Dead Traditionism and Life Issues
Between the Council of Ephesus and the Council of III Constantinople, there was a significant development of Christological doctrine. Terminology became more precise, causing the meaning of different theological words to change over time. St Cyril of Alexandria’s correct but loose “one incarnate nature,” was orthodox, but only if one understood his definition of “nature” or “phusis.” After Chalcedon, where the distinction between “phusis” and “hypostasis” had become clearer, one could no longer say “one incarnate nature” without it meaning something quite different from St Cyril’s definition, but the critics of Chalcedon read the words of St Cyril with the new, developed meaning of “phusis” or nature after Chalcedon. They did this to reject Chalcedon, claiming the council was in error because it had rejected orthodox Christological tradition. They did not understand how they were reading the writings of Cyril anachronistically. Both sides of the debate had changed and developed. Yet, one side was more understanding of the significance of linguistic change and was capable of reading and interpreting the past properly, so they could see the true meaning of the less-sophisticated terminology and show its accord with the newer, more nuanced insight of later doctrine. The other was stuck in their present while misreading the past, incapable of understanding why developed meanings must not be placed upon texts written into the past. They were tied to specific words, the letter of the law as it was read in their time, instead of the meaning, while the Church always is interested in the meaning and its proper presentation, and never completely tied to the words if the words no longer signified the same meanings.
This problem is a common one when people are trying to understand what the Church teaches. Often there is an apparent contradiction in the way the Church teaches with the way it taught in the past. We need only look to the controversy around the filioque to see how divisive this can be. While it is important to look to tradition, for it shows where we come from and the record of our theological development, one who does so must always be careful to read it properly, understanding the development and not misreading the past. One must read the past in accord with the Church, not as a way to fight against the Church. This does not mean one cannot or should not look to the past as a means of understanding the present and even questioning the present; when this is done, however, it should be done for the sake of elaboration rather than contradiction (a good example of this in history would be Neo-Chalcedonian thought, which reengaged the thought of St Cyril and Ephesus with Chalcedon, to make sure the two coincide and neither side betrayed the other).
Now why do I bring this up here? Because it is a reminder to everyone that we should listen to and follow the Church even if we think the Church today is contradicting the Church in the past. Traditionism has always had the problem of misunderstanding the past; it is a response to the internal development of the Church by reacting to it, reacting in a way that they do not understand either the meaning of the Church’s word in the past, the meaning of the Church’s word in the present, or both. Nor do they really appreciate the way of the Fathers and Doctors and Popes they quote. For theology is always an active engagement with tradition, consistently developing and never final; it is living; it always works to reinterpret the Apostolic tradition so it can be properly understood in its present circumstance. The Fathers and Doctors of the Church understood this (as can be seen how they applied this truth to their own writings). Meyendorff explains this well, “…dead traditionalism cannot be truly traditional. It is an essential characteristic of patristic theology that it was able to face the challenges of its own time while remaining consistent with the original apostolic Orthodox faith. Thus simply to repeatwhat the Fathers said is to be unfaithful to their spirit and to the intention embodied in their theology,” John Meyendorff, Living Tradition(Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1978),7.
This is why, when people bring up texts from the past about what was allowed in issues of war or the death penalty, without understanding the context of those writings (i.e., other texts which contradict their interpretations of the texts they use) or the fact that theological questions have been asked recently which had not yet been examined in those times, they demonstrate they do not understand what it means to follow tradition. The Church has always been pro-life. She has always seen that all life is a divine gift. That all human people are made in the image and likeness of God, making their life of intrinsic value which cannot be or should not be snuffed out. Ancient writers were concerned with abortion, but they were also concerned with other issues of life. Reading the ante-Nicenes and their debates with the pagan rulers of Rome will make this very clear. But what united each issue was not always seen or understood, and some aspects of life were treated more clearly and succinctly than others. This did not mean the Church was not pro-life, but it had not been challenged to look at life as a theological and moral doctrine of its own – until modern times. The challenge of the great world wars, eugenics, and the rise of a culture of death has caused the Church to look to life in a new, more sophisticated manner. This does not mean it is contradicting its past, rather, it means it is taking the pro-life seeds of the past and clarifying them, and even recognizing the failure she has had, in her own part, to live out its proper heritage. It also understands that the new world situation we live in also limits the needs of extreme measures, so that she can, in the past, defend more extreme measures (as dispensations) than she can in the present when they are not needed. She is more aware of what life is, its dignity, and our ability to follow it today, and as such, requires more of us, not in contradiction with the past, but in complete accordance with her traditional theological anthropology.
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It would be helpful if you would clearly define,in time, phusis and hypostasis.Are we dealing with phusis in the ancient sense or the developed one rejected by heidegger ?Secondly ,not being a theologian nor student of ancient languages doesthe “hypostasis” in question clearly differentiate essence and being?
WE or at least I am the general public,you’ll have to alter your articles for a general posting.
Jim.
The Christological question relies upon the unity of Christ while understanding his two natures. The term eventually used for the united person was “hypostasis.” Phusis eventually became the used used for nature (there are good reasons for this, but the linguistic issues get complex). Earlier understanding of hypostasis (which was eventually translated as persona or person) allowed it to be seen as the same as “nature” — i.e., phusis.
Thus, the Trinity says there are three hypostases in one ousia; but later understanding is that ousia is of the divine phusis (divine nature).
Hence, when St Cyril, described the united person of Christ, he says there is “one incarnate nature.” He is describing the united of the person of Christ. He is not going against what would eventually be described at Chalcedon. His ability to come into an agreement with the Antiochians helps demonstrate this quite well. But a later dispute happened when “nature” became distinct from “hypostasis.” Then, one has to say there is one hypostasis but two natures, (Man and God). But Eutyches and others like him said this went against this, saying that the earlier definition of the Fathers must be kept in literal word.
I find the catechism of the Church pretty clear on the matters of the death penalty and just war and consistent with my understanding of earlier writings, does that mean I’m one of the few that can properly understand the “arcane” language of the earlier Church? The reality is my disagreement on just war and the death penalty is not with the Church but with various commentators, and mostly it’s about prudential facts.
I think you’re trying to back door doctrinal evolution by saying that what “modern theologians” say is really the same as what the Church has always taught but just in “arcane” language. Denied.
God Bless,
Matt
“Ithink you’re trying to back door doctrinal evolution by saying that what “modern theologians” say is really the same as what the Church has always taught but just in “arcane” language. Denied.”
Alright, Eutyches… or is it Photius? Maybe it’s Mark of Ephesus I hear in there. No, wait, I know, it’s Martin Luther!
Mr. Karlson,
thank you for the explanation.
Good post, Henry.
On a analogous point, It would be interesting to explore how the interpretation of the “person” has evolved over the years, both as to its theological origins and its philosophical enrichment.
Jim (I take that is your name, I hope I am right).
You are welcome. Sometimes I write things quickly, and trying to keep the text down, don’t know how much details I should give. If you ever think there is something which needs further explanation such as that, always let me know.
Gerald
That is always a good discussion. It’s a complex one, to be sure, with many twists and turns (and I don’t know all of them, nor do I think, does anyone yet).
While he was here posting, Anxietas did some good posts on the topic. If you have not seen them before, you might want to look at all he posted, since much of it was directly related to this question. http://vox-nova.com/category/anxietas/
It is quite probable, in a few months, I will write something on it, although I admit, until my dissertation is finished, I am trying to limit any serious engagement on the topic of the person, because it is one of the central issues being discussed in the dissertation itself and I want to make sure I don’t burn out on the topic before the dissertation is finished.