Quote of the Week: Vladimir Soloviev*
Moral principle, which is essentially recognized by all normal people (although on different grounds and with different degrees of precision), affirms that human dignity must be respected in each person, and that, therefore, it is not possible to make anyone whatsoever only a means or an instrument for anyone’s use. But in the theory of deterrence, the punished criminal is ultimately considered to all intents and purposes as only a means of instilling fear in others for the sake of the preservation of public security. In fact, if the criminal’s own good also entered into the purpose of criminal law — keeping him from committing a crime by the fear of threat of punishment — then once it is already committed, this motive falls away on its own. And from this point of view, the criminal who is punished is left only as a means for the deterrence of others, that is, for a purpose extraneous to himself, which now directly contradicts an absolute moral requirement. From this aspect, deterrent punishment would be permissible only as a threat; but a threat never acted upon loses all meaning. Thus the principle of deterrent punishment could be morally permissible only under conditions of its uselessness, and it can be materially useful only under condition of its immoral application.
In fact, the cutting edge of the theory of deterrence has been completely blunted. The theory should be considered as having laid down its arms from the time that physical torture punishments and qualified death sentences were abolished in all civilized and semicivilized countries. It is clear that if the task of punishment consists in the instilling of fear and horror in individuals who are liable to commit crimes, then the brutal means themselves would also be valid and expedient. Why do the advocates of deterrence reject what from their point of view should be recognized as the very best thing? It must be assumed that it is because these measures, superlative as regards to deterrence, are, however, recognized as impermissible, as immoral and contrary to the requirements of compassion and love of fellowmen. But in such an event, deterrence now stops being the determining or decisive principle of punishment. It’s one of two things: either the chief meaning of punishment is deterrence, and then agonizing punishments must be allowed as measures which most correspond to this meaning, as being those which chiefly produce fear; or the character of punishment, above and beyond practical utility, should conform with moral principle, which decides what is permitted and what is not permitted, and then it is necessary to reject the principle of deterrence itself completely as an essentially immoral motive, or impermissible from a moral point of view.
–Vladimir Soloviev, Politics, Law & Morality: Essays by V. Soloviev. trans. Vladimir Wozniuk (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 170.
* I am using the transliteration of his name used for this book, though I prefer to use Solovyov when I write on him.
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It is interesting to see that I was going to have this posted tomorrow, but with the discussions of deterrence engaged on the blog today, I thought it was important to put it on today instead.
I would highly recommend Solovyov’s works on moral philosophy, such as his Justification of the Good. I am certain much of his work has helped influence modern moral theology and has found itself in the thought of Pope John Paul II in his understanding of the Gospel of Life; whether it is a direct or indirect influence, I am not sure.
This is a false dichotomy. Deterrence need not override all other considerations in order to perform useful work as a consideration. In this case, deterrence can be (and is) legitimately bounded by certain moral principles: but within those bounds, it is a legitimate and relevant factor to take into account when shaping policy.
Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument would prohibit a parent from punishing his or her child for bad behavior.
Listless Lawyer
I would suggest you read the argument once more. The point is a person is of such dignity and honor that we cannot overcome that dignity and honor and turn them into mere instruments or tools, which is the point if you look at criminal punishment as a detterent instead of something else, such as correction and their eventual restoration to society.
Solovyov is not against punishment, but his point is that some aspects of the legal system are immoral, and one of it is detterence because of how it ignores human, personal dignity. You might be interested in reading the quote in context — which discusses the possible use of force, for example, and where it is moral and where it would not be (thus, he points out, just holding someone down and preventing them from action is a use of force).
Thus we get to your issue with parents. If their desire is not personal correction but to use their children as examples — something is wrong. That’s not child raising. That’s child abuse.
I would agree that deterrence shouldn’t be the sole or even primary basis for punishment, for the reasons Solovyov states here. The question is whether it can be an appropriate subsidiary purpose. On that point I would answer yes. There are a range of punishments that might be appropriate for a given crime, and in choosing between them, I see no reason why the comparative deterrent effect of the different punishments shouldn’t be taken into account (I would say something similar for rehabilitation).
Certainly there are many ways one can talk about deterrence; indeed, as Solovyov also points out, one could suggest that the moral transformation of the criminal to non-criminal is, in part, deterrence, since once they follow through and act out as moral instead of a-moral persons, their criminal behavior will have been abolished. I do not think anyone would even be upset at the fact that deterrence happens as an accident to one’s criminal system — the problem is when, as you point out, it beomes the sole or primary understanding of the penal system, but it still is a problem when you think it can be used in any way other than an accident, because once again, you begin to affirm the de-personalization of humanity when you do so.
That’s a darn good argument against using the deterrence factor as the sole basis for the death penalty. I hadn’t thought of that before. Thanks for posting. I’m sure I’ll be using that one.
Kyle
When you have the time, and if you want to explore Solovyov’s thought further, you should check out his work on crime and punishment in the Solovyov Anthology, Justification of the Good, or Politics, Law & Morality. It’s through his discussion I was able, years ago, to understand the way life issues are all inter-related.