary to the ends (such as St Alexander Nevsky’s cooperation with the Mongols). But it is wrong to impute upon them evil intentions, or naiveté, just because we disagree with them.
That is very true, as stated. However, means-end relations are not a subjective matter. Either a given means is objectively proportionate to a given end, or it isn’t. We can’t judge the subjective states of a person, and I for one would not want to. But the objective relations between means and end are very much subject to judgement: indeed we are required to judge them.
There is nothing wrong with a statement of the form ‘there is no proportionate reason to vote for Obama/McCain, and therefore voting for Obama/McCain is always morally wrong, though we can never know the subjective culpability of the voter in doing that wrong’.
Indeed, the statement is either objectively true or it isn’t, and is just the sort of objective statement which ought to be the subject of our debates on the morality of voting.
June 15, 2008 at 11:11 am
Zippy
The issue is that such proportionality is also a thing in dispute. I agree, as I point out, not all means are valid. However, we can’t be legalistic Pharisees either. There is a middle road which allows for prudential decisions. And I think, as has been made clear from the Church, there are prudential reasons for which one can vote for either McCain or Obama (or someone else) this year. However, those reasons must be valid and must keep in account the whole. Yet, because the Church has made it clear that a vote for a candidate is not a support for all that candidate stands for, it is the first step to realize that cooperation is indeed possible, and necessary, in this world.
June 15, 2008 at 3:25 pm
The issue is that such proportionality is also a thing in dispute.
It doesn’t say much to say that something is in dispute though. I’m hard pressed to think of anything that is not in dispute, other than perhaps Descarte’s cogito. (Probably someone will dispute that).
And I think, as has been made clear from the Church, there are prudential reasons for which one can vote for either McCain or Obama (or someone else) this year.
That is wayyyy more than the Church has said. Never has the Church said ‘it is morally licit to vote for McCain’ or ‘it is morally licit to vote for Obama’. (It would be extremely out of character for the Church to do so).
I could as easily argue that because the Church has articulated a Just War doctrine, and because the JWD says that the responsibility lies with the competent authority, She has granted permission to the Faithful to support the Iraq war specifically. In fact someone rather prominent in ‘Conservative’ Catholic circles has argued just that kind of thing. I didn’t think much of Weigel’s argument that supporting the Iraq war is necessarily licit because of what the Magisterium has taught about war in general, and I don’t think much of a similar argument that voting for Obama or voting for McCain is necessarily licit because of what the Magisterium has taught about voting in general.
June 15, 2008 at 3:47 pm
Zippy,
You are not dealing with the issues and going with strawmen. I have not argued one can support immoral means. I have, however, argued one can work with people who are using immoral means. Those are two different issues. The point is a significant one and needful one.
I think one of the big problems and what lies behind this attempt to equate a vote for someone as complicit with all that person does is the modern world’s idolatrous understanding of politics. It has turned politics and the person you support into a religious issue. It has made politics religion. Thus, the one who votes wrong is a heretic. That is, of course, what happens when politicians are turned into something they are not: messianic figures.
Nonetheless, unlike what you have proposed the Church gives much more flexibility to the person and their ability to act within their conscience under certain guidelines. It makes it clear a vote for an individual, when it is made despite what evil that person supports, is not complicit in that evil. That is what is being ignored. The person’s vote is not a vote of support for evil. However, in working with an individual, even voting for them, it does not remove the duty for the Christian to be critical in response, and work with the person as far as morality allows, and criticize when necessary. Thus, the Pope himself works with Bush; is he complicit in the Iraq War? No, he is also criticial despite his work with Bush. Thus, no matter who you vote for, that must not be seen as the end, and it is only seen as the end because votes, not what happens after, have become ends in themselves. And that’s why people make out of a vote more than what it is.
In this way, the Church has consistently told priests: you can’t become a partaker of partisan politics in the pulpit. If, however, one or more candidate was, de facto, one that a Catholic can’t vote for, the Church would issue forth such a decree. Instead, it has made itself clear: the possibilities are open. Make the decision yourself. This is also why when priests do make claims about it being illicit to vote for a certain candidate from the pulpit, the Church reacts.
June 15, 2008 at 4:06 pm
To make myself a bit clearer.
The Church is indeed the moral guide. When it pronounces a judgment based upon its moral authority (such as the immorality of the Iraq War), it is to be followed. A politician who might not be following it can still be supported without one supporting this action of the politician. However, the voter cannot support them because of the war itself. Nor can they support the war, when it is declared by a definitive judgment, that it is unjust.
On the other hand, when the Church gives a general guideline, says “here are intrinsic evils” but also says “you can vote for someone who supports them as long as you have proportionate reasons to do so” (which can include, lack of choices) “and as long as you do so, not because of their support for such evil, but inspite of it” then it is up to the person to use their conscience, wit, and listening tot he Church to determine, from the choices involved, who they think best fit with the Church’s moral teaching. If the Church, however, makes a definitive judgment against a certain politician, then it must be followed. But it hasn’t. Therefore, there is an opennes.
June 15, 2008 at 4:11 pm
Henry: frankly, I think you are engaging a straw man. I never said anything so general about “working with” various people. I am talking specifically about the morality of voting for a candidate.
To wit, your statement:
It makes it clear a vote for an individual, when it is made despite what evil that person supports, is not complicit in that evil.
… is at best incomplete. Material cooperation with evil is only licit where there is a proportionate reason. And proportionate reason, while assuredly a difficult subject, refers to objective criteria. Thus it may well be objectively immoral to support the Iraq war, to vote for Obama, and/or to vote for McCain.
June 15, 2008 at 4:17 pm
Once again, Zippy, you are forgetting the fact that although there are objective criteria, unless those criteria are used by the Church to make a judgment call, there is a subjective dimension with creative freedom that one is to use. One can get it wrong. One can be wrong in their opinion and their mapping out what is “proportionate reasons.” But that is a different issue. And they might be right, despite our own subjective reading of the objective reality. The problem is people judge others through their own fallible reason. Once again, the Church has not made the judgment you have; you confuse your own reading of the situation with what is acceptable or not. It is — for you, but not others. That is always what is forgotten, and comes from a poor understanding of Christian liberty.
June 15, 2008 at 4:53 pm
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June 15, 2008 at 5:10 pm
…you are forgetting the fact that although there are objective criteria, unless those criteria are used by the Church to make a judgment call, there is a subjective dimension with creative freedom that one is to use.
I am not forgetting that. I think it is false, at least in the sense that ‘prudential judgement’ is not code for ‘there is never any wrong answer, only wrong justifications’.
In some cases, that is, for some ballots in some circumstances, of course, there might be perfectly reasonable proportionate reasons for voting for any of the candidates. There is no reason to even suspect that that is the case for all ballots and circumstances. Someone who has not even considered the possibility that it might be morally wrong to vote for the candidate he plans to vote for is not reasoning properly in anticipation of the act.
The problem is people judge others through their own fallible reason.
That, again, is a straw man. If I were to conclude that it was morally wrong to support the initiation of the Iraq war (I have indeed concluded that by the way) I am making a determination about objective reality: indeed just the sort that I am required to make. That my own judgments are fallible is doubtless true; but the fallibility of my judgments does not constitute a license for me to make morally wrong ones. Indeed I have (everyone has) a moral obligation to correct my erroneous judgments.
That there is a fine line between judging objective reality and judging the subjective culpability of persons is doubtless true; but that also does not constitute a license for me to make and act upon morally wrong judgments.