New York Ruling On Same Sex Marriage
Since I’m not a lawyer, my understanding could be and probably is fallacious. My understanding was that the State in which a marriage occurred was the one that had standing to adjudicate disputes regarding marital rights. Pursuant to that, a court could accept jurisdiction on a case if a) both parties consented, b) both parties agreed to be governed by the laws of that court and c) the relationship would have or could have otherwise been created in like manner in the jurisdiction. Hence, I’m confused on how an appellate court in New York could rule that a private company needs to recognize a same-sex marriage performed in Canada and therefore provide benefits to the spouse.
Even though gay couples may not legally marry in New York, the appellate court in Rochester held that a gay couple’s 2004 marriage in Canada must be respected under the state’s longstanding “marriage recognition rule,” and that an employer’s denial of health benefits had discriminated against the couple on the basis of their sexual orientation.
“The Legislature may decide to prohibit the recognition of same-sex marriages solemnized abroad,” a five-judge panel of the Appellate Division of State Supreme Court ruled unanimously in rejecting a 2006 lower court decision. “Until it does so, however, such marriages are entitled to recognition in New York.”
Update:
For well over a century, New York has recognized marriages solemnized outside of New York unless they fall into two categories of exception: (1) marriage, the recognition of which is prohibited by the “positive law” of New York and (2) marriages involving incest or polygamy, both of which fall within the prohibitions of “natural law” (Matter of May, 305 NY 486, 491; see Moore v Hegeman, 92 NY 521, 524; Thorp v Thorp, 90 NY 602, 605; see generally Van Voorhis v Brintnall, 86 NY 18, 24-26). Thus, if a marriage is valid in the place where it was entered, “it is to be recognized as such in the courts of this State, unless contrary to the prohibitions of natural law or the express prohibitions of a statute” (Moore, 92 NY at 524; see also Thorp, 90 NY at 606; Van Voorhis, 86 NY at 25-26). Under that “marriage-recognition” rule, New York has recognized a marriage between an uncle and his niece “by the half blood” (May, 305 NY at 488), common-law marriages valid under the laws of other states (see Matter of Mott v Duncan Petroleum Trans., 51 NY2d 289, 292-293), a marriage valid under the law of the Province of Ontario, Canada of a man and a woman both under the age of 18 (see Donohue v Donohue, 63 Misc 111, 112-113), and a “proxy marriage” valid in the District of Columbia (Fernandes v Fernandes, 275 App Div 777), all of which would have been invalid if solemnized in New York. We conclude that plaintiff’s marriage does not fall within either of the two exceptions to the marriage-recognition rule. “[A]bsent any New York statute expressing clearly the Legislature’s intent to regulate within this State marriages of its domiciliaries solemnized abroad, there is no positive law in this jurisdiction” to prohibit recognition of a marriage that would have been invalid if solemnized in New York (May, 305 NY at 493 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Van Voorhis, 86 NY at 37). The Legislature has not enacted legislation to prohibit the recognition of same-sex marriages validly entered into outside of New York, and we thus conclude that the positive law exception to the general rule of foreign marriage recognition is not applicable in this case.
The natural law exception also is not applicable. That exception has generally been limited to marriages involving polygamy or incest or marriages “offensive to the public sense of morality to a degree regarded generally with abhorrence” (May, 305 NY at 493), and that cannot be said here.
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The law requiring New York employers to give health benefits to spouses is undoubtedly a New York law. So that’s how the New York courts got a hold of the case.
M.Z. – I believe that your understanding of the law here is wrong. A court has authority/jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes of marital rights of any person within the state (subject to certain residency requirements), regardless of where the marriage occured. The court also has jurisdiction to resolve property disputes if the property exists within the state, even if the parties are not resident.
So, a NY court making a decision about “marital” rights of NY residents can come to this conclusion. Generally, the court making the decision will ask whether the couples met the requirements for a civil marriage in the place they claim to have been married, and then will resolve the disputes according to law of the residence/domicile. It is possible (esp. when dealing with inter-national as opposed to simply inter-state) for a state to have a law or public policy to not recognize certain marriages, as many states do with various “Defense of Marriage Acts” out there.
But, in general, a NY court would not be on the fringe for determining that a couple, even same-sex, “married” in Canda could claim marital benefits in NY.
My understanding of the law being wrong would be a perfectly acceptable answer.
What has thrown me for a loop is the article claims that the company couldn’t make the claim that the spouse wasn’t a spouse due to NY law against discrimination. It just seems goofy to me, because my understanding is that NY Courts would refuse to adjudicate a same-sex divorce because the couple could not be married under NY law. Since this is on appeal, it sounds like the Supreme Court (lowest court in New York, confusing I know) ruled that the spouse didn’t have standing to make a claim against the employer. For the Appeals court to rule that establishing standing as a spouse is a form of discrimination seems like circular logic. I’ll have to see if I can find the actually ruling. Maybe it will make more sense then.
“Pursuit to that, …”
I think you want “Pursuant” here …
If only spell checkers could correct for what I wanted to say… :-)
Thanks Stephen.