Yes, we agree on that point. I’m sorry for not making myself more clear.

It would be interesting to review the methodology used for the official statistics of DOD. Aside from the one article I saw, I’ve seen nothing else. But my belief is that those statistics are just as phony as any other claim.

Even the numbers for US soldiers killed in Iraq is highly misleading. The number of wounded, the degree of the wounds, PTSD’s — all these add up to a much more horrid situation than the simple count of dead bodies.

The recent RAND study shows an extremely high percentage of the 1.6 million soldiers that have been deployed in Iraq (20% or 300,000) suffer from invisible wounds such as post-traumatic stress disorder, major depression, and traumatic brain injury. This number (once again, a number) is highly disproportionate to the number of actual deaths.

To me, this is a cost that should carry as much, if not more, weight in our calculations of the actual costs of the war. These invisible wounds will carry on with these people through the rest of their lives. It impacts relations with everyone including family, friends, the community, etc. Yet the public is never fully attuned to these hidden costs.

War should always be the always be the last resort. Often times, we are too eager to commit to war. It’s poor judgment.

The RAND study is at:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG720/

Follow the links.

You seem to be insisting that I’m defending the methodology of the Lancet study. I’m not. When I read the report after it first came out, I knew intuitively — without even looking closely — that it could not be accurate. It was also clear to me it would cause a lot of inflamed discussion. A conversation about war casualties is always a cause for heated discussion. The disputants have different purposes, and it is these purposes which clash in pubic debate. The same kind of clash can be seen in this post. The is a wide range of purposes behind each comment.

My point is simple: no methodology will give an accurate count of the war casualties in Iraq. Why? Because the USG will not allow for an accurate accounting. Even if it did, this is a war zone and there is chaos everywhere.

By the way, look at the methodology that supports the USG numbers on war casualties. I’ll bet you’ll find gross deficiencies in their methodology as well. I read such a critique awhile back, but wasn’t interested enough to keep the reference.

Personally, I don’t believe statistics provide the best means for getting a persuasive accounting of the costs of the war. They can be helpful. But a qualitative portrait is much more effective.

“Critics say that the surveys used too few clusters, and too few people, to do the job properly.

Sample size. The design for Lancet II committed eight surveyors to visit 50 regional clusters (the number ended up being 47) with each cluster consisting of 40 households. By contrast, in a 2004 survey, the United Nations Development Program used many more questioners to visit 2,200 clusters of 10 houses each. This gave the U.N. investigators greater geographical variety and 10 times as many interviews, and produced a figure of about 24,000 excess deaths — one-quarter the number in the first Lancet study. The Lancet II sample is so small that each violent death recorded translated to 2,000 dead Iraqis overall. The question arises whether the chosen clusters were enough to be truly representative of the entire Iraqi population and therefore a valid data set for extrapolating to nationwide totals.

“Main street” bias? According to the Lancet II article, surveyors randomly selected a main street within a randomly picked district; “a residential street was then randomly selected from a list of residential streets crossing the main street.” This method pulled the survey teams away from side streets and toward main streets, where car bombs can kill the most people, thus boosting the apparent death rate, according to a critique of the study by Michael Spagat, an economics professor at the Royal Holloway, University of London, and Sean Gourley and Neil Johnson of the physics department at Oxford University.
Burnham responds that The Lancet’s description of how the researchers picked sites was an editing error, and that the method used eliminated main-street bias.

Oversight. To undertake the first Lancet study, Roberts went into Iraq concealed on the floor of an SUV with $20,000 in cash stuffed into his money belt and shoes. Daring stuff, to be sure, but just eight days after arriving, Roberts witnessed the police detaining two surveyors who had questioned the governor’s household in a Sadr-dominated town. Roberts subsequently remained in a hotel until the survey was completed. Thus, most of the oversight for Lancet I — and all of it for Lancet II — was done long-distance. For this reason, although he defends the methodology, Garfield took his name off Lancet II. “The study in 2006 suffered because Les was running for Congress and wasn’t directly supervising the work as he had done in 2004,” Garfield told NJ.
Black-Box Data
With the original data unavailable, other scholars cannot verify the findings, a key test of scientific rigor.

Response rate. The surveyors said that 1.7 percent of households — fewer than one in 50 — were unoccupied or uncooperative, even though questioners visited each house only once on one day; that answers were taken only from the household’s husband or wife, not from in-laws or adult children; and that householders had reason to fear that their participation would expose them to threats from armed groups.
To Kane, the study’s reported response rate of more than 98 percent “makes no sense,” if only because many male heads of households would be at work or elsewhere during the day and Iraqi women would likely refuse to participate. On the other hand, Kieran J. Healy, a sociologist at the University of Arizona, found that in four previous unrelated surveys, the polling response in Iraq was typically in the 90 percent range.

The Lancet II questioners had enough time to accomplish the surveys properly, Burnham said.

Lack of supporting data. The survey teams failed to collect the fraud-preventing demographic data that pollsters routinely gather. For example, D3 Systems, a polling firm based in Vienna, Va., that has begun working in Iraq, tries to prevent chicanery among its 100-plus Iraqi surveyors by requiring them to ask respondents for such basic demographic data as ages and birthdates. This anti-fraud measure works because particular numbers tend to appear more often in surveys based on fake interviews and data — or “curb-stoning — than they would in truly random surveys, said Matthew Warshaw, the Iraq director for D3. Curb-stoning surveyors might report the ages of many people to be 30 or 40, for example, rather than 32 or 38. This type of fabrication is called “data-heaping,” Warshaw said, because once the data are transferred to spreadsheets, managers can easily see the heaps of faked numbers.

Death certificates. The survey teams said they confirmed most deaths by examining government-issued death certificates, but they took no photographs of those certificates. “Confirmation of deaths through death certificates is a linchpin for their story,” Spagat told NJ. “But they didn’t record (or won’t provide) information about these death certificates that would make them traceable.”
Under pressure from critics, the authors did release a disk of the surveyors’ collated data, including tables showing how often the survey teams said they requested to see, and saw, the death certificates. But those tables are suspicious, in part, because they show data-heaping, critics said. For example, the database reveals that 22 death certificates for victims of violence and 23 certificates for other deaths were declared by surveyors and households to be missing or lost. That similarity looks reasonable, but Spagat noticed that the 23 missing certificates for nonviolent deaths were distributed throughout eight of the 16 surveyed provinces, while all 22 missing certificates for violent deaths were inexplicably heaped in the single province of Nineveh. That means the surveyors reported zero missing or lost certificates for 180 violent deaths in 15 provinces outside Nineveh. The odds against such perfection are at least 10,000 to 1, Spagat told NJ. Also, surveyors recorded another 70 violent deaths and 13 nonviolent deaths without explaining the presence or absence of certificates in the database. In a subsequent MIT lecture, Burnham said that the surveyors sometimes forgot to ask for the certificates.

Suspicious cluster. Lafta’s team reported 24 car bomb deaths in early July, as well as one nonviolent death, in “Cluster 33″ in Baghdad. The authors do not say where the cluster was, but the only major car bomb in the city during that period, according to Iraq Body Count’s database, was in Sadr City. It was detonated in a marketplace on July 1, likely by Al Qaeda, and killed at least 60 people, according to press reports.
The authors should not have included the July data in their report because the survey was scheduled to end on June 30, according to Debarati Guha-Sapir, director of the World Health Organization’s Collaborating Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the University of Louvain in Belgium. Because of the study’s methodology, those 24 deaths ultimately added 48,000 to the national death toll and tripled the authors’ estimate for total car bomb deaths to 76,000. That figure is 15 times the 5,046 car bomb killings that Iraq Body Count recorded up to August 2006.

According to a data table reviewed by Spagat and Kane, the team recorded the violent deaths as taking place in early July and did not explain why they failed to see death certificates for any of the 24 victims. The surveyors did remember, however, to ask for the death certificate of the one person who had died peacefully in that cluster.

The Cluster 33 data is curious for other reasons as well. The 24 Iraqis who died violently were neatly divided among 18 houses — 12 houses reported one death, and six houses reported two deaths, according to the authors’ data. This means, Spagat said, that the survey team found a line of 40 households that neatly shared almost half of the deaths suffered when a marketplace bomb exploded among a crowd of people drawn from throughout the broader neighborhood.

The data also bolster Spagat’s criticism that the surveyors selected too many clusters in places where bomb explosions and gunfights were most common. ”

The Hopkins study is poor. The ORB may also be.

“So are we left with a sum of individual findings that are clues to bias in the Lancet II death statistics. 1) A calculated estimate amounting to 1 death per 40 people in a population of 25 million, in an area the size of California, over 3 1/2 years – an extraordinary number; 2) use of a method used for other surveys but not previously used in a war zone; 3) use of surveyors contracted from local populations, often hostile to the US/UK; 4) sample verification by those native surveyors, not by the primary investigators; 5) refusal of the authors to release raw data to the public…”

Not a big stretch at all to say that the models were used incorrectly when physicians who do studies cite METHODOLOGICAL errors in this given study.

This is a flawed statement.

The weakness of these studies not because the models are used in a very flawed fashion. Rather it’s because those doing the study have not been allowed the necessary access to obtain the necessary data. They are using the tools they have at their disposal to make the best case they can. Despite knowing the weaknesses of their methodology, they felt compelled to proceed anyway. I’ve been reading Lancet for a long time. I can’t recall anytime when their studies have been criticized.

Of course, these people are going to be attacked by outsiders. But to conclude they don’t know how use models correctly is a big stretch. And it’s not accurate. They are put in that predicament by the USG and then criticized for doing an imperfect analysis. That’s a hoot!

Nice rhetorical shift. I guess that means that the studies are flawed.

Would they say their death was worth it for…. whatever is the latest “flavor of the month” explanation from the Bush administration?

Would they say, sorry, but a million of you is the price to pay to save a million of the unborn a year in the US, even though it did no such thing?

I do not dispute what you say here. The only point I was making had to do with the question: why is there a need to use statistical models in the first place? The answer is that the USG has made it impossible to obtain an accurate accounting. Even the final casualty figures from the US bombing of Japan range widely.

Statistical models are the only recourse to getting some kind of accounting. But such models are always going to be flawed. Even the degree to which they are flawed cannot be known.